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<front>
<title abbrev=" Quantum abbrev="Quantum Internet Application Scenarios">Application Scenarios for the Quantum Internet</title>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9583"/>
<author initials="C." surname="Wang" fullname="Chonggang Wang">
<organization>InterDigital Communications, LLC</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street>1001 E Hector St</street>
<city>Conshohocken</city>
<region>PA</region>
<code>19428</code>
<country>USA</country>
<region></region>
<country>United States of America</country>
</postal>
<phone></phone>
<email>Chonggang.Wang@InterDigital.com</email>
<uri></uri>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="A." surname="Rahman" fullname="Akbar Rahman">
<organization>Ericsson</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street>349 Terry Fox Drive</street>
<city>Ottawa Ontario</city>
<city>Ottawa</city>
<region>Ontario</region>
<code>K2K 2V6</code>
<country>Canada</country>
<region></region>
</postal>
<phone></phone>
<email>Akbar.Rahman@Ericsson.Com</email>
<uri></uri>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="R." surname="Li" fullname="Ruidong Li">
<organization>Kanazawa University</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street>Kakuma-machi</street>
<city>Kanazawa City</city>
<code>Ishikawa Prefecture 920-1192</code>
<street>Kakumamachi, Kanazawa</street>
<region>Ishikawa</region>
<code>920-1192</code>
<country>Japan</country>
<region></region>
</postal>
<phone></phone>
<email>lrd@se.kanazawa-u.ac.jp</email>
<uri></uri>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="M." surname="Aelmans" fullname="Melchior Aelmans">
<organization>Juniper Networks</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street>Boeing Avenue 240</street>
<city>Schiphol-Rijk</city>
<code>1119 PZ</code>
<country>The Netherlands</country>
<region/>
<country>Netherlands</country>
</postal>
<phone/>
<email>maelmans@juniper.net</email>
<uri/>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="K." surname="Chakraborty" fullname="Kaushik Chakraborty">
<organization>The University of Edinburgh</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street>10 Crichton Street</street>
<city>Edinburgh</city>
<city>Edinburgh, Scotland</city>
<code>EH8 9AB, Scotland</code>
<country>UK</country>
<region></region> 9AB</code>
<country>United Kingdom</country>
</postal>
<phone></phone>
<email>kchakrab@exseed.edu.ac.uk</email>
<uri></uri>
<email>kaushik.chakraborty9@gmail.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<date year="2023" month="October" day="16"/>
<area>Internet Research Task Force (IRTF)</area> year="2024" month="June"/>
<workgroup>QIRG</workgroup>
<keyword>Quantum Key Distribution</keyword>
<keyword>Blind Quantum Computing</keyword>
<keyword>Distributed Quantum Computing</keyword>
<keyword>Entanglement Distribution</keyword>
<keyword>Quantum Internet Requirement</keyword>
<abstract>
<t>
The
<t>The Quantum Internet has the potential to improve application
functionality by incorporating quantum information technology into the
infrastructure of the overall Internet. This document provides an
overview of some applications expected to be used on the Quantum
Internet and categorizes them. Some general requirements for the Quantum
Internet are also discussed. The intent of this document is to describe
a framework for applications, applications and to describe a few selected application
scenarios for the Quantum Internet.This Internet. This document is a product of the
Quantum Internet Research Group (QIRG).
</t> (QIRG).</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<middle>
<section anchor="sec:introduction" title="Introduction">
<t>
The anchor="sec_introduction" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Introduction</name>
<t>The Classical, i.e., non-quantum, Internet has been constantly
growing since it first became commercially popular in the early 1990's. 1990s.
It essentially consists of a large number of end nodes (e.g., laptops,
smart phones, and network servers) connected by routers and clustered in
Autonomous Systems. The end nodes may run applications that provide
service for the end users such as processing and transmission of voice, video
video, or data. The connections between the various nodes in the
Internet include backbone links (e.g., fiber optics) and access links
(e.g., fiber optics, WiFi, Wi-Fi, cellular wireless, and Digital Subscriber
Lines (DSLs)). Bits are transmitted across the Classical Internet in
packets.
</t>
<t>
Research
<t>Research and experiments have picked up over the last few years for
developing the Quantum Internet <xref target="Wehner" />.
format="default"/>. End nodes will also be a part of the Quantum Internet,
Internet; in that case case, they are called quantum "quantum end nodes that nodes" and may be connected by
quantum repeaters/routers. repeaters and/or routers. These quantum end nodes will also run
value-added applications applications, which will be discussed later.
</t>
<t>
The
<t>The physical layer quantum channels between the various nodes in the
Quantum Internet can be either waveguides waveguides, such as optical fibers fibers, or free
space. Photonic channels are particularly useful because light
(photons) is very suitable for physically realizing qubits. The Quantum
Internet will operate according to quantum physical principles such as
quantum superposition and entanglement <xref target="RFC9340" />.
format="default"/>.
</t>
<t>
The
<t>The Quantum Internet is not anticipated to replace, replace but rather to
enhance the Classical Internet and/or provide breakthrough
applications. For instance,
quantum key distribution Quantum Key Distribution can improve the
security of the Classical Internet; Internet, and quantum computing can expedite and
optimize computation-intensive tasks in the Classical Internet. The
Quantum Internet will run in conjunction with the Classical
Internet. The process of integrating the Quantum Internet with the
Classical Internet is similar to the process of introducing any new
communication and networking paradigm into the existing Internet, Internet but
with more profound implications.
</t>
<t>
The
<t>The intent of this document is to provide a common understanding and
framework of applications and application scenarios for the Quantum
Internet. It is noted that ITU-T SG13-TD158/WP3 <xref target="ITUT"/> target="ITUT"
format="default"/> briefly describes four kinds of use cases of quantum
networks beyond quantum key distribution Quantum Key Distribution networks: quantum time
synchronization use cases, quantum computing use cases, quantum random
number generator use cases, and quantum communication use cases (e.g.,
quantum digital signatures, quantum anonymous transmission, and quantum
money). This document focuses on quantum applications that have more
impact on networking networking, such as secure communication setup, blind quantum
computing, and distributed quantum computing; although these
applications were mentioned in <xref target="ITUT"/>, target="ITUT" format="default"/>,
this document gives more details and derives some requirements from
a networking perspective.
</t>
<t>This document was produced by the Quantum Internet Research Group(QIRG).
Group (QIRG). It was discussed on the QIRG mailing list and during several
meetings of the Research Group. research group. It has been reviewed extensively by the
QIRG members with expertise in both quantum physics and classical Classical
Internet operation. This document represents the consensus of the QIRG
members, of both experts in the subject matter (from the quantum and
networking domains) and newcomers newcomers, who are the target audience. It is
not an IETF product and is not a standard.
</t>
</section>
<section anchor="sec:acronyms" title="Terms anchor="sec_acronyms" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Terms and Acronyms List">
<t>
This List</name>
<t>This document assumes that the reader is familiar with the quantum information technology related terms and
concepts that are relate to quantum information technology described in
<xref target="RFC9340" />. format="default"/>. In addition, the following
terms and acronyms are defined herein for clarity:
</t>
<t>
<list style="symbols">
<t>Bell Pairs – A
<dl spacing="normal">
<dt>Bell Pairs:</dt><dd>A special type of two-qubits quantum state. state that is two
qubits. The two qubits show a correlation that cannot be observed in
classical information theory. We refer to such correlation as
quantum entanglement. Bell pairs exhibit the maximal quantum
entanglement. One example of a Bell pair is (|00>+|11>)/(Sqrt(2)).
(|00>+|11>)/(Sqrt(2)). The Bell pairs are a fundamental
resource for quantum communication. </t>
<t>Bit - Binary Digit communication.</dd>
<dt>Bit:</dt><dd>Binary digit (i.e., fundamental unit of information in
classical communications and classical computing). Bit is used in
the Classical Internet where the state of a bit is deterministic. In
contrast, Qubit qubit is used in the Quantum Internet where the state of a
qubit is uncertain before it is measured. </t>
<t>Classical Internet - The measured.</dd>
<dt>Classical Internet:</dt><dd>The existing, deployed Internet (circa 2020)
where bits are transmitted in packets between nodes to convey
information. The Classical Internet supports applications which that may
be enhanced by the Quantum Internet. For example, the end-to-end
security of a Classical Internet application may be improved by
a secure communication setup using a quantum application. Classical
Internet is a network of classical network nodes which that do not
support quantum information technology. In contrast, Quantum
Internet consists of quantum nodes based on quantum information technology. </t>
<!--<t>DSL - Digital Subscriber Line</t>-->
<!--<t>GUI - Graphical User Interface</t>-->
<t>Entanglement Swapping: It
technology.</dd>
<dt>Entanglement Swapping:</dt><dd>It is a process of sharing an
entanglement between two distant parties via some intermediate
nodes. For example, suppose that there are three parties A, (A, B, C, and
C) and that each of the parties (A, B) and (B, C) share Bell
pairs. B can use the qubits it shares with A and C to perform entanglement swapping
entanglement-swapping operations, and as a result, A and C share
Bell pairs. Entanglement swapping essentially realizes entanglement
distribution (i.e., two nodes separated in distance can share a Bell pair). </t>
<t>Fast
pair).</dd>
<dt>Fast Byzantine Negotiation - A Quantum-based Negotiation:</dt><dd>A quantum-based method for
fast agreement in Byzantine negotiations <xref target="Ben-Or" />
format="default"/> <xref target="Taherkhani" />. </t>
<!--<t>Hybrid Internet - The "new" or evolved Internet to be formed due to a merger of the Classical Internet and the Quantum Internet.</t> -->
<t>Local
format="default"/>.</dd>
<dt>Local Operations and Classical Communication (LOCC) - A (LOCC):</dt><dd>A
method where nodes communicate in rounds, in which (1) they can send
any classical information to each other; other, (2) they can perform local
quantum operations individually; individually, and (3) the actions performed in
each round can depend on the results from previous rounds. </t>
<t>Noisy rounds.</dd>
<dt>Noisy Intermediate-Scale Quantum (NISQ) - NISQ (NISQ):</dt><dd>NISQ was
defined in <xref target="Preskill"/> target="Preskill" format="default"/> to represent a
near-term era in quantum technology. According to this definition,
NISQ computers have two salient features: (1) The the size of NISQ
computers range from 50 to a few hundred physical qubits (i.e., intermediate-scale);
intermediate-scale) and (2) Qubits qubits in NISQ computers have inherent
errors and the control over them is imperfect (i.e., noisy).</t>
<t> Packet - A noisy).</dd>
<dt>Packet:</dt><dd>A self-identified message with in-band addresses
or other information that can be used for forwarding the
message. The message contains an ordered set of bits of determinate
number. The bits contained in a packet are classical bits. </t>
<!--<t>Packet - Formatted unit of multiple related bits. The bits contained in a packet may be classical bits, or the measured state of qubits expressed in classical bits.</t> -->
<t>Prepare-and-Measure - A bits.</dd>
<dt>Prepare and Measure:</dt><dd>A set of Quantum Internet scenarios where
quantum nodes only support simple quantum functionalities (i.e.,
prepare qubits and measure qubits). For example, BB84 <xref target="BB84"/>
target="BB84" format="default"/> is a prepare-and-measure quantum
key distribution protocol.
</t>
<t>Quantum protocol.</dd>
<dt>Quantum Computer (QC) - A (QC):</dt><dd>A quantum end node that also has
quantum memory and quantum computing capabilities is regarded as a
full-fledged quantum
computer.</t>
<t>Quantum computer.</dd>
<dt>Quantum End Node - An Node:</dt><dd>An end node that hosts user
applications and interfaces with the rest of the Internet.
Typically, an end node may serve in a client, server, or
peer-to-peer role as part of the application. A quantum end node
must also be able to interface to the Classical Internet for control
purposes and thus also be able to receive, process, and transmit
classical bits/packets.</t>
<t>Quantum Internet - A bits and/or packets.</dd>
<dt>Quantum Internet:</dt><dd>A network of Quantum Networks. quantum networks. The
Quantum Internet is expected to be merged into the Classical
Internet. The Quantum Internet may either improve classical
applications or may enable new quantum applications.</t>
<t>Quantum applications.</dd>
<dt>Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) - A (QKD):</dt><dd>A method that leverages
quantum mechanics such as a no-cloning theorem to let two parties
create the same arbitrary classical key.</t>
<!--<t>Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) - A method that leverages quantum mechanics such as no-cloning theorem to let two parties (e.g., a sender and a receiver) securely establish/agree on a key.</t> -->
<t>Quantum Network - A key.</dd>
<dt>Quantum Network:</dt><dd>A new type of network enabled by quantum
information technology where quantum resources resources, such as qubits and entanglement
entanglement, are transferred and utilized between quantum nodes.
The Quantum Network quantum network will use both quantum channels, channels and classical
channels provided by the Classical Internet, referred to as a hybrid implementation. </t>
<!--<t>Quantum Network - A new type of network enabled by quantum information technology where qubits are transmitted between nodes to convey information.
(Note: qubits must be sent individually and not in packets). The Quantum Network will use both quantum channels, and classical channels provided
by the Classical Internet.</t>-->
<t>Quantum Teleportation - A "hybrid
implementation".</dd>
<dt>Quantum Teleportation:</dt><dd>A technique for transferring
quantum information via local operations Local Operations and classical communication Classical Communication
(LOCC). If two parties share a Bell pair, then by using quantum teleportation
teleportation, a sender can transfer a quantum data bit to a receiver
without sending it physically via a quantum channel.
</t>
<t>Qubit - Quantum Bit channel.</dd>
<dt>Qubit:</dt><dd>Quantum bit (i.e., fundamental unit of
information in quantum communication and quantum computing). It is
similar to a classic bit in that the state of a qubit is either "0"
or "1" after it is measured, measured and is denoted as denotes its basis state vector |0> as
|0> or |1> |1> using Dirac's ket notation. However, the qubit is
different than a classic bit in that the qubit can be in a linear
combination of both states before it is measured and termed to be in
superposition. Any of several Degrees of Freedom (DOF) of a photon
(e.g., polarization, time bib, and/or frequency) or an electron
(e.g., spin) can be used to encode a qubit.</t>
<!--<t>VoIP - Voice Over IP</t>-->
<t>Transmit qubit.</dd>
<dt>Teleport a Qubit - An operation of encoding a qubit into a mobile carrier (i.e., typically photon) and passing it through a quantum channel from
a sender (a transmitter) to a receiver.</t>
<t>Teleport a Qubit - An Qubit:</dt><dd>An operation on two or more carriers in
succession to move a qubit from a sender to a receiver using quantum teleportation. </t>
<t>Transfer
teleportation.</dd>
<dt>Transfer a Qubit - An Qubit:</dt><dd>An operation to move a qubit from a sender to
a receiver without specifying the means of moving the qubit, which
could be “transmit” "transmit" or “teleport”.</t>
</list>
</t> "teleport".</dd>
<dt>Transmit a Qubit:</dt><dd>An operation to encode a qubit into a mobile
carrier (i.e., typically photon) and pass it through a quantum
channel from a sender (a transmitter) to a receiver.</dd>
</dl>
</section>
<section anchor="sec:applications" title="Quantum anchor="sec_applications" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Quantum Internet Applications">
<t>
The Applications</name>
<t>The Quantum Internet is expected to be beneficial for a subset of
existing and new applications. The expected applications for the
Quantum Internet are still being developed as we are in the formative
stages of the Quantum Internet <xref target="Castelvecchi" />
format="default"/> <xref target="Wehner" />. format="default"/>. However,
an initial (and non-exhaustive) list of the applications to be supported
on the Quantum Internet can be identified and classified using two
different schemes. Note, Note that this document does not include quantum
computing applications that are purely local to a given node.
<!--We use "applications" in the widest sense of the word and include functionality typically contained in Layers 4
(Transport) to Layers 7 (Application) of the Open System Interconnect (OSI) model. --> </t>
<t>Applications may be grouped by the usage that they serve.
Specifically, applications may be grouped according to the following
categories:
<list style="symbols">
<t>Quantum
</t>
<dl spacing="normal">
<dt>Quantum cryptography applications - Refer applications:</dt><dd>Refer to the use of
quantum information technology for cryptographic tasks (e.g., quantum key distribution
Quantum Key Distribution <xref target="Renner" />).</t>
<t>Quantum sensors applications - Refer
format="default"/>).</dd>
<dt>Quantum sensor applications:</dt><dd>Refer to the use of
quantum information technology for supporting distributed sensors
(e.g., clock synchronization <xref target="Jozsa2000"/> target="Jozsa2000"
format="default"/> <xref target="Komar" /> format="default"/> <xref
target="Guo" /> ).</t>
<t>Quantum format="default"/>).</dd>
<dt>Quantum computing applications - Refer applications:</dt><dd>Refer to the use of
quantum information technology for supporting remote quantum
computing facilities (e.g., distributed quantum computing <xref
target="Denchev" />).</t>
</list>
This format="default"/>).</dd>
</dl>
<t>This scheme can be easily understood by both a technical and
non-technical audience. The next sections describe the scheme in more
detail.
</t>
<section anchor="sec:typeofquantumcrypto" title="Quantum anchor="sec_typeofquantumcrypto" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Quantum Cryptography Applications"> Applications</name>
<t> Examples of quantum cryptography applications include quantum-based secure communication setup and fast Byzantine negotiation.
<list style="numbers">
<t>Secure
</t>
<dl spacing="normal">
<dt>Secure communication setup - Refers setup:</dt><dd>Refers to secure
cryptographic key distribution between two or more end nodes. The
most well-known method is referred to as Quantum "Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) (QKD)"
<xref target="Renner" />.</t>
<t>Fast format="default"/>.</dd>
<dt>Fast Byzantine negotiation - Refers negotiation:</dt><dd>Refers to a Quantum-based quantum-based
method for fast agreement in Byzantine negotiations <xref
target="Ben-Or" />, format="default"/>, for example, to reduce the
number of expected communication rounds and and, in turn turn, to achieve
faster agreement, in contrast to classical Byzantine negotiations. A quantum aided
quantum-aided Byzantine agreement on quantum repeater networks as
proposed in <xref target="Taherkhani" /> format="default"/> includes
optimization techniques to greatly reduce the quantum circuit depth
and the number of qubits in each node. Quantum-based methods for
fast agreement in Byzantine negotiations can be used for improving
consensus protocols such as practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance(pBFT),
Tolerance (pBFT) as well as other distributed computing features which
that use Byzantine negotiations.</t>
<t>Quantum money - The negotiations.</dd>
<dt>Quantum money:</dt><dd>Refers to the main security requirement
of money is unforgeability. A quantum money scheme aims to fulfill by exploiting exploit
the no-cloning property of the unknown quantum states. Though the
original idea of quantum money dates back to 1970, these early
protocols allow only the issuing bank to verify a quantum
banknote. However, the recent protocols such as public-key public key quantum
money <xref target ="Zhandry" /> target="Zhandry" format="default"/> allow anyone to
verify the banknotes locally.</t>
</list>
</t> locally.</dd>
</dl>
</section>
<section anchor="sec:typeofquantumsensor" title="Quantum Sensing/Metrology Applications">
<t> The anchor="sec_typeofquantumsensor" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Quantum Sensing and Metrology Applications</name>
<t>The entanglement, superposition, interference, and squeezing of
properties can enhance the sensitivity of the quantum sensors and
eventually can outperform the classical strategies. Examples of
quantum sensor applications include network clock synchronization, high sensitivity
high-sensitivity sensing, etc. These applications mainly leverage a
network of entangled quantum sensors (i.e. (i.e., quantum sensor networks)
for high-precision multi-parameter high-precision, multiparameter estimation <xref target="Proctor" />.
<list style="numbers">
<t>Network
format="default"/>.
</t>
<dl spacing="normal">
<dt>Network clock synchronization - Refers synchronization:</dt><dd>Refers to a world wide
set of high-precision clocks connected by the Quantum Internet to
achieve an ultra precise clock signal <xref target="Komar" />
format="default"/> with fundamental precision limits set by quantum theory.</t>
<t>High sensitivity sensing - Refers
theory.</dd>
<dt>High-sensitivity sensing:</dt><dd>Refers to applications that
leverage quantum phenomena to achieve reliable nanoscale sensing of
physical magnitudes. For example, <xref target="Guo" />
format="default"/> uses an entangled quantum network for measuring
the average phase shift among multiple distributed nodes.</t>
<!--<t>Quantum imaging - The highly sensitive quantum sensors show great potential in improving the domain of magnetoencephalography. Unlike the current classical strategies,
with the help of a network of nodes.</dd>
<dt>Interferometric telescopes using quantum sensors, it is possible information:</dt><dd>
Refers to measure the magnetic fields generated by the flow of current through neuronal assemblies in
the brain while the subject is moving. It reveals the dynamics of the networks of neurons inside the human brain on a millisecond timescale. This kind of
imaging capability could improve the diagnosis and monitoring the conditions like attention-deficit-hyperactivity disorder <xref target="Hill" />. </t> -->
<t> Interferometric Telescopes using Quantum Information - Interferometric interferometric techniques that are used to combine
signals from two or more telescopes to obtain measurements with
higher resolution than what could be obtained with either telescope
individually. It can make measurements of very small astronomical
objects if the telescopes are spread out over a wide area. However,
the phase fluctuations and photon loss introduced by the
communication channel between the telescopes put a limitation on the
baseline lengths of the optical interferometers. This limitation can be
potentially be avoided using quantum teleportation. In general, by
sharing EPR-pairs Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen pairs using quantum repeaters, the
optical interferometers can communicate photons over long distances,
providing arbitrarily long baselines <xref target="Gottesman2012" />. </t>
</list>
</t>
format="default"/>.</dd>
</dl>
</section>
<section anchor="sec:typeofquantumcomputing" title="Quantum anchor="sec_typeofquantumcomputing" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Quantum Computing Applications">
<t> In Applications</name>
<t>In this section, we include the applications for the quantum
computing. It's anticipated that quantum computers as a cloud service
will become more available in future. Sometimes, to run such
applications in the cloud while preserving the privacy, a client and a
server need to exchange qubits (e.g., in blind quantum computation
<xref target="Fitzsimons"/> target="Fitzsimons" format="default"/> as described
below). Therefore, such privacy preserving quantum computing
applications require a Quantum Internet to execute. </t>
<t> Examples of quantum computing include distributed quantum
computing and blind quantum computing, which can enable new types of
cloud computing.
<list style="numbers">
<t>Distributed
</t>
<dl spacing="normal">
<dt>Distributed quantum computing - Refers computing:</dt><dd>Refers to a collection
of small-capacity, remote small-capacity quantum computers (i.e., each supporting
a relatively small number of qubits) that are connected and work
together in a coordinated fashion so as to simulate a virtual
large capacity quantum computer <xref target="Wehner" />.</t>
<t>Blind
format="default"/>.</dd>
<dt>Blind quantum computing - computing:</dt><dd> Refers to private, or blind,
quantum computation, which provides a way for a client to delegate
a computation task to one or more remote quantum computers without
disclosing the source data to be computed over <xref target="Fitzsimons"/>.</t>
<!-- <t>Quantum chemistry - Quantum chemistry is one of the most promising quantum computing applications that can outperform the classical strategy using only a few hundred
qubits quantum computers. Using the NISQ devices, the quantum algorithms manage to determine the molecular energies of the small molecules within
chemical accuracy <xref target="YudongCao" />. However, due to the short coherence time of the quantum devices, it is still difficult to simulate larger molecules. </t>
-->
</list>
</t>
</section>
<!--
<section anchor="sec:classification" title="Control vs Data Plane Classification">
<t>The majority of routers currently used in the Classical Internet separate control plane functionality and data plane functionality for,
amongst other reasons, stability, capacity and security. In order to classify applications for the Quantum Internet, a somewhat similar
distinction can be made. Specifically some applications can be classified as being responsible for initiating sessions and performing other
control plane functionality (including management functionalities too). Other applications carry application or user data and can be classified as
data plane functionality.
</t>
<t>Some examples of what may be called control plane applications in the Classical Internet are Domain Name Server (DNS),
Session Information Protocol (SIP), and Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP). Furthermore, examples of data plane
applications are E-mail, web browsing, and video streaming. Note that some applications may require both control plane
and data plane functionality. For example, a Voice over IP (VoIP) application may use SIP to set up the call and then
transmit the VoIP user packets over the data plane to the other party.
</t>
<t>Similarly, nodes in the Quantum Internet applications may also use the classification paradigm of control plane functionality
versus data plane functionality where:
<list style="symbols">
<t>Control Plane - Network functions and processes that operate on (1) control bits/packets or qubits (e.g., to setup up end-user
encryption); or (2) management bits/packets or qubits (e.g., to configure nodes). For example, a quantum ping could be implemented
as a control plane application to test and verify if there is a quantum connection between two quantum nodes.
Another example is quantum superdense coding (which is used to transmit two classical bits by sending only one qubit). Quantum superdense
coding can be leveraged to implement a secret sharing application
to share secrets between two parties <xref target="Wang" />. This secret sharing application based on quantum superdense encoding can be classified
as control plane functionality.</t>
<t>Data Plane - Network functions and processes that operate on end-user application bits/packets or qubits (e.g., voice, video,
data). Sometimes also referred to as the user plane. For example, a data plane application can be video conferencing, which
uses QKD-based secure communication setup (which is a control plane function) to share a classical secret key for encrypting
and decrypting video frames.</t>
</list>
</t>
<t> As shown in the table in <xref target="fig:controldataplane" />, control and data plane applications vary for different types of networks.
For a standalone Quantum Network (i.e., that is not integrated into the Internet), entangled qubits are its "data" and thus entanglement distribution can be
regarded as its data plane application, while the signalling for controlling entanglement distribution be considered as control plane.
However, looking at the Quantum Internet, QKD-based secure communication setup, which may be based on and leverage entanglement distribution, is
in fact a control plane application, while video conference using QKD-based secure communication setup is a data plane application.
In the future, two data planes may exist, respectively for Quantum Internet and Classical Internet, while one control plane can be leveraged for
both Quantum Internet and Classical Internet.
</t>
target="Fitzsimons" format="default"/>.</dd>
</dl>
</section> -->
</section>
<section anchor="sec:usecases" title="Selected anchor="sec_usecases" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Selected Quantum Internet Application Scenarios"> Scenarios</name>
<t>The Quantum Internet will support a variety of applications and
deployment configurations. This section details a few key application
scenarios which illustrates that illustrate the benefits of the Quantum Internet. In
system engineering, an application scenario is typically made up of a
set of possible sequences of interactions between nodes and users in a
particular environment and related to a particular goal. This will be
the definition that we use in this section.
</t>
<section anchor="sec:usecase1" title="Secure anchor="sec_usecase1" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Secure Communication Setup">
<t>
In Setup</name>
<t>In this scenario, two nodes (e.g., quantum node A and quantum node
B) need to have secure communications for transmitting confidential
information (see <xref target="fig:securecom" />). target="fig_securecom" format="default"/>).
For this purpose, they first need to securely share a classic secret
cryptographic key (i.e., a sequence of classical bits), which is
triggered by an end user with local secure interface to quantum node
A. This results in a quantum node A
to securely establish establishing a classical
secret key with a quantum node B. This is referred to as a secure "secure
communication setup. setup". Note that quantum nodes A and B may be either a
bare-bone quantum end node or a full-fledged quantum computer. This
application scenario shows that the Quantum Internet can be leveraged
to improve the security of Classical Internet applications.
</t>
<t>
One
<t>One requirement for this secure communication setup process is that
it should not be vulnerable to any classical or quantum computing
attack. This can be realized using QKD QKD, which is unbreakable in
principle. QKD can securely establish a secret key between two
quantum nodes, using a classical authentication channel and insecure
quantum channel without physically transmitting the key through the
network and thus achieving the required security. However, care must
be taken to ensure that the QKD system is safe against physical side channel side-channel attacks which that can compromise the system. An example of a
physical side channel side-channel attack is to surreptitiously inject additional
light into the optical devices used in QKD to learn side information
about the system such as the polarization. Other specialized physical
attacks against QKD also use a classical authentication channel and
an insecure quantum channel such as the phase-remapping attack, photon
number splitting attack, and decoy state attack <xref
target="Zhao2018" />. format="default"/>. QKD can be used for many other
cryptographic communications, such as IPSec IPsec and Transport Layer
Security (TLS) (TLS), where involved parties need to establish a shared
security key, although it usually introduces a high latency.
</t>
<t>
QKD
<t>QKD is the most mature feature of the quantum information technology,
technology and has been commercially released in small-scale and
short-distance deployments. More QKD use cases are described in the ETSI documents
document <xref target="ETSI-QKD-UseCases" />; format="default"/>; in
addition, the ETSI document
<xref target="ETSI-QKD-Interfaces" /> specifies interfaces between QKD users and QKD devices.
devices are specified in the ETSI document <xref target="ETSI-QKD-Interfaces"
format="default"/>.
</t>
<t>
In
<t>In general, the prepare and measure prepare-and-measure QKD protocols (e.g., <xref target="BB84"/>)
target="BB84" format="default"/>) without using entanglement work as
follows:
<list style="numbers">
<t> The
</t>
<ol spacing="normal" type="1">
<li>The quantum node A encodes classical bits to qubits. Basically,
the node A generates two random classical bit strings X, X and Y. Among
them, it uses the bit string X to choose the basis and uses Y to
choose the state corresponding to the chosen basis. For example, if X=0
X=0, then in case of the BB84 protocol protocol, Alice prepares the state in {|0>, |1>}-basis; otherwise
{|0>, |1>}-basis; otherwise, she prepares the state in {|+>, |->}-basis. {|+>,
|->}-basis. Similarly, if Y=0 Y=0, then Alice prepares the qubit
as either |0> |0> or |+> |+> (depending on the value of X), X); and if Y =1,
then Alice prepares the qubit as either |1> |1> or |->.</t>
<t> The |->.</li>
<li>The quantum node A sends qubits to the quantum node B via a
quantum channel.</t>
<t> The channel.</li>
<li>The quantum node B receives qubits and measures each of them in
one of the two basis bases at random. </t>
<t> The random.</li>
<li>The quantum node B informs the quantum node A of its choice of basis
bases for each qubit.</t>
<t> The qubit.</li>
<li>The quantum node A informs the quantum node B which random
quantum basis is correct.</t>
<t> Both correct.</li>
<li>Both nodes discard any measurement bit under different quantum basis
bases, and the remaining bits could be used as the secret key.
Before generating the final secret key, there is a post-processing
procedure over authenticated classical channels. The classical
post-processing part can be subdivided into three steps, namely
parameter estimation, error-correction, error correction, and privacy
amplification. In the parameter estimation phase, both Alice and Bob
use some of the bits to estimate the channel error. If it is larger
than some threshold value, they abort the protocol or otherwise move to
the error-correction phase. Basically, if an eavesdropper tries to
intercept and read qubits sent from node A to node B, the
eavesdropper will be detected due to the entropic uncertainty
relation property theorem of quantum mechanics. As a part of the
post-processing procedure, both nodes usually also perform
information reconciliation <xref target="Elkouss"/> target="Elkouss" format="default"/>
for efficient error correction and/or conduct privacy amplification
<xref target="Tang"/> target="Tang" format="default"/> for generating the final
information-theoretical secure keys. </t>
<t> The keys.</li>
<li>The post-processing procedure needs to be performed over an
authenticated classical channel. In other words, the quantum node A
and the quantum node B need to authenticate the classical channel to
make sure there is no eavesdroppers or man-in-the-middle on-path attacks,
according to certain authentication protocols such as that described in <xref target=" Kiktenko"/>.
target="Kiktenko" format="default"/>. In <xref target=" Kiktenko"/>, target="Kiktenko"
format="default"/>, the authenticity of the classical channel is
checked at the very end of the post-processing procedure instead of
doing it for each classical message exchanged between the quantum
node A and the quantum node B.
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
It B.</li>
</ol>
<t>It is worth noting that:
<list style="numbers">
<t> There
</t>
<ol spacing="normal" type="1">
<li>There are many enhanced QKD protocols based on <xref target="BB84"/>.
target="BB84" format="default"/>. For example, a series of loopholes
have been identified due to the imperfections of measurement
devices; there are several solutions to take into account concerning
these attacks such as measurement-device-independent QKD <xref target="Zhang2019"/>.
target="Zheng2019" format="default"/>. These enhanced QKD protocols
can work differently than the steps of BB84 protocol <xref target="BB84"/>.
</t>
<t> For
target="BB84" format="default"/>.</li>
<li>For large-scale QKD, QKD Networks (QKDN) (QKDNs) are required, which can
be regarded as a subset of a Quantum Internet. A QKDN may consist of
a QKD application layer, a QKD network layer, and a QKD link layer
<xref target="Qin"/>. target="Qin" format="default"/>. One or multiple trusted QKD
relays <xref target="Zhang2018"/> target="Zhang2018" format="default"/> may exist between
the quantum node A and the quantum node B, which are connected by a
QKDN. Alternatively, a QKDN may rely on entanglement distribution
and entanglement-based QKD protocols; as a result, quantum-repeaters/routers
quantum repeaters and/or routers instead of trusted QKD relays are needed
for large-scale QKD. Entanglement swapping can be leveraged to
realize entanglement distribution.
</t>
<!-- In general, there could be three types of QKD solutions: 1) Basic QKD: In this case, QKD only works for two directly connected quantum nodes within a short distance or a network segment;
If both nodes are long-distanced, trusted nodes will be needed for relaying multiple basic QKDs between two faraway quantum nodes; 2) E2E QKD: In this case, based on long-distance qubit transmission,
QKD works for two faraway quantum nodes to provide the end-to-end security without relying on trusted nodes; and 3) Advanced E2E QKD: In this case,
two quantum nodes are far away from each other but long-distance qubit transmission may not be available. Instead, QKD leverages entanglement distribution
or quantum repeaters (not trusted nodes) to achieve the end-to-end security.
-->
<!--<t> Although the addresses of Source Quantum Node A and Destination Quantum Node B could be identified and exposed, the identity of users, who will use
the secret cryptographic key for secure communications, will not necessarily be exposed during QKD process. In other words, there is no direct mapping
from the addresses of quantum nodes to the user identity; as a result, QKD protocols do not disclose user identities.
</t>-->
<t> QKD distribution.</li>
<li>QKD provides an information-theoretical way to share secret keys
between two parties (i.e., a transmitter and a receiver) in the
presence of an eavesdropper. However, this is true in theory, and
there is a significant gap between theory and practice. By exploiting
the imperfection of the detectors detectors, Eve can gain information about the
shared key <xref target="Xu" />. format="default"/>. To avoid such
side-channel attacks in <xref target="Lo" />, format="default"/>, the
researchers provide a QKD protocol called Measurement "Measurement
Device-Independent (MDI) (MDI)" QKD that allows two users (a transmitter “Alice”
"Alice" and a receiver “Bob”) "Bob") to communicate with perfect security,
even if the (measurement) hardware they are using has been tampered
with (e.g., by an eavesdropper) and thus is not trusted. It is
achieved by measuring correlations between signals from Alice and Bob Bob,
rather than the actual signals themselves.
</t>
<t> QKD themselves.</li>
<li>QKD protocols based on Continuous Variable QKD (CV-QKD) have recently
seen plenty of interest as they only require telecommunications
equipment that is readily available and is also in common use
industry-wide. This kind of technology is a potentially
high-performance technique for secure key distribution over limited
distances. The recent demonstration of CV-QKD shows compatibility
with classical coherent detection schemes that are widely used for high bandwidth
high-bandwidth classical communication systems <xref
target="Grosshans" />. format="default"/>. Note that we still do not have
a quantum repeater for the continuous variable systems; hence, this kind these
kinds of QKD technologies can be used for the short distance
communications or trusted relay-based QKD networks.
</t>
<t> Secret networks.</li>
<li>Secret sharing can be used to distribute a secret key among
multiple nodes by letting each node know a share or a part of the
secret key, while no single node can know the entire secret key. The
secret key can only be re-constructed reconstructed via collaboration from a
sufficient number of nodes. Quantum Secret Sharing (QSS) typically
refers to the following scenario: The the secret key to be shared is based
on quantum states instead of classical bits. QSS enables to split splitting and share
sharing such quantum states among multiple nodes.
</t>
<t> There nodes.</li>
<li>There are some entanglement-based QKD protocols, such as that described in <xref target="Treiber"/><xref target="E91"/><xref target="BBM92"/>,
target="Treiber" format="default"/>, <xref target="E91"
format="default"/>, and <xref target="BBM92" format="default"/>, which
work differently than the above steps. The entanglement-based schemes,
where entangled states are prepared externally to the quantum node A
and the quantum node B, are not normally considered "prepare-and-measure"
"prepare and measure" as defined in <xref target="Wehner"/>;
other target="Wehner"
format="default"/>. Other entanglement-based schemes, where
entanglement is generated within the source quantum node node, can still be
considered "prepare-and-measure"; send-and-return "prepare and measure". Send-and-return schemes can still be "prepare-and-measure",
"prepare and measure" if the information content, from which keys
will be derived, is prepared within the quantum node A before being
sent to the quantum node B for measurement.
</t>
</list>
</t> measurement.</li>
</ol>
<t> As a result, the Quantum Internet in <xref target="fig:securecom" /> target="fig_securecom"
format="default"/> contains quantum channels. And in order to support
secure communication setup setup, especially in large-scale deployment, it
also requires entanglement generation and entanglement distribution
<xref target="I-D.van-meter-qirg-quantum-connection-setup"/>, target="I-D.van-meter-qirg-quantum-connection-setup"
format="default"/>, quantum repeaters/routers, repeaters and/or routers, and/or trusted QKD
relays.
</t>
<t>
<?rfc needLines="16" ?>
<figure anchor="fig:securecom" title="Secure anchor="fig_securecom">
<name>Secure Communication Setup"> Setup</name>
<artwork align="center">
<![CDATA[ align="center" name="" type="" alt=""><![CDATA[
+---------------+
| End User |
+---------------+
^
| Local Secure Interface
| (e.g., the same physical hardware
| or a local secure network)
V
+-----------------+ /--------\ +-----------------+
| |--->( Quantum )--->| |
| | ( Internet ) | |
| Quantum | \--------/ | Quantum |
| Node A | | Node B |
| | /--------\ | |
| | ( Classical) | |
| |<-->( Internet )<-->| |
+-----------------+ \--------/ +-----------------+
]]>
</artwork>
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</t>
</section>
<section anchor="sec:usecase2" title="Blind anchor="sec_usecase2" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Blind Quantum Computing">
<t>
Blind Computing</name>
<t>Blind quantum computing refers to the following scenario:
<list style="numbers">
<t>A
</t>
<ol spacing="normal" type="1">
<li>A client node with source data delegates the computation of the
source data to a remote computation node (i.e. (i.e., a server).</t>
<t>Furthermore, server).</li>
<li>Furthermore, the client node does not want to disclose any
source data to the remote computation node, which preserves the
source data privacy.</t>
<t>Note privacy.</li>
<li>Note that there is no assumption or guarantee that the remote
computation node is a trusted entity from the source data privacy perspective.</t>
</list>
</t>
perspective.</li>
</ol>
<t> As an example illustrated in <xref target="fig:bqcom" />, target="fig_bqcom"
format="default"/>, a terminal node can be a small quantum computer
with limited computation capability compared to a remote quantum
computation node (e.g., a remote mainframe quantum computer), but the
terminal node needs to run a computation-intensive task (e.g., Shor’s Shor's
factoring algorithm). The terminal node can create individual qubits
and send them to the remote quantum computation node. Then, the remote
quantum computation node can entangle the qubits, calculate on them,
measure them, generate measurement results in classical bits, and
return the measurement results to the terminal node. It is noted that
those measurement results will look like purely random data to the
remote quantum computation node because the initial states of the
qubits were chosen in a cryptographically secure fashion.
</t>
<!--<t>
As an example illustrated in <xref target="fig:bqcom" />, a terminal node such as a home gateway has collected lots of data and needs
to perform computation on the data. The terminal node could be a classical node without any quantum capability, a bare-bone
quantum end-node or a full-fledged quantum computer. The terminal node has insufficient computing power and needs to offload data
computation to some remote nodes. Although the terminal node can upload the data to the cloud to leverage cloud computing without
introducing local computing overhead, to upload the data to the cloud can cause privacy concerns.
In this particular case, there is no privacy concern since the source data will not be sent
to the remote computation node which could be compromised. Many protocols as described in <xref target="Fitzsimons" /> for delegated quantum
computing or Blind Quantum Computation (BQC) can be leveraged to realize secure delegated computation and guarantee
privacy preservation simultaneously.
</t>
-->
<t>
As
<t>As a new client/server client and server computation model, Blind Quantum Computation
(BQC) generally enables: 1) The enables the following process:</t>
<ol spacing="normal" type="1">
<li>The client delegates a computation function to the server; 2) The server.</li>
<li>The client does not send original qubits to
the server, server but does send transformed qubits to the server; 3) The server.</li>
<li>The computation function is performed at the server on the
transformed qubits to generate temporary result qubits, which could be
quantum-circuit-based computation or measurement-based quantum
computation. The server sends the temporary result qubits to the client; 4) The
client.</li>
<li>The client receives the temporary result qubits and transforms
them to the final result qubits. During qubits.</li>
</ol>
<t>During this process, the
server can not cannot figure out the original qubits from the transformed
qubits. Also, it will not take too much efforts effort on the client side to
transform the original qubits to the transformed qubits, qubits or transform
the temporary result qubits to the final result qubits. One of the
very first BQC protocols protocols, such as that described in <xref target="Childs"/> target="Childs"
format="default"/>, follows this process, although the client needs
some basic quantum features such as quantum memory, qubit preparation
and measurement, and qubit transmission. Measurement-based quantum
computation is out of the scope of this document document, and more details
about it can be found in <xref target="Jozsa2005"/>. target="Jozsa2005" format="default"/>.
</t>
<t>
It
<t>It is worth noting that:
<list style="numbers">
<t> The
</t>
<ol spacing="normal" type="1">
<li>The BQC protocol in <xref target="Childs"/> target="Childs" format="default"/> is
a circuit-based BQC model, where the client only performs simple
quantum circuit for qubit transformation, while the server performs
a sequence of quantum logic gates. Qubits are transmitted back and
forth between the client and the server.
</t>
<t> Universal server.</li>
<li><t>Universal BQC (UBQC) in <xref target="Broadbent"/> target="Broadbent"
format="default"/> is a measurement-based BQC model, which is based
on measurement-based quantum computing leveraging entangled
states. The principle in UBQC is based on the fact that the quantum
teleportation plus a rotated Bell measurement realizes realize a quantum
computation, which can be repeated multiple times to realize a
sequence of quantum computation. In this approach, the client first
prepares transformed qubits and sends them to the server server, and the
server needs first to first prepare entangled states from all received
qubits. Then, multiple interaction and measurement rounds happen
between the client and the server. For each round, the round:</t>
<ol type="i" spacing="normal">
<li>the client computes and sends new measurement instructions or
measurement adaptations to the server; then, the server;</li>
<li>the server performs the measurement according to the received
measurement instructions to generate measurement results (qubits (in
qubits or in classic bits); and</li>
<li>then the client receives the measurement results and
transforms them to the final results.
</t>
<t> A results.</li>
</ol>
</li>
<li>A hybrid universal BQC UBQC is proposed in <xref target="Zhang2009"/>, target="Zhang2009"
format="default"/>, where the server performs both quantum circuits
like that demonstrated in <xref target="Childs"/> target="Childs" format="default"/>
and quantum measurements like that demonstrated in <xref target="Broadbent"/>
target="Broadbent" format="default"/> to reduce the number of
required entangled states in <xref target="Broadbent"/>. target="Broadbent"
format="default"/>. Also, the client is much simpler than the client
in <xref target="Childs"/>. target="Childs" format="default"/>. This hybrid BQC is a
combination of a circuit-based BQC model and a measurement-based BQC model.
</t>
<t> It will be
model.</li>
<li>It is ideal if the client in BQC is a purely classical
client, which only needs to interact with the server using classical channel
channels and communications. <xref target="Huang"/> target="Huang" format="default"/>
demonstrates such an approach, approach where a classical client leverages
two entangled servers to perform BQC, BQC with the assumption that both
servers cannot communicate with each other; otherwise, the blindness
or privacy of the client cannot be guaranteed. The scenario as
demonstrated in <xref target="Huang"/> target="Huang" format="default"/> is
essentially an example of BQC with multiple servers.
</t>
<t> How servers.</li>
<li>How to verify that the server will perform what the client
requests or expects is an important issue in many BQC protocols,
referred to as verifiable BQC. "verifiable BQC". <xref target="Fitzsimons"/> target="Fitzsimons"
format="default"/> discusses this issue and compares it in various
BQC protocols.
</t>
</list>
</t> protocols.</li>
</ol>
<t> In <xref target="fig:bqcom" />, target="fig_bqcom" format="default"/>, the Quantum Internet contains quantum channels and quantum repeaters/routers repeaters and/or routers for long-distance qubits transmission <xref target="RFC9340" />.</t>
<t>
<?rfc needLines="16" ?> format="default"/>.</t>
<figure anchor="fig:bqcom" title="Bind anchor="fig_bqcom">
<name>Bind Quantum Computing"> Computing</name>
<artwork align="center">
<![CDATA[ align="center" name="" type="" alt=""><![CDATA[
+----------------+ /--------\ +-------------------+
| |--->( Quantum )--->| |
| | ( Internet ) | Remote Quantum |
| Terminal | \--------/ | Computation |
| Node | | Node |
| (e.g., A Small| a small| /--------\ | (e.g., Remote a remote |
| Quantum quantum | ( Classical) | Mainframe mainframe |
| Computer) computer) |<-->( Internet )<-->| Quantum Computer)| quantum computer) |
+----------------+ \--------/ +-------------------+
]]>
</artwork>
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</t>
</section>
<section anchor="sec:usecase3" title="Distributed anchor="sec_usecase3" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Distributed Quantum Computing"> Computing</name>
<t>There can be two types of distributed quantum computing <xref target="Denchev" />:
<list style="numbers">
<t>Leverage format="default"/>:
</t>
<ol spacing="normal" type="1">
<li>Leverage quantum mechanics to enhance classical distributed
computing. For example, entangled quantum states can be exploited to
improve leader election in classical distributed computing, computing by
simply measuring the entangled quantum states at each party (e.g., a
node or a device) without introducing any classical communications
among distributed parties <xref target="Pal" />.
format="default"/>. Normally, pre-shared entanglement needs first needs to be
established among distributed parties, followed by LOCC operations
at each party. And it generally does not need to transfer qubits
among distributed parties.
</t>
<t>Distribute parties.</li>
<li><t>Distribute quantum computing functions to distributed quantum
computers. A quantum computing task or function (e.g., quantum
gates) is split and distributed to multiple physically separate
quantum computers. And it may or may not need to transmit qubits
(either inputs or outputs) among those distributed quantum
computers. Entangled states will be needed and actually consumed to
support such distributed quantum computing tasks. It is worth noting that: 1)Entangled
that:</t>
<ol type="a" spacing="normal">
<li>Entangled states can be created beforehand and stored or buffered; 2)
The
buffered;</li>
<li>The rate of entanglement creation will limit the
performance of practical quantum internet applicaitons Quantum Internet applications including
distributed quantum computing, although entangled states could be buffered. For
buffered.</li></ol>
<t>For example, <xref target="Gottesman1999" />
format="default"/> and <xref target="Eisert" /> format="default"/> have proved
demonstrated that a CNOT Controlled NOT (CNOT) gate can be realized jointly by and distributed
to multiple quantum computers. The rest of this section focuses on
this type of distributed quantum computing.
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
As
</li>
</ol>
<t>As a scenario for the second type of distributed quantum computing,
Noisy Intermediate-Scale Quantum (NISQ) computers distributed in
different locations are available for sharing. According to the
definition in <xref target="Preskill" />, format="default"/>, a NISQ
computer can only realize a small number of qubits and has limited
quantum error correction. This scenario is referred to as distributed "distributed
quantum
computing computing" <xref target="Caleffi"/> target="Caleffi" format="default"/> <xref target="Cacciapuoti2020"/>
target="Cacciapuoti2020" format="default"/> <xref target="Cacciapuoti2019"/>.
target="Cacciapuoti2019" format="default"/>. This application scenario
reflects the vastly increased computing power which that quantum computers
can bring as a part of the Quantum Internet can bring, Internet, in contrast to classical
computers in the Classical Internet, in the context of a distributed
quantum computing ecosystem <xref target="Cuomo"/>. target="Cuomo"
format="default"/>. According to <xref target="Cuomo"/>, target="Cuomo"
format="default"/>, quantum teleportation enables a new communication
paradigm, referred to as teledata "teledata" <xref target="VanMeter2006-01"/>, target="VanMeter2006-01"
format="default"/>, which moves quantum states among qubits to
distributed quantum computers. In addition, distributed quantum
computation also needs the capability of remotely performing quantum
computation on qubits on distributed quantum computers, which can be
enabled by the technique called telegate "telegate" <xref target="VanMeter2006-02"/>.
target="VanMeter2006-02" format="default"/>.
</t>
<t>As an example, a user can leverage these connected NISQ computers
to solve highly complex scientific computation problems, such as
analysis of chemical interactions for medical drug development <xref target="Cao"/>
target="Cao" format="default"/> (see <xref target="fig:dqcom" />). target="fig_dqcom"
format="default"/>). In this case, qubits will be transmitted among
connected quantum computers via quantum channels, while the user's
execution requests are transmitted to these quantum computers via
classical channels for coordination and control purpose. Another
example of distributed quantum computing is secure Multi-Party Quantum
Computation (MPQC) <xref target="Crepeau"/>, target="Crepeau" format="default"/>, which
can be regarded as a quantum version of classical secure Multi-Party
Computation (MPC). In a secure MPQC protocol, multiple participants
jointly perform quantum computation on a set of input quantum states,
which are prepared and provided by different participants. One of the
primary aims of the secure MPQC is to guarantee that each participant
will not know input quantum states provided by other
participants. Secure MPQC relies on verifiable quantum secret sharing
<xref target="Lipinska" />. format="default"/>.
</t>
<t>
For
<t>For the example shown in <xref target="fig:dqcom"/>, target="fig_dqcom"
format="default"/>, we want to move qubits from one NISQ computer to
another NISQ computer. For this purpose, quantum teleportation can be
leveraged to teleport sensitive data qubits from one quantum computer A
(A) to another quantum computer B. (B). Note that <xref target="fig:dqcom" /> target="fig_dqcom"
format="default"/> does not cover measurement-based distributed
quantum computing, where quantum teleportation may not be required.
When quantum teleportation is employed, the following steps happen
between A and B. In fact, LOCC <xref target="Chitambar"/> target="Chitambar"
format="default"/> operations are conducted at the quantum computers A
and B in order to achieve quantum teleportation as illustrated in
<xref target="fig:dqcom" />.
<list style="numbers">
<t> The target="fig_dqcom" format="default"/>.
</t>
<ol spacing="normal" type="1">
<li>The quantum computer A locally generates some sensitive data
qubits to be teleported to the quantum computer B. </t>
<t> A B.</li>
<li>A shared entanglement is established between the quantum
computer A and the quantum computer B (i.e., there are two entangled
qubits: q1 at A and q2 at B). For example, the quantum computer A
can generate two entangled qubits (i.e., q1 and q2) and sends send q2 to
the quantum computer B via quantum communications. </t>
<t> Then, communications.</li>
<li>Then, the quantum computer A performs a Bell measurement of the
entangled qubit q1 and the sensitive data qubit.</t>
<t> The qubit.</li>
<li>The result from this Bell measurement will be encoded in two
classical bits, which will be physically transmitted via a classical
channel to the quantum computer B.</t>
<t> Based B.</li>
<li>Based on the received two classical bits, the quantum computer B
modifies the state of the entangled qubit q2 in the way to generate
a new qubit identical to the sensitive data qubit at the quantum
computer A.</t>
</list>
</t>
<t> In A.</li>
</ol>
<t>In <xref target="fig:dqcom" />, target="fig_dqcom" format="default"/>, the Quantum
Internet contains quantum channels and quantum repeaters/routers repeaters and/or routers <xref
target="RFC9340" />. format="default"/>. This application scenario needs
to support entanglement generation and entanglement distribution (or
quantum connection) setup <xref target="I-D.van-meter-qirg-quantum-connection-setup"/>
target="I-D.van-meter-qirg-quantum-connection-setup"
format="default"/> in order to support quantum teleportation.
</t>
<t>
<?rfc needLines="16" ?>
<figure anchor="fig:dqcom" title="Distributed anchor="fig_dqcom">
<name>Distributed Quantum Computing"> Computing</name>
<artwork align="center">
<![CDATA[ align="center" name="" type="" alt=""><![CDATA[
+-----------------+
| End User |
| |
+-----------------+
^
| Local Secure Interface
| (e.g., the same phyical physical hardware
| or a local secure network)
|
+------------------+-------------------+
| |
| |
V V
+----------------+ /--------\ +----------------+
| |--->( Quantum )--->| |
| | ( Internet ) | |
| Quantum | \--------/ | Quantum |
| Computer A | | Computer B |
| (e.g., Site #1)| /--------\ | (e.g., Site #2)|
| | ( Classical) | |
| |<-->( Internet )<-->| |
+----------------+ \--------/ +----------------+
]]>
</artwork>
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section anchor="sec:generalrequirements" title="General Requirements"> anchor="sec_generalrequirements" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>General Requirements</name>
<t>Quantum technologies are steadily evolving and improving. Therefore,
it is hard to predict the timeline and future milestones of quantum
technologies as pointed out in <xref target="Grumbling"/> target="Grumbling"
format="default"/> for quantum computing. Currently, a NISQ computer can
achieve fifty to hundreds of qubits with some given error rate.
</t>
<t>On the network level, six stages of Quantum Internet development are
described in <xref target="Wehner"/> target="Wehner" format="default"/> as a Quantum
Internet technology roadmap as follows:
<list style="numbers">
<t>Trusted
</t>
<ol spacing="normal" type="1">
<li>Trusted repeater networks (Stage-1)</t>
<t>Prepare and measure (Stage-1)</li>
<li>Prepare-and-measure networks (Stage-2)</t>
<t>Entanglement (Stage-2)</li>
<li>Entanglement distribution networks (Stage-3)</t>
<t>Quantum (Stage-3)</li>
<li>Quantum memory networks (Stage-4)</t>
<t>Fault-tolerant (Stage-4)</li>
<li>Fault-tolerant few qubit networks (Stage-5)</t>
<t>Quantum (Stage-5)</li>
<li>Quantum computing networks (Stage-6)</t>
</list>
</t> (Stage-6)</li>
</ol>
<t>The first stage is simple trusted repeater networks, while the final
stage is the quantum computing networks where the full-blown Quantum
Internet will be achieved. Each intermediate stage brings with it new
functionality, new applications, and new characteristics. <xref target="fig:appsinstages"/>
target="fig_appsinstages" format="default"/> illustrates Quantum
Internet application scenarios as described in Sections <xref target="sec:applications" />
target="sec_applications" format="counter"/> and <xref target="sec:usecases" />
target="sec_usecases" format="counter"/> mapped to the Quantum Internet
stages described in <xref target="Wehner"/>. target="Wehner" format="default"/>. For
example, secure communication setup can be supported in Stage-1,
Stage-2, or Stage-3, Stage-3 but with different QKD solutions. More
specifically:</t>
<t>In
<ul spacing="normal">
<li>In Stage-1, basic QKD is possible and can be leveraged to support
secure communication setup setup, but trusted nodes are required to provide
end-to-end security. The primary requirement is the trusted nodes. </t>
<t>In </li>
<li>In Stage-2, the end users can prepare and measure the qubits. In this
stage, the users can verify classical passwords without revealing it.</t>
<t>In
them.</li>
<li>In Stage-3, end-to-end security can be enabled based on quantum
repeaters and entanglement distribution, distribution to support the same secure
communication setup application. The primary requirement is entanglement
distribution to enable long-distance QKD. </t>
<t>In </li>
<li>In Stage-4, the quantum repeaters gain the capability of storing and
manipulating entangled qubits in the quantum memories. Using these kind kinds
of quantum networks, one can run sophisticated applications like blind
quantum computing, leader election, and quantum secret sharing. </t>
<t>In </li>
<li>In Stage-5, quantum repeaters can perform error correction; hence hence,
they can perform fault-tolerant quantum computations on the received
data. With the help of these repeaters, it is possible to run
distributed quantum computing and quantum sensor applications over a
smaller number of qubits.</t>
<t>Finally, qubits.</li>
<li>Finally, in Stage-6, distributed quantum computing relying on more
qubits can be supported.</t>
<t>
<?rfc needLines="16" ?>
<figure anchor="fig:appsinstages" title="Example supported.</li>
</ul>
<table align="center" anchor="fig_appsinstages">
<name>Example Application Scenarios in Different Quantum Internet Stages">
<artwork align="center">
<![CDATA[
+---------+----------------------------+------------------------+
| Quantum | Example Stages</name>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantum Internet Stage</th>
<th>Example Quantum | |
| Internet| Internet Use | Characteristic |
| Stage | Cases | |
+---------+----------------------------+------------------------+
| Stage-1 | Secure comm Cases</th>
<th>Characteristic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stage-1</td>
<td>Secure communication setup | Trusted nodes |
| | using basic QKD | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| Stage-2 | Secure comm QKD</td>
<td>Trusted nodes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage-2</td>
<td>Secure communication setup | Prepare-and-measure |
| | using the QKD with | capability |
| | end-to-end security | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| Stage-3 | Secure comm security</td>
<td>Prepare-and-measure capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage-3</td>
<td>Secure communication setup | Entanglement |
| | using entanglement-enabled | distribution |
| | QKD | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| Stage-4 | Blind quantum | Quantum memory |
| | computing | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| Stage-5 | Higher-Accuracy Clock | Fault tolerance |
| | synchronization | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| Stage-6 | Distributed quantum | More qubits |
| | computing | |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
]]>
</artwork>
</figure>
</t> QKD</td>
<td>Entanglement distribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage-4</td>
<td>Blind quantum computing</td>
<td>Quantum memory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage-5</td>
<td>Higher-accuracy clock synchronization</td>
<td>Fault tolerance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage-6</td>
<td>Distributed quantum computing</td>
<td>More qubits</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<t>Some general and functional requirements on the Quantum Internet from
the networking perspective, based on the above application scenarios and
Quantum Internet technology roadmap <xref target="Wehner"/>, target="Wehner"
format="default"/>, are identified and described in next sections. </t>
<section anchor="sec:requirement01" title="Operations anchor="sec_requirement01" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Operations on Entangled Qubits">
<t> Methods Qubits</name>
<t>Methods for facilitating quantum applications to interact
efficiently with entangled qubits are necessary in order for them to
trigger distribution of designated entangled qubits to potentially any
other quantum node residing in the Quantum Internet. To accomplish
this, specific operations must be performed on entangled qubits (e.g.,
entanglement swapping, swapping or entanglement distillation). Quantum nodes may
be quantum end nodes, quantum repeaters/routers, repeaters and/or routers, and/or quantum
computers.</t>
</section>
<section anchor="sec:requirement02" title="Entanglement Distribution">
<t> Quantum repeaters/routers anchor="sec_requirement02" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Entanglement Distribution</name>
<t>Quantum repeaters and/or routers should support robust and efficient
entanglement distribution in order to extend and establish
a high-fidelity entanglement connection between two quantum nodes. For
achieving this, it is required to first generate an entangled pair on
each hop of the path between these two nodes, nodes and then perform entanglement swapping
entanglement-swapping operations at each of the intermediate
nodes. </t>
</section>
<section anchor="sec:requirement03" title="The anchor="sec_requirement03" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>The Need for Classical Channels">
<t> Quantum Channels</name>
<t>Quantum end nodes must send additional information on classical
channels to aid in transferring and understanding qubits across
quantum repeaters/receivers. repeaters and/or receivers. Examples of such additional information
include qubit measurements in secure communication setup <xref target="sec:usecase1"/>, (<xref
target="sec_usecase1" format="default"/>) and Bell measurements in
distributed quantum computing <xref target="sec:usecase3"/>. (<xref target="sec_usecase3"
format="default"/>). In addition, qubits are transferred individually
and do not have any associated packet header header, which can help in
transferring the qubit. Any extra information to aid in routing,
identification, etc., etc. of the qubit(s) must be sent via classical
channels.</t>
</section>
<section anchor="sec:requirement04" title="Quantum anchor="sec_requirement04" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Quantum Internet Management">
<t> Methods Management</name>
<t>Methods for managing and controlling the Quantum Internet including
quantum nodes and their quantum resources are necessary. The
resources of a quantum node may include quantum memory, quantum
channels, qubits, established quantum connections, etc. Such
management methods can be used to monitor the network status of the
Quantum Internet, diagnose and identify potential issues
(e.g. (e.g., quantum
connections), and configure quantum nodes with new actions and/or
policies (e.g. (e.g., to perform a new entanglement
swapping entanglement-swapping operation). New A new
management information model for the Quantum Internet may need to be
developed. </t>
</section>
</section>
<section anchor="sec:conclusion" title="Conclusion">
<t>
This anchor="sec_conclusion" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Conclusion</name>
<t>This document provides an overview of some expected application
categories for the Quantum Internet, Internet and then details selected
application scenarios. The applications are first grouped by their usage
usage, which is easy to understand an easy-to-understand classification scheme. This set of
applications may, of course, expand over time as the Quantum Internet
matures. Finally, some general requirements for the Quantum Internet are
also provided.
</t>
<t>
This
<t>This document can also serve as an introductory text to readers
interested in learning about the practical uses of the Quantum Internet.
Finally, it is hoped that this document will help guide further research
and development of the Quantum Internet functionality required to
implement the application scenarios described herein.
</t>
</section>
<section anchor="IANA" title="IANA Considerations"> numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>IANA Considerations</name>
<t>This document requests has no IANA actions.
</t> actions.</t>
</section>
<section anchor="sec:security" title="Security Considerations">
<t> This anchor="sec_security" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Security Considerations</name>
<t>This document does not define an architecture nor a specific protocol
for the Quantum Internet. It focuses instead on detailing application scenarios, requirements,
scenarios and requirements and describing typical Quantum Internet
applications. However, some salient observations can be made regarding
security of the Quantum Internet as follows.
</t>
<t>
It
<t>It has been identified in <xref target="NISTIR8240" /> that
format="default"/> that, once large-scale quantum computing becomes
reality that
reality, it will be able to break many of the public-key public key (i.e.,
asymmetric) cryptosystems currently in use. This is because of the
increase in computing ability with quantum computers for certain classes
of problems (e.g., prime factorization, factorization and optimizations). This would
negatively affect many of the security mechanisms currently in use on
the Classical Internet which that are based on public-key (Diffie-Hellman) public key (Diffie-Hellman (DH))
encryption. This has given strong impetus for starting development of
new cryptographic systems that are secure against quantum computing
attacks <xref target="NISTIR8240" />. format="default"/>.
</t>
<t>
Interestingly,
<t>Interestingly, development of the Quantum Internet will also mitigate
the threats posed by quantum computing attacks against
Diffie-Hellman based public-key DH-based public
key cryptosystems. Specifically, the secure communication setup feature
of the Quantum Internet Internet, as described in <xref target="sec:usecase1" /> target="sec_usecase1"
format="default"/>, will be strongly resistant to both classical and
quantum computing attacks against Diffie-Hellman based public-key public key
cryptosystems.
</t>
<t>A key additional threat consideration for the Quantum Internet is pointed to by
addressed in <xref target="RFC7258" />, format="default"/>, which warns of
the dangers of pervasive monitoring as a widespread attack on privacy.
Pervasive monitoring is defined as a widespread, and usually covert,
surveillance through intrusive gathering of application content or
protocol metadata metadata, such as headers. This can be accomplished through
active or passive wiretaps, through traffic analysis, or by subverting
the cryptographic keys used to secure communications.
</t>
<t>The secure communication setup feature of the Quantum Internet Internet, as
described in <xref target="sec:usecase1" /> target="sec_usecase1" format="default"/>, will be
strongly resistant to pervasive monitoring based on directly attacking
(Diffie-Hellman) encryption keys. Also, <xref target="sec:usecase2" /> target="sec_usecase2"
format="default"/> describes a method to perform remote quantum
computing while preserving the privacy of the source data. Finally, the
intrinsic property of qubits to decohere if they are observed, albeit
covertly, will theoretically allow detection of unwanted monitoring in
some future solutions.
</t>
<t> Modern
<t>Modern networks are implemented with zero trust principles where
classical cryptography is used for confidentiality, integrity
protection, and authentication on many of the logical layers of the
network stack, often all the way from device to software in the cloud
<xref target="NISTSP800-207"/>. target="NISTSP800-207" format="default"/>. The cryptographic
solutions in use today are based on well-understood primitives, provably
secure protocols protocols, and state-of-the-art implementations that are secure
against a variety of side-channel attacks.
</t>
<t> In
<t>In contrast to conventional cryptography and Post-Quantum
Cryptography (PQC), the security of QKD is inherently tied to the
physical layer, which makes the threat surfaces of QKD and conventional
cryptography quite different. QKD implementations have already been
subjected to publicized attacks <xref target="Zhao2008"/> target="Zhao2008"
format="default"/>, and the National Security Agency (NSA) notes that the
risk profile of conventional cryptography is better understood <xref target="NSA"/>.
target="NSA" format="default"/>. The fact that conventional cryptography
and PQC are implemented at a higher layer than the physical one means
PQC can be used to securely send protected information through untrusted
relays. This is in stark contrast with QKD, which relies on hop-by-hop
security between intermediate trusted nodes. The PQC approach is better
aligned with the modern technology environment, in which more
applications are moving toward end-to-end security and zero-trust
principles. It is also important to note that that, while PQC can be deployed
as a software update, QKD requires new hardware. In addition, the IETF has a
working group on Post-Quantum Use In Protocols (PQUIP) that is studying
PQC transition issues.
</t>
<t> Regarding
<t>Regarding QKD implementation details, the NSA states that
communication needs and security requirements physically conflict in QKD
and that the engineering required to balance them has extremely low
tolerance for error. While conventional cryptography can be implemented
in hardware in some cases for performance or other reasons, QKD is
inherently tied to hardware. The NSA points out that this makes QKD less
flexible with regard to upgrades or security patches. As QKD is
fundamentally a point-to-point protocol, the NSA also notes that QKD
networks often require the use of trusted relays, which increases the
security risk from insider threats.
</t>
<t> The UK’s
<t>The UK's National Cyber Security Centre cautions against reliance on
QKD, especially in critical national infrastructure sectors, and
suggests that PQC PQC, as standardized by the NIST NIST, is a better solution <xref target="NCSC"/>.
target="NCSC" format="default"/>. Meanwhile, the National Cybersecurity
Agency of France has decided that QKD could be considered as a
defense-in-depth measure complementing conventional cryptography, as
long as the cost incurred does not adversely affect the mitigation of
current threats to IT systems <xref target="ANNSI"/>. target="ANNSI" format="default"/>.
</t>
</section>
<section anchor="Acknowledgments" title="Acknowledgments">
<t>The authors want to thank Michele Amoretti, Mathias Van Den Bossche, Xavier de Foy, Patrick Gelard, Álvaro Gómez Iñesta, Mallory Knodel, Wojciech Kozlowski,
John Mattsson, Rodney Van Meter, Colin Perkins, Joey Salazar, and Joseph Touch, Brian Trammell, and the rest of the QIRG community as a whole for their very useful reviews
and comments to the document.</t>
</section>
</middle>
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&I-D.van-meter-qirg-quantum-connection-setup;
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<section anchor="Acknowledgments" numbered="false" toc="default">
<name>Acknowledgments</name>
<t>The authors want to thank <contact fullname="Michele Amoretti"/>,
<contact fullname="Mathias Van Den Bossche"/>, <contact fullname="Xavier
de Foy"/>, <contact fullname="Patrick Gelard"/>, <contact
fullname="Álvaro Gómez Iñesta"/>, <contact fullname="Mallory Knodel"/>,
<contact fullname="Wojciech Kozlowski"/>, <contact fullname="John Preuß
Mattsson"/>, <contact fullname="Rodney Van Meter"/>, <contact
fullname="Colin Perkins"/>, <contact fullname="Joey Salazar"/>, <contact
fullname="Joseph Touch"/>, <contact fullname="Brian Trammell"/>, and
the rest of the QIRG community as a whole for their very useful reviews
and comments on the document.</t>
</section>
</back>
</rfc>