rfc9583xml2.original.xml   rfc9583.xml 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE rfc [
<!DOCTYPE rfc SYSTEM "rfc2629.dtd" [ <!ENTITY nbsp "&#160;">
<!ENTITY zwsp "&#8203;">
<!ENTITY rfc7498 PUBLIC '' 'http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference. <!ENTITY nbhy "&#8209;">
RFC.7498.xml'> <!ENTITY wj "&#8288;">
<!ENTITY rfc2119 PUBLIC '' 'http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.
RFC.2119.xml'>
<!ENTITY rfc7258 PUBLIC '' 'http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.
RFC.7258.xml'>
<!ENTITY rfc9340 PUBLIC '' 'http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.
RFC.9340.xml'>
<!ENTITY I-D.dahlberg-ll-quantum SYSTEM 'http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibx
ml3/reference.I-D.dahlberg-ll-quantum.xml'>
<!ENTITY I-D.van-meter-qirg-quantum-connection-setup SYSTEM 'http://xml.resource
.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.van-meter-qirg-quantum-connection-setup.xm
l'>
]> ]>
<rfc ipr="trust200902" category="info" docName="draft-irtf-qirg-quantum-internet <rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" category="info
-use-cases-19"> " number="9583" docName="draft-irtf-qirg-quantum-internet-use-cases-19" obsolete
<?rfc toc="yes"?> s="" updates="" consensus="true" submissionType="IRTF" xml:lang="en" tocInclude=
<?rfc symrefs="yes"?> "true" symRefs="true" sortRefs="true" version="3">
<?rfc sortrefs="yes"?>
<?rfc compact="yes"?>
<?rfc subcompact="no"?>
<?rfc private=""?>
<?rfc topblock="yes"?>
<?rfc comments="no"?>
<front> <front>
<title abbrev=" Quantum Internet Application Scenarios">Application Scenario <title abbrev="Quantum Internet Application Scenarios">Application Scenarios
s for the Quantum Internet</title> for the Quantum Internet</title>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9583"/>
<author initials="C." surname="Wang" fullname="Chonggang Wang"> <author initials="C." surname="Wang" fullname="Chonggang Wang">
<organization>InterDigital Communications, LLC</organization> <organization>InterDigital Communications, LLC</organization>
<address> <address>
<postal> <postal>
<street>1001 E Hector St</street> <street>1001 E Hector St</street>
<city>Conshohocken</city> <city>Conshohocken</city>
<region>PA</region>
<code>19428</code> <code>19428</code>
<country>USA</country> <country>United States of America</country>
<region></region>
</postal> </postal>
<phone></phone>
<email>Chonggang.Wang@InterDigital.com</email> <email>Chonggang.Wang@InterDigital.com</email>
<uri></uri>
</address> </address>
</author> </author>
<author initials="A." surname="Rahman" fullname="Akbar Rahman"> <author initials="A." surname="Rahman" fullname="Akbar Rahman">
<organization>Ericsson</organization> <organization>Ericsson</organization>
<address> <address>
<postal> <postal>
<street>349 Terry Fox Drive</street> <street>349 Terry Fox Drive</street>
<city>Ottawa Ontario</city> <city>Ottawa</city>
<region>Ontario</region>
<code>K2K 2V6</code> <code>K2K 2V6</code>
<country>Canada</country> <country>Canada</country>
<region></region>
</postal> </postal>
<phone></phone>
<email>Akbar.Rahman@Ericsson.Com</email> <email>Akbar.Rahman@Ericsson.Com</email>
<uri></uri>
</address> </address>
</author> </author>
<author initials="R." surname="Li" fullname="Ruidong Li"> <author initials="R." surname="Li" fullname="Ruidong Li">
<organization>Kanazawa University</organization> <organization>Kanazawa University</organization>
<address> <address>
<postal> <postal>
<street>Kakuma-machi</street> <street>Kakumamachi, Kanazawa</street>
<city>Kanazawa City</city> <region>Ishikawa</region>
<code>Ishikawa Prefecture 920-1192</code> <code>920-1192</code>
<country>Japan</country> <country>Japan</country>
<region></region>
</postal> </postal>
<phone></phone>
<email>lrd@se.kanazawa-u.ac.jp</email> <email>lrd@se.kanazawa-u.ac.jp</email>
<uri></uri>
</address> </address>
</author> </author>
<author initials="M." surname="Aelmans" fullname="Melchior Aelmans">
<author initials="M." surname="Aelmans" fullname="Melchior Aelmans"> <organization>Juniper Networks</organization>
<organization>Juniper Networks</organization> <address>
<address> <postal>
<postal> <street>Boeing Avenue 240</street>
<street>Boeing Avenue 240</street> <city>Schiphol-Rijk</city>
<city>Schiphol-Rijk</city> <code>1119 PZ</code>
<code>1119 PZ</code> <country>Netherlands</country>
<country>The Netherlands</country> </postal>
<region/> <email>maelmans@juniper.net</email>
</postal> </address>
<phone/> </author>
<email>maelmans@juniper.net</email> <author initials="K." surname="Chakraborty" fullname="Kaushik Chakraborty">
<uri/>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="K." surname="Chakraborty" fullname="Kaushik Chakraborty
">
<organization>The University of Edinburgh</organization> <organization>The University of Edinburgh</organization>
<address> <address>
<postal> <postal>
<street>10 Crichton Street</street> <street>10 Crichton Street</street>
<city>Edinburgh</city> <city>Edinburgh, Scotland</city>
<code>EH8 9AB, Scotland</code> <code>EH8 9AB</code>
<country>UK</country> <country>United Kingdom</country>
<region></region>
</postal> </postal>
<phone></phone> <email>kaushik.chakraborty9@gmail.com</email>
<email>kchakrab@exseed.edu.ac.uk</email>
<uri></uri>
</address> </address>
</author> </author>
<date year="2023" month="October" day="16"/> <date year="2024" month="June"/>
<area>Internet Research Task Force (IRTF)</area>
<workgroup>QIRG</workgroup> <workgroup>QIRG</workgroup>
<keyword>Quantum Key Distribution</keyword>
<keyword>Blind Quantum Computing</keyword>
<keyword>Distributed Quantum Computing</keyword>
<keyword>Entanglement Distribution</keyword>
<keyword>Quantum Internet Requirement</keyword>
<abstract> <abstract>
<t> <t>The Quantum Internet has the potential to improve application
The Quantum Internet has the potential to improve application fun functionality by incorporating quantum information technology into the
ctionality by incorporating quantum information infrastructure of the overall Internet. This document provides an
technology into the infrastructure of the overall Internet. This overview of some applications expected to be used on the Quantum
document provides an overview of some applications Internet and categorizes them. Some general requirements for the Quantum
expected to be used on the Quantum Internet and categorizes them. Internet are also discussed. The intent of this document is to describe
Some general a framework for applications and to describe a few selected application
requirements for the Quantum Internet are also discussed. The int scenarios for the Quantum Internet. This document is a product of the
ent of this document is to describe a Quantum Internet Research Group (QIRG).</t>
framework for applications, and describe a few selected applicati
on scenarios for the Quantum Internet.This document
is a product of the Quantum Internet Research Group (QIRG).
</t>
</abstract> </abstract>
</front> </front>
<middle> <middle>
<section anchor="sec_introduction" numbered="true" toc="default">
<section anchor="sec:introduction" title="Introduction"> <name>Introduction</name>
<t>The Classical, i.e., non-quantum, Internet has been constantly
<t> growing since it first became commercially popular in the early 1990s.
The Classical, i.e., non-quantum, Internet has been constantly growin It essentially consists of a large number of end nodes (e.g., laptops,
g since it first became commercially popular in the early 1990's. It essentiall smart phones, and network servers) connected by routers and clustered in
y consists Autonomous Systems. The end nodes may run applications that provide
of a large number of end nodes (e.g., laptops, smart phones, netw service for the end users such as processing and transmission of voice,
ork servers) connected by routers and clustered in Autonomous Systems. video, or data. The connections between the various nodes in the
The end nodes may run applications that provide service for the e Internet include backbone links (e.g., fiber optics) and access links
nd users such as processing and transmission of voice, video or data. (e.g., fiber optics, Wi-Fi, cellular wireless, and Digital Subscriber
The connections between the various nodes in the Internet include Lines (DSLs)). Bits are transmitted across the Classical Internet in
backbone links (e.g., fiber optics) and access packets.
links (e.g., fiber optics, WiFi, cellular wireless, Digital Subsc
riber Lines (DSLs)). Bits are transmitted across the Classical Internet in packe
ts.
</t> </t>
<t> <t>Research and experiments have picked up over the last few years for
Research and experiments have picked up over the last few years for deve developing the Quantum Internet <xref target="Wehner"
loping the Quantum Internet <xref target="Wehner" />. format="default"/>. End nodes will also be a part of the Quantum
End nodes will also be part of the Quantum Internet, in that case Internet; in that case, they are called "quantum end nodes" and may be con
called quantum end nodes that may be connected by quantum repeaters/routers. nected by
These quantum end nodes will also run value-added applications wh quantum repeaters and/or routers. These quantum end nodes will also run
ich will be discussed later. value-added applications, which will be discussed later.
</t> </t>
<t>The physical layer quantum channels between the various nodes in the
<t> Quantum Internet can be either waveguides, such as optical fibers, or free
The physical layer quantum channels between the various nodes in space. Photonic channels are particularly useful because light
the Quantum Internet can be either waveguides such as optical fibers or free spa (photons) is very suitable for physically realizing qubits. The Quantum
ce. Internet will operate according to quantum physical principles such as
Photonic channels are particularly useful because light (photons) quantum superposition and entanglement <xref target="RFC9340"
is very suitable for physically realizing qubits. The Quantum Internet will ope format="default"/>.
rate </t>
according to quantum physical principles such as quantum superpos <t>The Quantum Internet is not anticipated to replace but rather to
ition and entanglement <xref target="RFC9340" />. enhance the Classical Internet and/or provide breakthrough
</t> applications. For instance, Quantum Key Distribution can improve the
security of the Classical Internet, and quantum computing can expedite and
<t> optimize computation-intensive tasks in the Classical Internet. The
The Quantum Internet is not anticipated to replace, but rather to Quantum Internet will run in conjunction with the Classical
enhance the Classical Internet and/or provide breakthrough applications. For in Internet. The process of integrating the Quantum Internet with the
stance, Classical Internet is similar to the process of introducing any new
quantum key distribution can improve the security of the Classica communication and networking paradigm into the existing Internet but
l Internet; quantum computing can expedite and optimize computation-intensive ta with more profound implications.
sks </t>
in the Classical Internet. The Quantum Internet will run in <t>The intent of this document is to provide a common understanding and
conjunction with the Classical Internet. The process of integrati framework of applications and application scenarios for the Quantum
ng the Quantum Internet with the Classical Internet. It is noted that ITU-T SG13-TD158/WP3 <xref target="ITUT"
Internet is similar to the process of introducing any new communi format="default"/> briefly describes four kinds of use cases of quantum
cation and networking networks beyond Quantum Key Distribution networks: quantum time
paradigm into the existing Internet, but with more profound impli synchronization use cases, quantum computing use cases, quantum random
cations. number generator use cases, and quantum communication use cases (e.g.,
</t> quantum digital signatures, quantum anonymous transmission, and quantum
<t> money). This document focuses on quantum applications that have more
The intent of this document is to provide a common understanding impact on networking, such as secure communication setup, blind quantum
and framework of applications computing, and distributed quantum computing; although these
and application scenarios for the Quantum Internet. It is noted t applications were mentioned in <xref target="ITUT" format="default"/>,
hat ITU-T SG13-TD158/WP3 <xref target="ITUT"/> briefly describes four kinds of u this document gives more details and derives some requirements from
se cases of quantum a networking perspective.
networks beyond quantum key distribution networks: quantum time s </t>
ynchronization use cases, quantum computing use cases, quantum random number gen <t>This document was produced by the Quantum Internet Research
erator use cases, and quantum Group (QIRG). It was discussed on the QIRG mailing list and during several
communication use cases (e.g., quantum digital signatures, quantu meetings of the research group. It has been reviewed extensively by the
m anonymous transmission, and quantum money). This document focuses on quantum a QIRG members with expertise in both quantum physics and Classical
pplications that have more impact on networking such as secure communication set Internet operation. This document represents the consensus of the QIRG
up, blind quantum computing, members, of both experts in the subject matter (from the quantum and
and distributed quantum computing; although these applications we networking domains) and newcomers, who are the target audience. It is
re mentioned in <xref target="ITUT"/>, this document gives more details and deri not an IETF product and is not a standard.
ves some requirements from networking perspective.
</t> </t>
<t>This document was produced by the Quantum Internet Research Group(QI
RG). It was discussed on the QIRG mailing list and several meetings of the Resea
rch Group. It has been reviewed extensively by the QIRG members with expertise i
n
both quantum physics and classical Internet operation. This docum
ent represents the consensus of the QIRG members, of both experts in the subject
matter (from the quantum and networking domains) and newcomers who are the targ
et audience.
It is not an IETF product and is not a standard.
</t>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="sec_acronyms" numbered="true" toc="default">
<section anchor="sec:acronyms" title="Terms and Acronyms List"> <name>Terms and Acronyms List</name>
<t> <t>This document assumes that the reader is familiar with the terms and
This document assumes that the reader is familiar with the quantu concepts that relate to quantum information technology described in
m information technology related terms and concepts that are <xref target="RFC9340" format="default"/>. In addition, the following
described in <xref target="RFC9340" />. In addition, the followi terms and acronyms are defined herein for clarity:
ng terms and acronyms are defined herein for clarity:
</t> </t>
<dl spacing="normal">
<t> <dt>Bell Pairs:</dt><dd>A special type of quantum state that is two
<list style="symbols"> qubits. The two qubits show a correlation that cannot be observed in
<t>Bell Pairs – A special type of two-qubits quantum stat classical information theory. We refer to such correlation as
e. The two qubits show a correlation that cannot be observed in classical inform quantum entanglement. Bell pairs exhibit the maximal quantum
ation theory. entanglement. One example of a Bell pair is
We refer to such correlation as quantum entanglement. (|00&gt;+|11&gt;)/(Sqrt(2)). The Bell pairs are a fundamental
Bell pairs exhibit the maximal quantum entanglement. One example of a Bell pair resource for quantum communication.</dd>
is (|00>+|11>)/(Sqrt(2)). <dt>Bit:</dt><dd>Binary digit (i.e., fundamental unit of information i
The Bell pairs are a fundamental resource for quantum n
communication. </t> classical communications and classical computing). Bit is used in
<t>Bit - Binary Digit (i.e., fundamental unit of informat the Classical Internet where the state of a bit is deterministic. In
ion in classical communications and classical computing). contrast, qubit is used in the Quantum Internet where the state of a
Bit is used in Classical Internet where the stat qubit is uncertain before it is measured.</dd>
e of a bit is deterministic. In contrast, Qubit is used in Quantum Internet <dt>Classical Internet:</dt><dd>The existing, deployed Internet (circa
where the state of a qubit is uncertain 2020)
before it is measured. </t> where bits are transmitted in packets between nodes to convey
information. The Classical Internet supports applications that may
<t>Classical Internet - The existing, deployed Internet ( be enhanced by the Quantum Internet. For example, the end-to-end
circa 2020) where bits are transmitted in packets between nodes to convey inform security of a Classical Internet application may be improved by
ation. a secure communication setup using a quantum application. Classical
The Classical Internet supports applications which may Internet is a network of classical network nodes that do not
be enhanced by the Quantum Internet. For example, the end-to-end security of a support quantum information technology. In contrast, Quantum
Classical Internet application may be improved by secu Internet consists of quantum nodes based on quantum information
re communication setup using a quantum application. Classical Internet is a netw technology.</dd>
ork <dt>Entanglement Swapping:</dt><dd>It is a process of sharing an
of classical network nodes which do not support q entanglement between two distant parties via some intermediate
uantum information technology. In contrast, Quantum Internet consists of quantum nodes. For example, suppose that there are three parties (A, B, and
nodes based on C) and that each of the parties (A, B) and (B, C) share Bell
quantum information technology. </t> pairs. B can use the qubits it shares with A and C to perform
entanglement-swapping operations, and as a result, A and C share
<!--<t>DSL - Digital Subscriber Line</t>--> Bell pairs. Entanglement swapping essentially realizes entanglement
<!--<t>GUI - Graphical User Interface</t>--> distribution (i.e., two nodes separated in distance can share a Bell
<t>Entanglement Swapping: It is a process of sharing an e pair).</dd>
ntanglement between two distant parties via some intermediate nodes. For example <dt>Fast Byzantine Negotiation:</dt><dd>A quantum-based method for
, suppose there are three parties A, B, C, fast agreement in Byzantine negotiations <xref target="Ben-Or"
and each of the parties (A, B) and (B, C) share Bell pair format="default"/> <xref target="Taherkhani"
s. B can use the qubits it shares with A and C to perform entanglement swapping format="default"/>.</dd>
operations, and as a result, <dt>Local Operations and Classical Communication (LOCC):</dt><dd>A
A and C share Bell pairs. Entanglement swapping essential method where nodes communicate in rounds, in which (1) they can send
ly realizes entanglement distribution (i.e., two nodes in distance can share a B any classical information to each other, (2) they can perform local
ell pair). </t> quantum operations individually, and (3) the actions performed in
each round can depend on the results from previous rounds.</dd>
<t>Fast Byzantine Negotiation - A Quantum-based method fo <dt>Noisy Intermediate-Scale Quantum (NISQ):</dt><dd>NISQ was
r fast agreement in Byzantine negotiations <xref target="Ben-Or" /> <xref target defined in <xref target="Preskill" format="default"/> to represent a
="Taherkhani" />. </t> near-term era in quantum technology. According to this definition,
<!--<t>Hybrid Internet - The "new" or evolved Internet to NISQ computers have two salient features: (1) the size of NISQ
be formed due to a merger of the Classical Internet and the Quantum Internet.</ computers range from 50 to a few hundred physical qubits (i.e.,
t> --> intermediate-scale) and (2) qubits in NISQ computers have inherent
errors and the control over them is imperfect (i.e., noisy).</dd>
<t>Local Operations and Classical Communication (LOCC) - <dt>Packet:</dt><dd>A self-identified message with in-band addresses
A method where nodes communicate in rounds, in which (1) they can send any class or other information that can be used for forwarding the
ical message. The message contains an ordered set of bits of determinate
information to each other; (2) they can perform local number. The bits contained in a packet are classical bits.</dd>
quantum operations individually; and (3) the actions performed in each round ca <dt>Prepare and Measure:</dt><dd>A set of Quantum Internet scenarios w
n depend here
on the results from previous rounds. </t> quantum nodes only support simple quantum functionalities (i.e.,
prepare qubits and measure qubits). For example, BB84 <xref
<t>Noisy Intermediate-Scale Quantum (NISQ) - NISQ was def target="BB84" format="default"/> is a prepare-and-measure quantum
ined in <xref target="Preskill"/> to represent a near-term era in quantum techno key distribution protocol.</dd>
logy. <dt>Quantum Computer (QC):</dt><dd>A quantum end node that also has
According to this definition, NISQ computers have two sal quantum memory and quantum computing capabilities is regarded as a
ient features: (1) The size of NISQ computers range from 50 to a few hundred phy full-fledged quantum computer.</dd>
sical qubits <dt>Quantum End Node:</dt><dd>An end node that hosts user
(i.e., intermediate-scale); and (2) Qubits in NISQ comput applications and interfaces with the rest of the Internet.
ers have inherent errors and the control over them is imperfect (i.e., noisy).</ Typically, an end node may serve in a client, server, or
t> peer-to-peer role as part of the application. A quantum end node
must also be able to interface to the Classical Internet for control
<t> Packet - A self-identified message with in-band addre purposes and thus be able to receive, process, and transmit
sses or other information that can be used for forwarding the message. The messa classical bits and/or packets.</dd>
ge contains <dt>Quantum Internet:</dt><dd>A network of quantum networks. The
an ordered set of bits of determinate number. The bits co Quantum Internet is expected to be merged into the Classical
ntained in a packet are classical bits. </t> Internet. The Quantum Internet may either improve classical
<!--<t>Packet - Formatted unit of multiple related bits. applications or enable new quantum applications.</dd>
The bits contained in a packet may be classical bits, or the measured state of q <dt>Quantum Key Distribution (QKD):</dt><dd>A method that leverages
ubits expressed in classical bits.</t> --> quantum mechanics such as a no-cloning theorem to let two parties
<t>Prepare-and-Measure - A set of Quantum Internet scenar create the same arbitrary classical key.</dd>
ios where quantum nodes only support simple quantum functionalities (i.e., prepa <dt>Quantum Network:</dt><dd>A new type of network enabled by quantum
re qubits and measure qubits). information technology where quantum resources, such as qubits and
For example, BB84 <xref target="BB84"/> is a prepare-and- entanglement, are transferred and utilized between quantum nodes.
measure quantum key distribution protocol. The quantum network will use both quantum channels and classical
</t> channels provided by the Classical Internet, referred to as a "hybrid
<t>Quantum Computer (QC) - A quantum end node that also h implementation".</dd>
as quantum memory and quantum computing capabilities is regarded as a full-fledg <dt>Quantum Teleportation:</dt><dd>A technique for transferring
ed quantum quantum information via Local Operations and Classical Communication
computer.</t> (LOCC). If two parties share a Bell pair, then by using quantum
teleportation, a sender can transfer a quantum data bit to a receiver
<t>Quantum End Node - An end node that hosts user applica without sending it physically via a quantum channel.</dd>
tions and interfaces with the rest of the Internet. Typically, an end node may <dt>Qubit:</dt><dd>Quantum bit (i.e., fundamental unit of
serve in a client, information in quantum communication and quantum computing). It is
server, or peer-to-peer role as part of the application. similar to a classic bit in that the state of a qubit is either "0"
A quantum end node must also be able to interface to the Classical Internet for or "1" after it is measured and denotes its basis state vector as
control |0&gt; or |1&gt; using Dirac's ket notation. However, the qubit is
purposes and thus also be able to receive, process, and t different than a classic bit in that the qubit can be in a linear
ransmit classical bits/packets.</t> combination of both states before it is measured and termed to be in
superposition. Any of several Degrees of Freedom (DOF) of a photon
<t>Quantum Internet - A network of Quantum Networks. (e.g., polarization, time bib, and/or frequency) or an electron
The Quantum Internet is expected to be merged into the Classical Internet. (e.g., spin) can be used to encode a qubit.</dd>
The Quantum Internet may either improve classical applic <dt>Teleport a Qubit:</dt><dd>An operation on two or more carriers in
ations or may enable new quantum applications.</t> succession to move a qubit from a sender to a receiver using quantum
teleportation.</dd>
<t>Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) - A method that leverag <dt>Transfer a Qubit:</dt><dd>An operation to move a qubit from a send
es quantum mechanics such as no-cloning theorem to let two parties create the sa er to
me arbitrary classical key.</t> a receiver without specifying the means of moving the qubit, which
<!--<t>Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) - A method that lev could be "transmit" or "teleport".</dd>
erages quantum mechanics such as no-cloning theorem to let two parties (e.g., a <dt>Transmit a Qubit:</dt><dd>An operation to encode a qubit into a mo
sender and a receiver) securely establish/agree on a key.</t> --> bile
carrier (i.e., typically photon) and pass it through a quantum
<t>Quantum Network - A new type of network enabled by qua channel from a sender (a transmitter) to a receiver.</dd>
ntum information technology where quantum resources such as qubits and entanglem </dl>
ent are transferred and
utilized between quantum nodes. The Quantum Network will
use both quantum channels, and classical channels provided by the Classical Int
ernet, referred to as
a hybrid implementation. </t>
<!--<t>Quantum Network - A new type of network enabled b
y quantum information technology where qubits are transmitted between nodes to c
onvey information.
(Note: qubits must be sent individually and not in packet
s). The Quantum Network will use both quantum channels, and classical channels p
rovided
by the Classical Internet.</t>-->
<t>Quantum Teleportation - A technique for transferring q
uantum information via local operations and classical communication (LOCC). If t
wo parties share a Bell pair,
then using quantum teleportation a sender can transfer a
quantum data bit to a receiver without sending it physically via a quantum chann
el.
</t>
<t>Qubit - Quantum Bit (i.e., fundamental unit of informa
tion in quantum communication and quantum computing). It is similar to a classi
c bit in that the state of a qubit
is either "0" or "1" after it is measured, and is denoted
as its basis state vector |0> or |1> using Dirac's ket notation. However, the
qubit is different than a classic bit in that
the qubit can be in a linear combination of both states b
efore it is measured and termed to be in superposition. Any of several Degrees o
f Freedom (DOF) of a photon
(e.g., polarization, time bib, and/or frequency) or an el
ectron (e.g., spin) can be used to encode a qubit.</t>
<!--<t>VoIP - Voice Over IP</t>-->
<t>Transmit a Qubit - An operation of encoding a qubit in
to a mobile carrier (i.e., typically photon) and passing it through a quantum ch
annel from
a sender (a transmitter) to a receiver.</t>
<t>Teleport a Qubit - An operation on two or more carrier
s in succession to move a qubit from a sender to a receiver using quantum telepo
rtation. </t>
<t>Transfer a Qubit - An operation to move a qubit from a
sender to a receiver without specifying the means of moving the qubit, which co
uld be “transmit” or “teleport”.</t>
</list>
</t>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="sec_applications" numbered="true" toc="default">
<section anchor="sec:applications" title="Quantum Internet Applications"> <name>Quantum Internet Applications</name>
<t>The Quantum Internet is expected to be beneficial for a subset of
<t> existing and new applications. The expected applications for the
The Quantum Internet is expected to be beneficial for a subset of Quantum Internet are still being developed as we are in the formative
existing and new applications. stages of the Quantum Internet <xref target="Castelvecchi"
The expected applications for the Quantum Internet are still bein format="default"/> <xref target="Wehner" format="default"/>. However,
g developed as we are in the formative stages an initial (and non-exhaustive) list of the applications to be supported
of the Quantum Internet <xref target="Castelvecchi" /> <xref targ on the Quantum Internet can be identified and classified using two
et="Wehner" />. However, an initial different schemes. Note that this document does not include quantum
(and non-exhaustive) list of the applications to be supported on computing applications that are purely local to a given node. </t>
the Quantum Internet can be identified and <t>Applications may be grouped by the usage that they serve.
classified using two different schemes. Note, this document does Specifically, applications may be grouped according to the following
not include quantum computing applications that are purely categories:
local to a given node. </t>
<!--We use "applications" in the widest sense of the word and inc <dl spacing="normal">
lude functionality typically contained in Layers 4 <dt>Quantum cryptography applications:</dt><dd>Refer to the use of
(Transport) to Layers 7 (Application) of the Open System Intercon quantum information technology for cryptographic tasks (e.g.,
nect (OSI) model. --> Quantum Key Distribution <xref target="Renner"
</t> format="default"/>).</dd>
<dt>Quantum sensor applications:</dt><dd>Refer to the use of
<t>Applications may be grouped by the usage that they serve. Spe quantum information technology for supporting distributed sensors
cifically, (e.g., clock synchronization <xref target="Jozsa2000"
applications may be grouped according to the following categories format="default"/> <xref target="Komar" format="default"/> <xref
: target="Guo" format="default"/>).</dd>
<list style="symbols"> <dt>Quantum computing applications:</dt><dd>Refer to the use of
<t>Quantum cryptography applications - Refer to the use o quantum information technology for supporting remote quantum
f quantum information technology for cryptographic tasks computing facilities (e.g., distributed quantum computing <xref
(e.g., quantum key distribution <xref target="Renner" />) target="Denchev" format="default"/>).</dd>
.</t> </dl>
<t>Quantum sensors applications - Refer to the use of qua <t>This scheme can be easily understood by both a technical and
ntum information technology for supporting non-technical audience. The next sections describe the scheme in more
distributed sensors (e.g., clock synchronization <xref ta detail.
rget="Jozsa2000"/> <xref target="Komar" /> <xref target="Guo" /> ).</t> </t>
<t>Quantum computing applications - Refer to the use of q <section anchor="sec_typeofquantumcrypto" numbered="true" toc="default">
uantum information technology for <name>Quantum Cryptography Applications</name>
supporting remote quantum computing facilities (e.g., dis <t> Examples of quantum cryptography applications include quantum-based
tributed quantum computing <xref target="Denchev" />).</t> secure communication setup and fast Byzantine negotiation.
</t>
</list> <dl spacing="normal">
<dt>Secure communication setup:</dt><dd>Refers to secure
This scheme can be easily understood by both a technical cryptographic key distribution between two or more end nodes. The
and non-technical audience. most well-known method is referred to as "Quantum Key Distribution (QK
The next sections describe the scheme in more detail. D)"
</t> <xref target="Renner" format="default"/>.</dd>
<dt>Fast Byzantine negotiation:</dt><dd>Refers to a quantum-based
<section anchor="sec:typeofquantumcrypto" title="Quantum method for fast agreement in Byzantine negotiations <xref
Cryptography Applications"> target="Ben-Or" format="default"/>, for example, to reduce the
<t> Examples of quantum cryptography applications number of expected communication rounds and, in turn, to achieve
include quantum-based secure communication setup and fast Byzantine negotiation faster agreement, in contrast to classical Byzantine negotiations. A
. quantum-aided Byzantine agreement on quantum repeater networks as
<list style="numbers"> proposed in <xref target="Taherkhani" format="default"/> includes
<t>Secure communication setup - Refers to optimization techniques to greatly reduce the quantum circuit depth
secure cryptographic key distribution between two or more end nodes. and the number of qubits in each node. Quantum-based methods for
The most well-known method is referred to fast agreement in Byzantine negotiations can be used for improving
as Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) <xref target="Renner" />.</t> consensus protocols such as practical Byzantine Fault
Tolerance (pBFT) as well as other distributed computing features
<t>Fast Byzantine negotiation - Refers to that use Byzantine negotiations.</dd>
a Quantum-based method for fast agreement in Byzantine negotiations <xref targe <dt>Quantum money:</dt><dd>Refers to the main security requirement
t="Ben-Or" />, for example, of money is unforgeability. A quantum money scheme aims to exploit
to reduce the number of expected communic the no-cloning property of the unknown quantum states. Though the
ation rounds and in turn achieve faster agreement, in contrast to classical Byza original idea of quantum money dates back to 1970, these early
ntine negotiations. A quantum aided Byzantine agreement protocols allow only the issuing bank to verify a quantum
on quantum repeater networks as proposed banknote. However, the recent protocols such as public key quantum
in <xref target="Taherkhani" /> includes optimization techniques to greatly redu money <xref target="Zhandry" format="default"/> allow anyone to
ce the quantum circuit depth and the number of qubits in each node. verify the banknotes locally.</dd>
Quantum-based methods for fast agreement </dl>
in Byzantine negotiations can be used for improving consensus protocols such as </section>
practical Byzantine <section anchor="sec_typeofquantumsensor" numbered="true" toc="default">
Fault Tolerance(pBFT), as well as other d <name>Quantum Sensing and Metrology Applications</name>
istributed computing features which use Byzantine negotiations.</t> <t>The entanglement, superposition, interference, and squeezing of
properties can enhance the sensitivity of the quantum sensors and
<t>Quantum money - The main security requ eventually can outperform the classical strategies. Examples of
irement of money is unforgeability. A quantum money scheme aims to fulfill by ex quantum sensor applications include network clock synchronization,
ploiting the no-cloning property of the unknown quantum high-sensitivity sensing, etc. These applications mainly leverage a
states. Though the original idea of quant network of entangled quantum sensors (i.e., quantum sensor networks)
um money dates back to 1970, these early protocols allow only the issuing bank t for high-precision, multiparameter estimation <xref target="Proctor"
o verify a quantum banknote. However, the recent protocols format="default"/>.
such as public-key quantum money <xref ta </t>
rget ="Zhandry" /> allow anyone to verify the banknotes locally.</t> <dl spacing="normal">
</list> <dt>Network clock synchronization:</dt><dd>Refers to a world wide
</t> set of high-precision clocks connected by the Quantum Internet to
</section> achieve an ultra precise clock signal <xref target="Komar"
format="default"/> with fundamental precision limits set by quantum
<section anchor="sec:typeofquantumsensor" title="Quantum theory.</dd>
Sensing/Metrology Applications"> <dt>High-sensitivity sensing:</dt><dd>Refers to applications that
<t> The entanglement, superposition, interference leverage quantum phenomena to achieve reliable nanoscale sensing of
, squeezing properties can enhance the sensitivity of the quantum sensors and ev physical magnitudes. For example, <xref target="Guo"
entually can outperform the classical format="default"/> uses an entangled quantum network for measuring
strategies. Examples of quantum sensor applic the average phase shift among multiple distributed nodes.</dd>
ations include network clock synchronization, high sensitivity sensing, etc. The <dt>Interferometric telescopes using quantum information:</dt><dd>
se applications mainly Refers to interferometric techniques that are used to combine
leverage a network of entangled quantum s signals from two or more telescopes to obtain measurements with
ensors (i.e. quantum sensor networks) for high-precision multi-parameter estimat higher resolution than what could be obtained with either telescope
ion <xref target="Proctor" />. individually. It can make measurements of very small astronomical
<list style="numbers"> objects if the telescopes are spread out over a wide area. However,
<t>Network clock synchronization - Refers the phase fluctuations and photon loss introduced by the
to a world wide set of high-precision clocks connected by the Quantum Internet communication channel between the telescopes put a limitation on the
to achieve an ultra baseline lengths of the optical interferometers. This limitation can
precise clock signal <xref target="Komar" potentially be avoided using quantum teleportation. In general, by
/> with fundamental precision limits set by quantum theory.</t> sharing Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen pairs using quantum repeaters, the
<t>High sensitivity sensing - Refers to a optical interferometers can communicate photons over long distances,
pplications that leverage quantum phenomena to achieve reliable nanoscale sensin providing arbitrarily long baselines <xref target="Gottesman2012"
g of format="default"/>.</dd>
physical magnitudes. For example, <xref t </dl>
arget="Guo" /> uses an entangled quantum network for measuring the average phase </section>
shift among multiple <section anchor="sec_typeofquantumcomputing" numbered="true" toc="default"
distributed nodes.</t> >
<!--<t>Quantum imaging - The highly sensi <name>Quantum Computing Applications</name>
tive quantum sensors show great potential in improving the domain of magnetoence <t>In this section, we include the applications for the quantum
phalography. Unlike the current classical strategies, computing. It's anticipated that quantum computers as a cloud service
with the help of a network of quantum sen will become more available in future. Sometimes, to run such
sors, it is possible to measure the magnetic fields generated by the flow of cur applications in the cloud while preserving the privacy, a client and a
rent through neuronal assemblies in server need to exchange qubits (e.g., in blind quantum computation
the brain while the subject is moving. It <xref target="Fitzsimons" format="default"/> as described
reveals the dynamics of the networks of neurons inside the human brain on a mil below). Therefore, such privacy preserving quantum computing
lisecond timescale. This kind of applications require a Quantum Internet to execute. </t>
imaging capability could improve the diag <t> Examples of quantum computing include distributed quantum
nosis and monitoring the conditions like attention-deficit-hyperactivity disorde computing and blind quantum computing, which can enable new types of
r <xref target="Hill" />. </t> --> cloud computing.
<t> Interferometric Telescopes using Quan </t>
tum Information - Interferometric techniques are used to combine signals from tw <dl spacing="normal">
o or more telescopes to obtain <dt>Distributed quantum computing:</dt><dd>Refers to a collection
measurements with higher resolution than of small-capacity, remote quantum computers (i.e., each supporting
what could be obtained with either telescope individually. It can make measureme a relatively small number of qubits) that are connected and work
nts of very small astronomical together in a coordinated fashion so as to simulate a virtual
objects if the telescopes are spread out large capacity quantum computer <xref target="Wehner"
over a wide area. However, the phase fluctuations and photon loss introduced by format="default"/>.</dd>
the communication channel between <dt>Blind quantum computing:</dt><dd> Refers to private, or blind,
the telescopes put a limitation on the ba quantum computation, which provides a way for a client to delegate
seline lengths of the optical interferometers. This limitation can be potentiall a computation task to one or more remote quantum computers without
y avoided using quantum teleportation. disclosing the source data to be computed <xref
In general, by sharing EPR-pairs using qu target="Fitzsimons" format="default"/>.</dd>
antum repeaters, the optical interferometers can communicate photons over long d </dl>
istances, providing arbitrarily </section>
long baselines <xref target="Gottesman201
2" />. </t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section anchor="sec:typeofquantumcomputing" title="Quant
um Computing Applications">
<t> In this section, we include the applications
for the quantum computing. It's anticipated that quantum computers as a cloud se
rvice will become more available in future.
Sometimes, to run such applications in the cl
oud while preserving the privacy, a client and a server need to exchange qubits
(e.g., in blind quantum
computation <xref target="Fitzsimons"/> a
s described below). Therefore, such privacy preserving quantum computing applica
tions require a Quantum Internet to execute. </t>
<t> Examples of quantum computing include distrib
uted quantum computing and blind quantum computing, which can
enable new types of cloud computing.
<list style="numbers">
<t>Distributed quantum computing - Refers
to a collection of remote small-capacity quantum computers (i.e., each supporti
ng a relatively small number of qubits)
that are connected and work together in a
coordinated fashion so as to simulate a virtual large capacity
quantum computer <xref target="Wehner" />
.</t>
<t>Blind quantum computing - Refers to pr
ivate, or blind, quantum computation,
which provides a way for a client to dele
gate a computation task to one or more remote quantum computers without disclosi
ng the source data
to be computed over <xref target="Fitzsim
ons"/>.</t>
<!-- <t>Quantum chemistry - Quantum chemi
stry is one of the most promising quantum computing applications that can outper
form the classical strategy using only a few hundred
qubits quantum computers. Using the NISQ
devices, the quantum algorithms manage to determine the molecular energies of th
e small molecules within
chemical accuracy <xref target="YudongCao
" />. However, due to the short coherence time of the quantum devices, it is sti
ll difficult to simulate larger molecules. </t>
-->
</list>
</t>
</section>
<!--
<section anchor="sec:classification" title="Control vs Data Plane
Classification">
<t>The majority of routers currently used in the Classica
l Internet separate control plane functionality and data plane functionality for
,
amongst other reasons, stability, capacity and security.
In order to classify applications for the Quantum Internet, a somewhat similar
distinction can be made. Specifically some applications
can be classified as being responsible for initiating sessions and performing ot
her
control plane functionality (including management functio
nalities too). Other applications carry application or user data and can be cla
ssified as
data plane functionality.
</t>
<t>Some examples of what may be called control plane appl
ications in the Classical Internet are Domain Name Server (DNS),
Session Information Protocol (SIP), and Internet Control
Message Protocol (ICMP). Furthermore, examples of data plane
applications are E-mail, web browsing, and video streamin
g. Note that some applications may require both control plane
and data plane functionality. For example, a Voice over I
P (VoIP) application may use SIP to set up the call and then
transmit the VoIP user packets over the data plane to the
other party.
</t>
<t>Similarly, nodes in the Quantum Internet applications
may also use the classification paradigm of control plane functionality
versus data plane functionality where:
<list style="symbols">
<t>Control Plane - Network functions and processe
s that operate on (1) control bits/packets or qubits (e.g., to setup up end-user
encryption); or (2) management bits/packets or qu
bits (e.g., to configure nodes). For example, a quantum ping could be implemente
d
as a control plane application to test and verify
if there is a quantum connection between two quantum nodes.
Another example is quantum superdense coding (whi
ch is used to transmit two classical bits by sending only one qubit). Quantum su
perdense
coding can be leveraged to implement a secret sha
ring application
to share secrets between two parties <xref target
="Wang" />. This secret sharing application based on quantum superdense encoding
can be classified
as control plane functionality.</t>
<t>Data Plane - Network functions and processes t
hat operate on end-user application bits/packets or qubits (e.g., voice, video,
data). Sometimes also referred to as the user pla
ne. For example, a data plane application can be video conferencing, which
uses QKD-based secure communication setup (which
is a control plane function) to share a classical secret key for encrypting
and decrypting video frames.</t>
</list>
</t>
<t> As shown in the table in <xref target="fig:controldat
aplane" />, control and data plane applications vary for different types of netw
orks.
For a standalone Quantum Network (i.e., that is not integ
rated into the Internet), entangled qubits are its "data" and thus entanglement
distribution can be
regarded as its data plane application, while the signall
ing for controlling entanglement distribution be considered as control plane.
However, looking at the Quantum Internet, QKD-based secur
e communication setup, which may be based on and leverage entanglement distribut
ion, is
in fact a control plane application, while video conferen
ce using QKD-based secure communication setup is a data plane application.
In the future, two data planes may exist, respectively fo
r Quantum Internet and Classical Internet, while one control plane can be levera
ged for
both Quantum Internet and Classical Internet.
</t>
</section> -->
</section> </section>
<section anchor="sec_usecases" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Selected Quantum Internet Application Scenarios</name>
<t>The Quantum Internet will support a variety of applications and
deployment configurations. This section details a few key application
scenarios that illustrate the benefits of the Quantum Internet. In
system engineering, an application scenario is typically made up of a
set of possible sequences of interactions between nodes and users in a
particular environment and related to a particular goal. This will be
the definition that we use in this section.
</t>
<section anchor="sec_usecase1" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Secure Communication Setup</name>
<t>In this scenario, two nodes (e.g., quantum node A and quantum node
B) need to have secure communications for transmitting confidential
information (see <xref target="fig_securecom" format="default"/>).
For this purpose, they first need to securely share a classic secret
cryptographic key (i.e., a sequence of classical bits), which is
triggered by an end user with local secure interface to quantum node
A. This results in a quantum node A securely establishing a classical
secret key with a quantum node B. This is referred to as a "secure
communication setup". Note that quantum nodes A and B may be either a
bare-bone quantum end node or a full-fledged quantum computer. This
application scenario shows that the Quantum Internet can be leveraged
to improve the security of Classical Internet applications.
</t>
<t>One requirement for this secure communication setup process is that
it should not be vulnerable to any classical or quantum computing
attack. This can be realized using QKD, which is unbreakable in
principle. QKD can securely establish a secret key between two
quantum nodes, using a classical authentication channel and insecure
quantum channel without physically transmitting the key through the
network and thus achieving the required security. However, care must
be taken to ensure that the QKD system is safe against physical side-cha
nnel attacks that can compromise the system. An example of a
physical side-channel attack is to surreptitiously inject additional
light into the optical devices used in QKD to learn side information
about the system such as the polarization. Other specialized physical
attacks against QKD also use a classical authentication channel and
an insecure quantum channel such as the phase-remapping attack, photon
number splitting attack, and decoy state attack <xref
target="Zhao2018" format="default"/>. QKD can be used for many other
cryptographic communications, such as IPsec and Transport Layer
Security (TLS), where involved parties need to establish a shared
security key, although it usually introduces a high latency.
</t>
<t>QKD is the most mature feature of quantum information
technology and has been commercially released in small-scale and
short-distance deployments. More QKD use cases are described in the ETSI
document <xref target="ETSI-QKD-UseCases" format="default"/>; in
addition, interfaces between QKD users and QKD
devices are specified in the ETSI document <xref target="ETSI-QKD-Interf
aces"
format="default"/>.
</t>
<t>In general, the prepare-and-measure QKD protocols (e.g., <xref
target="BB84" format="default"/>) without using entanglement work as
follows:
</t>
<ol spacing="normal" type="1">
<li>The quantum node A encodes classical bits to qubits. Basically,
the node A generates two random classical bit strings X and Y. Among
them, it uses the bit string X to choose the basis and uses Y to
choose the state corresponding to the chosen basis. For example, if
X=0, then in case of the BB84 protocol, Alice prepares the state in
{|0&gt;, |1&gt;}-basis; otherwise, she prepares the state in {|+&gt;,
|-&gt;}-basis. Similarly, if Y=0, then Alice prepares the qubit
as either |0&gt; or |+&gt; (depending on the value of X); and if Y =1,
then Alice prepares the qubit as either |1&gt; or |-&gt;.</li>
<li>The quantum node A sends qubits to the quantum node B via a
quantum channel.</li>
<li>The quantum node B receives qubits and measures each of them in
one of the two bases at random.</li>
<li>The quantum node B informs the quantum node A of its choice of
bases for each qubit.</li>
<li>The quantum node A informs the quantum node B which random
quantum basis is correct.</li>
<li>Both nodes discard any measurement bit under different quantum
bases, and the remaining bits could be used as the secret key.
Before generating the final secret key, there is a post-processing
procedure over authenticated classical channels. The classical
post-processing part can be subdivided into three steps, namely
parameter estimation, error correction, and privacy
amplification. In the parameter estimation phase, both Alice and Bob
use some of the bits to estimate the channel error. If it is larger
than some threshold value, they abort the protocol or otherwise move t
o
the error-correction phase. Basically, if an eavesdropper tries to
intercept and read qubits sent from node A to node B, the
eavesdropper will be detected due to the entropic uncertainty
relation property theorem of quantum mechanics. As a part of the
post-processing procedure, both nodes usually also perform
information reconciliation <xref target="Elkouss" format="default"/>
for efficient error correction and/or conduct privacy amplification
<xref target="Tang" format="default"/> for generating the final
information-theoretical secure keys.</li>
<li>The post-processing procedure needs to be performed over an
authenticated classical channel. In other words, the quantum node A
and the quantum node B need to authenticate the classical channel to
make sure there is no eavesdroppers or on-path attacks,
according to certain authentication protocols such as that described i
n <xref
target="Kiktenko" format="default"/>. In <xref target="Kiktenko"
format="default"/>, the authenticity of the classical channel is
checked at the very end of the post-processing procedure instead of
doing it for each classical message exchanged between the quantum
node A and the quantum node B.</li>
</ol>
<t>It is worth noting that:
</t>
<ol spacing="normal" type="1">
<li>There are many enhanced QKD protocols based on <xref
target="BB84" format="default"/>. For example, a series of loopholes
have been identified due to the imperfections of measurement
devices; there are several solutions to take into account concerning
these attacks such as measurement-device-independent QKD <xref
target="Zheng2019" format="default"/>. These enhanced QKD protocols
can work differently than the steps of BB84 protocol <xref
target="BB84" format="default"/>.</li>
<section anchor="sec:usecases" title="Selected Quantum Internet Applicati <li>For large-scale QKD, QKD Networks (QKDNs) are required, which can
on Scenarios"> be regarded as a subset of a Quantum Internet. A QKDN may consist of
a QKD application layer, a QKD network layer, and a QKD link layer
<t>The Quantum Internet will support a variety of applications an <xref target="Qin" format="default"/>. One or multiple trusted QKD
d deployment configurations. This section details relays <xref target="Zhang2018" format="default"/> may exist between
a few key application scenarios which illustrates the benefits the quantum node A and the quantum node B, which are connected by a
of the Quantum Internet. In system engineering, an application scenario QKDN. Alternatively, a QKDN may rely on entanglement distribution
is typically made up of a set of possible sequences of interac and entanglement-based QKD protocols; as a result,
tions between nodes and users in a particular quantum repeaters and/or routers instead of trusted QKD relays are nee
environment and related to a particular goal. This will be th ded
e definition that we use in this section. for large-scale QKD. Entanglement swapping can be leveraged to
</t> realize entanglement distribution.</li>
<section anchor="sec:usecase1" title="Secure Communication Setup"
>
<t>
In this scenario, two nodes (e.g., quantum node A and qua
ntum node B) need to have secure
communications for transmitting confidential information
(see <xref target="fig:securecom" />).
For this purpose, they first need to securely share a cla
ssic secret cryptographic key (i.e., a sequence of classical bits),
which is triggered by an end user with local secure inter
face to quantum node A. This results in a quantum node A
to securely establish a classical secret key with a quantum node
B.
This is referred to as a secure communication setup. Note
that quantum nodes A and B may be either
a bare-bone quantum end node or a full-fledged quantum co
mputer. This application scenario shows that the Quantum Internet
can be leveraged to improve the security of Classical Int
ernet applications.
</t>
<t>
One requirement for this secure communication setup proce
ss is that it should not be vulnerable to any
classical or quantum computing attack. This can be reali
zed using QKD which is unbreakable in principle.
QKD can securely establish a secret key between two quant
um nodes, using a classical authentication channel and insecure quantum channel
without physically transmitting the key through the netwo
rk and thus achieving the required security.
However, care must be taken to ensure that the QKD system
is safe against physical side channel attacks which can compromise the
system. An example of a physical side channel attack is
to surreptitiously inject additional light
into the optical devices used in QKD to learn side inform
ation about the system such as the polarization.
Other specialized physical attacks against QKD also use a
classical authentication channel and insecure
quantum channel such as the phase-remapping attack,
photon number splitting attack, and decoy state attack <x
ref target="Zhao2018" />. QKD can be used for many other cryptographic communica
tions, such as IPSec and
Transport Layer Security (TLS) where involved parties nee
d to establish a shared security key, although it usually introduces a high late
ncy.
</t>
<t>
QKD is the most mature feature of the quantum information
technology, and has been commercially released in
small-scale and short-distance deployments. More QKD use
cases are described in ETSI documents <xref target="ETSI-QKD-UseCases" />; in ad
dition, the ETSI document
<xref target="ETSI-QKD-Interfaces" /> specifies interface
s between QKD users and QKD devices.
</t>
<t>
In general, the prepare and measure QKD protocols (e.
g., <xref target="BB84"/>) without using entanglement work as follows:
<list style="numbers">
<t> The quantum node A encodes classical bits to
qubits. Basically, the node A generates two random classical bit strings X, Y. A
mong them, it uses the bit
string X to choose the basis and uses Y to choose
the state corresponding to the chosen basis. For example, if X=0 then in case o
f BB84 protocol Alice prepares the state
in {|0>, |1>}-basis; otherwise she prepares the s
tate in {|+>, |->}-basis. Similarly, if Y=0 then Alice prepares the qubit either
|0> or |+> (depending on the value of X),
and if Y =1, then Alice prepares the qubit either
|1> or |->.</t>
<t> The quantum node A sends qubits to the quantu
m node B via quantum channel.</t>
<t> The quantum node B receives qubits and measur
es each of them in one of the two basis at random. </t>
<t> The quantum node B informs the quantum node A
of its choice of basis for each qubit.</t>
<t> The quantum node A informs the quantum node B
which random quantum basis is correct.</t>
<t> Both nodes discard any measurement bit under
different quantum basis and remaining bits could be used as the secret key.
Before generating the final secret key, there is
a post-processing procedure over authenticated classical channels. The classical
post-processing part can be subdivided
into three steps, namely parameter estimation, er
ror-correction, and privacy amplification. In the parameter estimation phase, bo
th Alice and Bob use some of the bits to
estimate the channel error. If it is larger than
some threshold value, they abort the protocol otherwise move to the error-correc
tion phase.
Basically, if an eavesdropper tries to intercept
and read qubits sent from node A to node B, the eavesdropper will be detected du
e to
the entropic uncertainty relation property theore
m of quantum mechanics. As a part of the post-processing procedure, both nodes u
sually also perform information reconciliation <xref target="Elkouss"/>
for efficient error correction and/or conduct pri
vacy amplification <xref target="Tang"/> for generating the final information-th
eoretical secure keys. </t>
<t> The post-processing procedure needs to be per
formed over an authenticated classical channel. In other words, the quantum node
A and the quantum node B need
to authenticate the classical channel to make sur
e there is no eavesdroppers or man-in-the-middle attacks, according to certain a
uthentication protocols such as <xref target=" Kiktenko"/>.
In <xref target=" Kiktenko"/>, the authenticity o
f the classical channel is checked at the very end of the post-processing proced
ure instead of doing it for each classical message exchanged
between the quantum node A and the quantum node B
.
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
It is worth noting that:
<list style="numbers">
<t> There are many enhanced QKD protocols based
on <xref target="BB84"/>. For example, a series of loopholes have been identifie
d due to the imperfections of measurement devices;
there are several solutions to take into acc
ount these attacks such as measurement-device-independent QKD <xref target="Zhan
g2019"/>. These enhanced QKD protocols can work differently than the steps
of BB84 protocol <xref target="BB84"/>.
</t>
<t> For large-scale QKD, QKD Networks (QKDN) are
required, which can be regarded as a subset of a Quantum Internet. A QKDN may
consist of a QKD application layer, a QKD network layer, and a QKD link layer <x
ref target="Qin"/>.
One or multiple trusted QKD relays <xref tar
get="Zhang2018"/> may exist between the quantum node A and the quantum node B, w
hich are connected by a QKDN. Alternatively, a QKDN may rely on
entanglement distribution and entangleme
nt-based QKD protocols; as a result, quantum-repeaters/routers instead of truste
d QKD relays are needed for large-scale QKD.
Entanglement swapping can be leveraged t
o realize entanglement distribution.
</t>
<!-- In general, there could be three types of Q <li>QKD provides an information-theoretical way to share secret keys
KD solutions: 1) Basic QKD: In this case, QKD only works for two directly connec between two parties (i.e., a transmitter and a receiver) in the
ted quantum nodes within a short distance or a network segment; presence of an eavesdropper. However, this is true in theory, and
If both nodes are long-distanced, trusted no there is a significant gap between theory and practice. By exploiting
des will be needed for relaying multiple basic QKDs between two faraway quantum the imperfection of the detectors, Eve can gain information about the
nodes; 2) E2E QKD: In this case, based on long-distance qubit transmission, shared key <xref target="Xu" format="default"/>. To avoid such
QKD works for two faraway quantum nodes side-channel attacks in <xref target="Lo" format="default"/>, the
to provide the end-to-end security without relying on trusted nodes; and 3) Adva researchers provide a QKD protocol called "Measurement
nced E2E QKD: In this case, Device-Independent (MDI)" QKD that allows two users (a transmitter
two quantum nodes are far away from each "Alice" and a receiver "Bob") to communicate with perfect security,
other but long-distance qubit transmission may not be available. Instead, QKD l even if the (measurement) hardware they are using has been tampered
everages entanglement distribution with (e.g., by an eavesdropper) and thus is not trusted. It is
or quantum repeaters (not trusted nodes) achieved by measuring correlations between signals from Alice and Bob,
to achieve the end-to-end security. rather than the actual signals themselves.</li>
-->
<!--<t> Although the addresses of Source Quantum <li>QKD protocols based on Continuous Variable QKD (CV-QKD) have recently
Node A and Destination Quantum Node B could be identified and exposed, the iden seen plenty of interest as they only require telecommunications
tity of users, who will use equipment that is readily available and is also in common use
the secret cryptographic key for secure communications, wil industry-wide. This kind of technology is a potentially
l not necessarily be exposed during QKD process. In other words, there is no dir high-performance technique for secure key distribution over limited
ect mapping distances. The recent demonstration of CV-QKD shows compatibility
from the addresses of quantum nodes to t with classical coherent detection schemes that are widely used for
he user identity; as a result, QKD protocols do not disclose user identities. high-bandwidth classical communication systems <xref
</t>--> target="Grosshans" format="default"/>. Note that we still do not have
<t> QKD provides an information-theoretical way a quantum repeater for the continuous variable systems; hence, these
to share secret keys between two parties (i.e., a transmitter and a receiver) in kinds of QKD technologies can be used for the short distance
the presence of an eavesdropper. However, this is true in theory, and there is communications or trusted relay-based QKD networks.</li>
a significant gap
between theory and practice. By exploiting t
he imperfection of the detectors Eve can gain information about the shared key <
xref target="Xu" />.
To avoid such side-channel attacks in <x
ref target="Lo" />, the researchers provide a QKD protocol called Measurement De
vice-Independent (MDI) QKD that allows two
users (a transmitter “Alice” and a recei
ver “Bob”) to communicate with perfect security, even if the (measurement) hardw
are they are using has been tampered with (e.g.,
by an eavesdropper) and thus is not trus
ted. It is achieved by measuring correlations between signals from Alice and Bob
rather than the actual signals themselves.
</t>
<t> QKD protocols based on Continuous Variable (
CV-QKD) have recently seen plenty of interest as they only require telecommunica
tions equipment that is readily available and
is also in common use industry-wide. This ki
nd of technology is a potentially high-performance technique for secure key dist
ribution over limited distances.
The recent demonstration of CV-QKD shows
compatibility with classical coherent detection schemes that are widely used fo
r high bandwidth classical
communication systems <xref target="Gros
shans" />. Note that we still do not have a quantum repeater for the continuous
variable systems; hence, this kind of QKD technologies
can be used for the short distance commu
nications or trusted relay-based QKD networks.
</t>
<t> Secret sharing can be used to distribute a s
ecret key among multiple nodes by letting each node know a share or a part of th
e secret key, while no single node can know the
entire secret key. The secret key can only b
e re-constructed via collaboration from a sufficient number of nodes. Quantum Se
cret Sharing (QSS) typically refers to the
scenario: The secret key to be shared is
based on quantum states instead of classical bits. QSS enables to split and sha
re such quantum states among multiple nodes.
</t>
<t> There are some entanglement-based QKD protoc
ols, such as <xref target="Treiber"/><xref target="E91"/><xref target="BBM92"/>,
which work differently than the above steps. The entanglement-based schemes, wh
ere entangled states are
prepared externally to the quantum node A an
d the quantum node B, are not normally considered "prepare-and-measure" as defin
ed in <xref target="Wehner"/>;
other entanglement-based schemes, where
entanglement is
generated within the source quantum node
can still be considered "prepare-and-measure"; send-and-return schemes can stil
l be "prepare-and-measure", if the information content, from which keys will be
derived, is prepared within the quantum
node A before being sent to the quantum node B for measurement.
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t> As a result, the Quantum Internet in <xref target="fi
g:securecom" /> contains quantum channels. And in order to support secure commun
ication setup especially in large-scale deployment, it also requires entanglemen
t generation
and entanglement distribution <xref target="I-D.van-meter
-qirg-quantum-connection-setup"/>, quantum repeaters/routers, and/or trusted QKD
relays.
</t>
<t> <li>Secret sharing can be used to distribute a secret key among
<?rfc needLines="16" ?> multiple nodes by letting each node know a share or a part of the
<figure anchor="fig:securecom" title="Secure Comm secret key, while no single node can know the entire secret key. The
unication Setup"> secret key can only be reconstructed via collaboration from a
<artwork align="center"> sufficient number of nodes. Quantum Secret Sharing (QSS) typically
<![CDATA[ refers to the following scenario: the secret key to be shared is based
on quantum states instead of classical bits. QSS enables splitting and
sharing such quantum states among multiple nodes.</li>
<li>There are some entanglement-based QKD protocols, such as that describ
ed in <xref
target="Treiber" format="default"/>, <xref target="E91"
format="default"/>, and <xref target="BBM92" format="default"/>, which
work differently than the above steps. The entanglement-based schemes,
where entangled states are prepared externally to the quantum node A
and the quantum node B, are not normally considered
"prepare and measure" as defined in <xref target="Wehner"
format="default"/>. Other entanglement-based schemes, where
entanglement is generated within the source quantum node, can still be
considered "prepare and measure". Send-and-return schemes can still be
"prepare and measure" if the information content, from which keys
will be derived, is prepared within the quantum node A before being
sent to the quantum node B for measurement.</li>
</ol>
<t> As a result, the Quantum Internet in <xref target="fig_securecom"
format="default"/> contains quantum channels. And in order to support
secure communication setup, especially in large-scale deployment, it
also requires entanglement generation and entanglement distribution
<xref target="I-D.van-meter-qirg-quantum-connection-setup"
format="default"/>, quantum repeaters and/or routers, and/or trusted QKD
relays.
</t>
<figure anchor="fig_securecom">
<name>Secure Communication Setup</name>
<artwork align="center" name="" type="" alt=""><![CDATA[
+---------------+ +---------------+
| End User | | End User |
+---------------+ +---------------+
^ ^
| Local Secure Interface | Local Secure Interface
| (e.g., the same physical hardware | (e.g., the same physical hardware
| or a local secure network) | or a local secure network)
V V
+-----------------+ /--------\ +-----------------+ +-----------------+ /--------\ +-----------------+
| |--->( Quantum )--->| | | |--->( Quantum )--->| |
| | ( Internet ) | | | | ( Internet ) | |
| Quantum | \--------/ | Quantum | | Quantum | \--------/ | Quantum |
| Node A | | Node B | | Node A | | Node B |
| | /--------\ | | | | /--------\ | |
| | ( Classical) | | | | ( Classical) | |
| |<-->( Internet )<-->| | | |<-->( Internet )<-->| |
+-----------------+ \--------/ +-----------------+ +-----------------+ \--------/ +-----------------+
]]> ]]></artwork>
</artwork> </figure>
</figure> </section>
</t> <section anchor="sec_usecase2" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Blind Quantum Computing</name>
</section> <t>Blind quantum computing refers to the following scenario:
</t>
<section anchor="sec:usecase2" title="Blind Quantum Computing"> <ol spacing="normal" type="1">
<t> <li>A client node with source data delegates the computation of the
Blind quantum computing refers to the following s source data to a remote computation node (i.e., a server).</li>
cenario:
<list style="numbers">
<t>A client node with source data delegat
es the computation of the source data to a remote computation node (i.e. a serve
r).</t>
<t>Furthermore, the client node does not
want to disclose any source data to the remote computation node, which preserves
the source data privacy.</t>
<t>Note that there is no assumption or gu
arantee that the remote computation node is a trusted entity from the source dat
a privacy perspective.</t>
</list>
</t>
<t> As an example illustrated in <xref target="fig:bqcom" <li>Furthermore, the client node does not want to disclose any
/>, a terminal node can be a small quantum computer with limited computation ca source data to the remote computation node, which preserves the
pability compared to source data privacy.</li>
a remote quantum computation node (e.g., a remote mainfra
me quantum computer), but the terminal node needs to run a computation-intensive
task
(e.g., Shor’s factoring algorithm). The terminal node can
create individual qubits and send them to the remote quantum computation node.
Then, the remote
quantum computation node can entangle the qubits, calcula
te on them, measure them, generate measurement results in classical bits, and re
turn the measurement
results to the terminal node. It is noted that those meas
urement results will look like purely random data to the remote quantum computat
ion node because
the initial states of the qubits were chosen in a cryptog
raphically secure fashion.
</t>
<!--<t>
As an example illustrated in <xref target="fig:bq
com" />, a terminal node such as a home gateway has collected lots of data and n
eeds
to perform computation on the data. The terminal
node could be a classical node without any quantum capability, a bare-bone
quantum end-node or a full-fledged quantum comput
er. The terminal node has insufficient computing power and needs to offload data
computation to some remote nodes. Although the te
rminal node can upload the data to the cloud to leverage cloud computing without
introducing local computing overhead, to upload t
he data to the cloud can cause privacy concerns.
In this particular case, there is no privacy conc
ern since the source data will not be sent
to the remote computation node which could be com
promised. Many protocols as described in <xref target="Fitzsimons" /> for delega
ted quantum
computing or Blind Quantum Computation (BQC) can
be leveraged to realize secure delegated computation and guarantee
privacy preservation simultaneously.
</t>
-->
<t>
As a new client/server computation model, Blind Q
uantum Computation (BQC) generally enables: 1) The client delegates a computatio
n
function to the server; 2) The client does not se
nd original qubits to the server, but send transformed qubits to the server; 3)
The computation
function is performed at the server on the transf
ormed qubits to generate temporary result qubits, which could be quantum-circuit
-based
computation or measurement-based quantum computat
ion. The server sends the temporary result qubits to the client; 4) The client r
eceives the
temporary result qubits and transforms them to th
e final result qubits. During this process, the server can not figure out the or
iginal qubits from
the transformed qubits. Also, it will not take to
o much efforts on the client side to transform the original qubits to the transf
ormed qubits, or transform
the temporary result qubits to the final result q
ubits. One of the very first BQC protocols such as <xref target="Childs"/> follo
ws this process, although the client needs some
basic quantum features such as quantum memory, qu
bit preparation and measurement, and qubit transmission. Measurement-based quant
um computation is
out of the scope of this document and more detail
s about it can be found in <xref target="Jozsa2005"/>.
</t>
<t> <li>Note that there is no assumption or guarantee that the remote
It is worth noting that: computation node is a trusted entity from the source data privacy
<list style="numbers"> perspective.</li>
<t> The BQC protocol in <xref target="Chi </ol>
lds"/> is a circuit-based BQC model, where the client only performs simple quant <t> As an example illustrated in <xref target="fig_bqcom"
um circuit for format="default"/>, a terminal node can be a small quantum computer
qubit transformation, while the s with limited computation capability compared to a remote quantum
erver performs a sequence of quantum logic gates. Qubits are transmitted back an computation node (e.g., a remote mainframe quantum computer), but the
d forth between the client terminal node needs to run a computation-intensive task (e.g., Shor's
and the server. factoring algorithm). The terminal node can create individual qubits
</t> and send them to the remote quantum computation node. Then, the remote
<t> Universal BQC in <xref target="Broadb quantum computation node can entangle the qubits, calculate on them,
ent"/> is a measurement-based BQC model, which is based on measurement-based qua measure them, generate measurement results in classical bits, and
ntum computing leveraging return the measurement results to the terminal node. It is noted that
entangled states. The principle i those measurement results will look like purely random data to the
n UBQC is based on the fact the quantum teleportation plus a rotated Bell measur remote quantum computation node because the initial states of the
ement realizes a quantum computation, qubits were chosen in a cryptographically secure fashion.
which can be repeated multiple ti </t>
mes to realize a sequence of quantum computation. In this approach, the client f
irst prepares transformed qubits
and sends them to the server and
the server needs first to prepare entangled states from all received qubits. The
n, multiple interaction and measurement
rounds happen between the client
and the server. For each round, the client computes and sends new measurement in
structions or measurement adaptations
to the server; then, the server p
erforms the measurement according to the received measurement instructions to ge
nerate measurement results (qubits or in classic bits);
the client receives the measureme
nt results and transforms them to the final results.
</t>
<t> A hybrid universal BQC is proposed in
<xref target="Zhang2009"/>, where the server performs both quantum circuits lik
e <xref target="Childs"/> and quantum
measurements like <xref target="B
roadbent"/> to reduce the number of required entangled states in <xref target="B
roadbent"/>. Also, the client is much simpler than
the client in <xref target="Child
s"/>. This hybrid BQC is a combination of circuit-based BQC model and measuremen
t-based BQC model.
</t>
<t> It will be ideal if the client in BQC
is a purely classical client, which only needs to interact with the server usin
g classical channel and communications.
<xref target="Huang"/> demonstrat
es such an approach, where a classical client leverages two entangled servers to
perform BQC, with the assumption that
both servers cannot communicate w
ith each other; otherwise, the blindness or privacy of the client cannot be guar
anteed. The scenario as demonstrated
in <xref target="Huang"/> is esse
ntially an example of BQC with multiple servers.
</t>
<t> How to verify that the server will pe
rform what the client requests or expects is an important issue in many BQC prot
ocols, referred to as verifiable BQC.
<xref target="Fitzsimons"/> discu
sses this issue and compares it in various BQC protocols.
</t>
</list> <t>As a new client and server computation model, Blind Quantum Computatio
</t> n
(BQC) generally enables the following process:</t>
<ol spacing="normal" type="1">
<li>The client delegates a computation function to the server.</li>
<li>The client does not send original qubits to
the server but does send transformed qubits to the server.</li>
<li>The computation function is performed at the server on the
transformed qubits to generate temporary result qubits, which could be
quantum-circuit-based computation or measurement-based quantum
computation. The server sends the temporary result qubits to the
client.</li>
<li>The client receives the temporary result qubits and transforms
them to the final result qubits.</li>
</ol>
<t>During this process, the
server cannot figure out the original qubits from the transformed
qubits. Also, it will not take too much effort on the client side to
transform the original qubits to the transformed qubits or transform
the temporary result qubits to the final result qubits. One of the
very first BQC protocols, such as that described in <xref target="Childs"
format="default"/>, follows this process, although the client needs
some basic quantum features such as quantum memory, qubit preparation
and measurement, and qubit transmission. Measurement-based quantum
computation is out of the scope of this document, and more details
about it can be found in <xref target="Jozsa2005" format="default"/>.
</t>
<t>It is worth noting that:
</t>
<ol spacing="normal" type="1">
<li>The BQC protocol in <xref target="Childs" format="default"/> is
a circuit-based BQC model, where the client only performs simple
quantum circuit for qubit transformation, while the server performs
a sequence of quantum logic gates. Qubits are transmitted back and
forth between the client and the server.</li>
<t> In <xref target="fig:bqcom" />, the Quantum Internet <li><t>Universal BQC (UBQC) in <xref target="Broadbent"
contains quantum channels and quantum repeaters/routers for long-distance qubits format="default"/> is a measurement-based BQC model, which is based
transmission on measurement-based quantum computing leveraging entangled
<xref target="RFC9340" />.</t> states. The principle in UBQC is based on the fact that the quantum
teleportation plus a rotated Bell measurement realize a quantum
computation, which can be repeated multiple times to realize a
sequence of quantum computation. In this approach, the client first
prepares transformed qubits and sends them to the server, and the
server needs to first prepare entangled states from all received
qubits. Then, multiple interaction and measurement rounds happen
between the client and the server. For each round:</t>
<ol type="i" spacing="normal">
<li>the client computes and sends new measurement instructions or
measurement adaptations to the server;</li>
<li>the server performs the measurement according to the received
measurement instructions to generate measurement results (in
qubits or classic bits); and</li>
<li>then the client receives the measurement results and
transforms them to the final results.</li>
</ol>
</li>
<li>A hybrid UBQC is proposed in <xref target="Zhang2009"
format="default"/>, where the server performs both quantum circuits
like that demonstrated in <xref target="Childs" format="default"/>
and quantum measurements like that demonstrated in <xref
target="Broadbent" format="default"/> to reduce the number of
required entangled states in <xref target="Broadbent"
format="default"/>. Also, the client is much simpler than the client
in <xref target="Childs" format="default"/>. This hybrid BQC is a
combination of a circuit-based BQC model and a measurement-based BQC
model.</li>
<t> <li>It is ideal if the client in BQC is a purely classical
<?rfc needLines="16" ?> client, which only needs to interact with the server using classical
<figure anchor="fig:bqcom" title="Bind Quantum Co channels and communications. <xref target="Huang" format="default"/>
mputing"> demonstrates such an approach where a classical client leverages
<artwork align="center"> two entangled servers to perform BQC with the assumption that both
<![CDATA[ servers cannot communicate with each other; otherwise, the blindness
or privacy of the client cannot be guaranteed. The scenario as
demonstrated in <xref target="Huang" format="default"/> is
essentially an example of BQC with multiple servers.</li>
<li>How to verify that the server will perform what the client
requests or expects is an important issue in many BQC protocols,
referred to as "verifiable BQC". <xref target="Fitzsimons"
format="default"/> discusses this issue and compares it in various
BQC protocols.</li>
</ol>
<t> In <xref target="fig_bqcom" format="default"/>, the Quantum Internet
contains quantum channels and quantum repeaters and/or routers for long-distanc
e qubits transmission <xref target="RFC9340" format="default"/>.</t>
<figure anchor="fig_bqcom">
<name>Bind Quantum Computing</name>
<artwork align="center" name="" type="" alt=""><![CDATA[
+----------------+ /--------\ +-------------------+ +----------------+ /--------\ +-------------------+
| |--->( Quantum )--->| | | |--->( Quantum )--->| |
| | ( Internet ) | Remote Quantum | | | ( Internet ) | Remote Quantum |
| Terminal | \--------/ | Computation | | Terminal | \--------/ | Computation |
| Node | | Node | | Node | | Node |
| (e.g., A Small| /--------\ | (e.g., Remote | | (e.g., a small| /--------\ | (e.g., a remote |
| Quantum | ( Classical) | Mainframe | | quantum | ( Classical) | mainframe |
| Computer) |<-->( Internet )<-->| Quantum Computer)| | computer) |<-->( Internet )<-->| quantum computer) |
+----------------+ \--------/ +-------------------+ +----------------+ \--------/ +-------------------+
]]> ]]></artwork>
</artwork> </figure>
</figure> </section>
</t> <section anchor="sec_usecase3" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Distributed Quantum Computing</name>
</section> <t>There can be two types of distributed quantum computing <xref target=
"Denchev" format="default"/>:
<section anchor="sec:usecase3" title="Distributed Quantum Computi </t>
ng"> <ol spacing="normal" type="1">
<li>Leverage quantum mechanics to enhance classical distributed
<t>There can be two types of distributed quantum computin computing. For example, entangled quantum states can be exploited to
g <xref target="Denchev" />: improve leader election in classical distributed computing by
<list style="numbers"> simply measuring the entangled quantum states at each party (e.g., a
<t>Leverage quantum mechanics to enhance node or a device) without introducing any classical communications
classical distributed computing. For example, entangled quantum states can be among distributed parties <xref target="Pal"
exploited to improve leader election in c format="default"/>. Normally, pre-shared entanglement first needs to be
lassical distributed computing, by simply measuring the entangled quantum states established among distributed parties, followed by LOCC operations
at each at each party. And it generally does not need to transfer qubits
party (e.g., a node or a device) without among distributed parties.</li>
introducing any classical communications among distributed parties <xref target= <li><t>Distribute quantum computing functions to distributed quantum
"Pal" />. Normally, pre-shared entanglement needs first be computers. A quantum computing task or function (e.g., quantum
established among distributed parties, fo gates) is split and distributed to multiple physically separate
llowed by LOCC operations at each party. And it generally does not need to trans quantum computers. And it may or may not need to transmit qubits
fer qubits (either inputs or outputs) among those distributed quantum
among distributed parties. computers. Entangled states will be needed and actually consumed to
</t> support such distributed quantum computing tasks. It is worth noting
<t>Distribute quantum computing functions that:</t>
to distributed quantum computers. A quantum computing task or function (e.g., q <ol type="a" spacing="normal">
uantum <li>Entangled states can be created beforehand and stored or
gates) is split and distributed to multip buffered;</li>
le physically separate quantum computers. And it may or may not need to transmit <li>The rate of entanglement creation will limit the
qubits (either inputs or outputs) among t performance of practical Quantum Internet applications including
hose distributed quantum computers. Entangled states will be needed and actually distributed quantum computing, although entangled states could be
consumed to support buffered.</li></ol>
such distributed quantum computing tasks. <t>For example, <xref target="Gottesman1999"
It is worth noting that: 1)Entangled states can be created beforehand and store format="default"/> and <xref target="Eisert" format="default"/> have
d or buffered; 2) demonstrated that a Controlled NOT (CNOT) gate can be realized jointly
The rate of entanglement creation will li by and distributed
mit the performance of practical quantum internet applicaitons including distrib to multiple quantum computers. The rest of this section focuses on
uted quantum computing, this type of distributed quantum computing.
although entangled states could be buffer </t>
ed. For example, <xref target="Gottesman1999" /> and <xref target="Eisert" /> ha </li>
ve proved that a CNOT gate can be </ol>
realized jointly by and distributed to mu <t>As a scenario for the second type of distributed quantum computing,
ltiple quantum computers. The rest of this section focuses on this type of distr Noisy Intermediate-Scale Quantum (NISQ) computers distributed in
ibuted quantum computing. different locations are available for sharing. According to the
</t> definition in <xref target="Preskill" format="default"/>, a NISQ
</list> computer can only realize a small number of qubits and has limited
</t> quantum error correction. This scenario is referred to as "distributed
quantum computing" <xref target="Caleffi" format="default"/> <xref
<t> target="Cacciapuoti2020" format="default"/> <xref
As a scenario for the second type of distributed quantum target="Cacciapuoti2019" format="default"/>. This application scenario
computing, Noisy Intermediate-Scale Quantum (NISQ) computers distributed in reflects the vastly increased computing power that quantum computers
different locations are available for sharing. According can bring as a part of the Quantum Internet, in contrast to classical
to the definition in <xref target="Preskill" />, a NISQ computer computers in the Classical Internet, in the context of a distributed
can only realize a small number of qubits and has limited quantum computing ecosystem <xref target="Cuomo"
quantum error correction. format="default"/>. According to <xref target="Cuomo"
This scenario is referred to as distributed quantum format="default"/>, quantum teleportation enables a new communication
computing <xref target="Caleffi"/> <xref target="Cacciapu paradigm, referred to as "teledata" <xref target="VanMeter2006-01"
oti2020"/> <xref target="Cacciapuoti2019"/>. This application scenario reflects format="default"/>, which moves quantum states among qubits to
the vastly increased computing power which quantum comput distributed quantum computers. In addition, distributed quantum
ers as a part of the Quantum Internet can bring, in contrast to classical computation also needs the capability of remotely performing quantum
computers in the Classical Internet, in the context of di computation on qubits on distributed quantum computers, which can be
stributed quantum computing ecosystem <xref target="Cuomo"/>. According to enabled by the technique called "telegate" <xref
<xref target="Cuomo"/>, quantum teleportation enables a n target="VanMeter2006-02" format="default"/>.
ew communication paradigm, referred to as teledata <xref target="VanMeter2006-01 </t>
"/>, which moves quantum states <t>As an example, a user can leverage these connected NISQ computers
among qubits to distributed quantum computers. In additio to solve highly complex scientific computation problems, such as
n, distributed quantum computation also needs the capability of remotely perform analysis of chemical interactions for medical drug development <xref
ing target="Cao" format="default"/> (see <xref target="fig_dqcom"
quantum computation on qubits on distributed quantum comp format="default"/>). In this case, qubits will be transmitted among
uters, which can be enabled by the technique called telegate <xref target="VanMe connected quantum computers via quantum channels, while the user's
ter2006-02"/>. execution requests are transmitted to these quantum computers via
</t> classical channels for coordination and control purpose. Another
example of distributed quantum computing is secure Multi-Party Quantum
<t>As an example, a user can leverage these connected NIS Computation (MPQC) <xref target="Crepeau" format="default"/>, which
Q computers to solve highly complex scientific computation can be regarded as a quantum version of classical secure Multi-Party
problems, such as analysis of chemical interactions for m Computation (MPC). In a secure MPQC protocol, multiple participants
edical drug development <xref target="Cao"/> (see <xref target="fig:dqcom" />). jointly perform quantum computation on a set of input quantum states,
In this case, which are prepared and provided by different participants. One of the
qubits will be transmitted among connected quantum primary aims of the secure MPQC is to guarantee that each participant
computers via quantum channels, while the user's executio will not know input quantum states provided by other
n requests are transmitted to these quantum computers via classical channels participants. Secure MPQC relies on verifiable quantum secret sharing
for coordination and control purpose. Another example of <xref target="Lipinska" format="default"/>.
distributed quantum computing is secure Multi-Party Quantum Computation (MPQC) < </t>
xref target="Crepeau"/>, <t>For the example shown in <xref target="fig_dqcom"
which can be regarded as a quantum version of classical s format="default"/>, we want to move qubits from one NISQ computer to
ecure Multi-Party Computation (MPC). In a secure MPQC protocol, multiple partici another NISQ computer. For this purpose, quantum teleportation can be
pants jointly leveraged to teleport sensitive data qubits from one quantum computer
perform quantum computation on a set of input quantum sta (A) to another quantum computer (B). Note that <xref target="fig_dqcom"
tes, which are prepared and provided by different participants. One of the prima format="default"/> does not cover measurement-based distributed
ry aims of the secure quantum computing, where quantum teleportation may not be required.
MPQC is to guarantee that each participant will not know When quantum teleportation is employed, the following steps happen
input quantum states provided by other participants. Secure MPQC relies on verif between A and B. In fact, LOCC <xref target="Chitambar"
iable format="default"/> operations are conducted at the quantum computers A
quantum secret sharing <xref target="Lipinska" />. and B in order to achieve quantum teleportation as illustrated in
</t> <xref target="fig_dqcom" format="default"/>.
</t>
<ol spacing="normal" type="1">
<li>The quantum computer A locally generates some sensitive data
qubits to be teleported to the quantum computer B.</li>
<t> <li>A shared entanglement is established between the quantum
For the example shown in <xref target="fig:dqcom"/>, we w computer A and the quantum computer B (i.e., there are two entangled
ant to move qubits from one NISQ computer to another NISQ computer. For this pur qubits: q1 at A and q2 at B). For example, the quantum computer A
pose, quantum teleportation can be can generate two entangled qubits (i.e., q1 and q2) and send q2 to
leveraged to teleport sensitive data qubits from one quan the quantum computer B via quantum communications.</li>
tum computer A to another quantum computer B.
Note that <xref target="fig:dqcom" /> does not cover meas
urement-based distributed quantum computing, where quantum teleportation may not
be required.
When quantum teleportation is employed, the following ste
ps happen between A and B. In fact, LOCC <xref target="Chitambar"/> operations a
re conducted at the quantum
computers A and B in order to achieve quantum teleportati
on as illustrated in <xref target="fig:dqcom" />.
<list style="numbers">
<t> The quantum computer A locally genera
tes some sensitive data qubits to be teleported to the quantum computer B. </t>
<t> A shared entanglement is establis
hed between the quantum computer A and the quantum computer B (i.e., there are t
wo entangled qubits: q1 at A and q2 at B).
For example, the quantum computer
A can generate two entangled qubits (i.e., q1 and q2) and sends q2 to the quant
um computer B via quantum communications. </t>
<t> Then, the quantum computer A perf
orms a Bell measurement of the entangled qubit q1 and the sensitive data qubit.<
/t>
<t> The result from this Bell measure
ment will be encoded in two classical bits, which will be physically transmitted
via a classical channel to the quantum computer B.</t>
<t> Based on the received two classical b
its, the quantum computer B modifies the state of the entangled qubit q2 in the
way to generate a new qubit identical to
the sensitive data qubit at the quant
um computer A.</t>
</list>
</t>
<t> In <xref target="fig:dqcom" />, the Quantum Internet <li>Then, the quantum computer A performs a Bell measurement of the
contains quantum channels and quantum repeaters/routers <xref target="RFC9340" / entangled qubit q1 and the sensitive data qubit.</li>
>.
This application scenario needs to support entangleme
nt generation and entanglement distribution (or quantum connection)
setup <xref target="I-D.van-meter-qirg-quantum-co
nnection-setup"/> in order to support quantum teleportation.
</t>
<t> <li>The result from this Bell measurement will be encoded in two
<?rfc needLines="16" ?> classical bits, which will be physically transmitted via a classical
<figure anchor="fig:dqcom" title="Distributed Qua channel to the quantum computer B.</li>
ntum Computing">
<artwork align="center">
<![CDATA[
<li>Based on the received two classical bits, the quantum computer B
modifies the state of the entangled qubit q2 in the way to generate
a new qubit identical to the sensitive data qubit at the quantum
computer A.</li>
</ol>
<t>In <xref target="fig_dqcom" format="default"/>, the Quantum
Internet contains quantum channels and quantum repeaters and/or routers
<xref
target="RFC9340" format="default"/>. This application scenario needs
to support entanglement generation and entanglement distribution (or
quantum connection) setup <xref
target="I-D.van-meter-qirg-quantum-connection-setup"
format="default"/> in order to support quantum teleportation.
</t>
<figure anchor="fig_dqcom">
<name>Distributed Quantum Computing</name>
<artwork align="center" name="" type="" alt=""><![CDATA[
+-----------------+ +-----------------+
| End User | | End User |
| | | |
+-----------------+ +-----------------+
^ ^
| Local Secure Interface | Local Secure Interface
| (e.g., the same phyical hardware | (e.g., the same physical hardware
| or a local secure network) | or a local secure network)
| |
+------------------+-------------------+ +------------------+-------------------+
| | | |
| | | |
V V V V
+----------------+ /--------\ +----------------+ +----------------+ /--------\ +----------------+
| |--->( Quantum )--->| | | |--->( Quantum )--->| |
| | ( Internet ) | | | | ( Internet ) | |
| Quantum | \--------/ | Quantum | | Quantum | \--------/ | Quantum |
| Computer A | | Computer B | | Computer A | | Computer B |
| (e.g., Site #1)| /--------\ | (e.g., Site #2)| | (e.g., Site #1)| /--------\ | (e.g., Site #2)|
| | ( Classical) | | | | ( Classical) | |
| |<-->( Internet )<-->| | | |<-->( Internet )<-->| |
+----------------+ \--------/ +----------------+ +----------------+ \--------/ +----------------+
]]> ]]></artwork>
</artwork> </figure>
</figure> </section>
</t>
</section>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="sec_generalrequirements" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>General Requirements</name>
<t>Quantum technologies are steadily evolving and improving. Therefore,
it is hard to predict the timeline and future milestones of quantum
technologies as pointed out in <xref target="Grumbling"
format="default"/> for quantum computing. Currently, a NISQ computer can
achieve fifty to hundreds of qubits with some given error rate.
</t>
<t>On the network level, six stages of Quantum Internet development are
described in <xref target="Wehner" format="default"/> as a Quantum
Internet technology roadmap as follows:
</t>
<ol spacing="normal" type="1">
<li>Trusted repeater networks (Stage-1)</li>
<li>Prepare-and-measure networks (Stage-2)</li>
<li>Entanglement distribution networks (Stage-3)</li>
<li>Quantum memory networks (Stage-4)</li>
<li>Fault-tolerant few qubit networks (Stage-5)</li>
<li>Quantum computing networks (Stage-6)</li>
</ol>
<t>The first stage is simple trusted repeater networks, while the final
stage is the quantum computing networks where the full-blown Quantum
Internet will be achieved. Each intermediate stage brings with it new
functionality, new applications, and new characteristics. <xref
target="fig_appsinstages" format="default"/> illustrates Quantum
Internet application scenarios as described in Sections <xref
target="sec_applications" format="counter"/> and <xref
target="sec_usecases" format="counter"/> mapped to the Quantum Internet
stages described in <xref target="Wehner" format="default"/>. For
example, secure communication setup can be supported in Stage-1,
Stage-2, or Stage-3 but with different QKD solutions. More
specifically:</t>
<ul spacing="normal">
<li>In Stage-1, basic QKD is possible and can be leveraged to support
secure communication setup, but trusted nodes are required to provide
end-to-end security. The primary requirement is the trusted nodes. </li>
<li>In Stage-2, the end users can prepare and measure the qubits. In this
stage, the users can verify classical passwords without revealing
them.</li>
<li>In Stage-3, end-to-end security can be enabled based on quantum
repeaters and entanglement distribution to support the same secure
communication setup application. The primary requirement is entanglement
distribution to enable long-distance QKD. </li>
<li>In Stage-4, the quantum repeaters gain the capability of storing and
manipulating entangled qubits in the quantum memories. Using these kinds
of quantum networks, one can run sophisticated applications like blind
quantum computing, leader election, and quantum secret sharing. </li>
<li>In Stage-5, quantum repeaters can perform error correction; hence,
they can perform fault-tolerant quantum computations on the received
data. With the help of these repeaters, it is possible to run
distributed quantum computing and quantum sensor applications over a
smaller number of qubits.</li>
<li>Finally, in Stage-6, distributed quantum computing relying on more
qubits can be supported.</li>
</ul>
<section anchor="sec:generalrequirements" title="General Requirements"> <table align="center" anchor="fig_appsinstages">
<name>Example Application Scenarios in Different Quantum Internet Stages</name
<t>Quantum technologies are steadily evolving and improving. Ther >
efore, it is hard to predict the timeline and future milestones <thead>
of quantum technologies as pointed out in <xref target="Grumbling <tr>
"/> for quantum computing. Currently, a NISQ computer can achieve <th>Quantum Internet Stage</th>
fifty to hundreds of qubits with some given error rate. <th>Example Quantum Internet Use Cases</th>
</t> <th>Characteristic</th>
</tr>
<t>On the network level, six stages of Quantum Internet developme </thead>
nt are described in <xref target="Wehner"/> as Quantum Internet technology roadm <tbody>
ap as follows: <tr>
<list style="numbers"> <td>Stage-1</td>
<t>Trusted repeater networks (Stage-1)</t> <td>Secure communication setup using basic QKD</td>
<t>Prepare and measure networks (Stage-2)</t> <td>Trusted nodes</td>
<t>Entanglement distribution networks (Stage-3)</ </tr>
t> <tr>
<t>Quantum memory networks (Stage-4)</t> <td>Stage-2</td>
<t>Fault-tolerant few qubit networks (Stage-5)</t <td>Secure communication setup using the QKD with end-to-end security</td>
> <td>Prepare-and-measure capability</td>
<t>Quantum computing networks (Stage-6)</t> </tr>
</list> <tr>
</t> <td>Stage-3</td>
<td>Secure communication setup using entanglement-enabled QKD</td>
<t>The first stage is simple trusted repeater networks, while the <td>Entanglement distribution</td>
final stage is the quantum computing networks where the full-blown </tr>
Quantum Internet will be achieved. Each intermediate stage brings <tr>
with it new functionality, new applications, <td>Stage-4</td>
and new characteristics. <xref target="fig:appsinstages"/> illus <td>Blind quantum computing</td>
trates Quantum Internet application scenarios as described in <xref target="sec: <td>Quantum memory</td>
applications" /> and <xref target="sec:usecases" /> mapped to </tr>
the Quantum Internet stages described in <xref target="Wehner"/>. <tr>
For example, secure communication setup can be supported in <td>Stage-5</td>
Stage-1, Stage-2, or Stage-3, but with different QKD solutions. <td>Higher-accuracy clock synchronization</td>
More specifically:</t> <td>Fault tolerance</td>
</tr>
<t>In Stage-1, basic QKD is possible and can be leveraged to supp <tr>
ort secure communication setup but trusted nodes are <td>Stage-6</td>
required to provide end-to-end security. The primary requirement <td>Distributed quantum computing</td>
is the trusted nodes. </t> <td>More qubits</td>
</tr>
<t>In Stage-2, the end users can prepare and measure the qubits. </tbody>
In this stage, the users can verify classical passwords without revealing it.</t </table>
> <t>Some general and functional requirements on the Quantum Internet from
the networking perspective, based on the above application scenarios and
<t>In Stage-3, end-to-end security can be enabled based on quantu Quantum Internet technology roadmap <xref target="Wehner"
m repeaters and entanglement distribution, to support the format="default"/>, are identified and described in next sections. </t>
same secure communication setup application. The primary requirem <section anchor="sec_requirement01" numbered="true" toc="default">
ent is entanglement distribution to enable long-distance QKD. </t> <name>Operations on Entangled Qubits</name>
<t>Methods for facilitating quantum applications to interact
<t>In Stage-4, the quantum repeaters gain the capability of stori efficiently with entangled qubits are necessary in order for them to
ng and manipulating entangled qubits in the quantum memories. Using these kind o trigger distribution of designated entangled qubits to potentially any
f quantum networks, other quantum node residing in the Quantum Internet. To accomplish
one can run sophisticated applications like blind quantum computi this, specific operations must be performed on entangled qubits (e.g.,
ng, leader election, quantum secret sharing. </t> entanglement swapping or entanglement distillation). Quantum nodes may
be quantum end nodes, quantum repeaters and/or routers, and/or quantum
<t>In Stage-5, quantum repeaters can perform error correction; he computers.</t>
nce they can perform fault-tolerant quantum computations on the received data. W </section>
ith the help of <section anchor="sec_requirement02" numbered="true" toc="default">
these repeaters, it is possible to run distributed quantum comput <name>Entanglement Distribution</name>
ing and quantum sensor applications over a smaller number of qubits.</t> <t>Quantum repeaters and/or routers should support robust and efficient
entanglement distribution in order to extend and establish
<t>Finally, in Stage-6, distributed quantum computing relying on a high-fidelity entanglement connection between two quantum nodes. For
more qubits can be supported.</t> achieving this, it is required to first generate an entangled pair on
each hop of the path between these two nodes and then perform
<t> entanglement-swapping operations at each of the intermediate
<?rfc needLines="16" ?> nodes. </t>
<figure anchor="fig:appsinstages" title="Example </section>
Application Scenarios in Different Quantum Internet Stages"> <section anchor="sec_requirement03" numbered="true" toc="default">
<artwork align="center"> <name>The Need for Classical Channels</name>
<![CDATA[ <t>Quantum end nodes must send additional information on classical
+---------+----------------------------+------------------------+ channels to aid in transferring and understanding qubits across
| Quantum | Example Quantum | | quantum repeaters and/or receivers. Examples of such additional informat
| Internet| Internet Use | Characteristic | ion
| Stage | Cases | | include qubit measurements in secure communication setup (<xref
+---------+----------------------------+------------------------+ target="sec_usecase1" format="default"/>) and Bell measurements in
| Stage-1 | Secure comm setup | Trusted nodes | distributed quantum computing (<xref target="sec_usecase3"
| | using basic QKD | | format="default"/>). In addition, qubits are transferred individually
|---------------------------------------------------------------| and do not have any associated packet header, which can help in
| Stage-2 | Secure comm setup | Prepare-and-measure | transferring the qubit. Any extra information to aid in routing,
| | using the QKD with | capability | identification, etc. of the qubit(s) must be sent via classical
| | end-to-end security | | channels.</t>
|---------------------------------------------------------------| </section>
| Stage-3 | Secure comm setup | Entanglement | <section anchor="sec_requirement04" numbered="true" toc="default">
| | using entanglement-enabled | distribution | <name>Quantum Internet Management</name>
| | QKD | | <t>Methods for managing and controlling the Quantum Internet including
|---------------------------------------------------------------| quantum nodes and their quantum resources are necessary. The
| Stage-4 | Blind quantum | Quantum memory | resources of a quantum node may include quantum memory, quantum
| | computing | | channels, qubits, established quantum connections, etc. Such
|---------------------------------------------------------------| management methods can be used to monitor the network status of the
| Stage-5 | Higher-Accuracy Clock | Fault tolerance | Quantum Internet, diagnose and identify potential issues (e.g., quantum
| | synchronization | | connections), and configure quantum nodes with new actions and/or
|---------------------------------------------------------------| policies (e.g., to perform a new entanglement-swapping operation). A new
| Stage-6 | Distributed quantum | More qubits | management information model for the Quantum Internet may need to be
| | computing | | developed. </t>
+---------------------------------------------------------------+ </section>
]]>
</artwork>
</figure>
</t>
<t>Some general and functional requirements on the Quantum Intern
et from the networking perspective, based on the above
application scenarios and Quantum Internet technology roadmap <xr
ef target="Wehner"/>, are identified and described in next sections. </t>
<section anchor="sec:requirement01" title="Operations on Entangled Qubits"
>
<t> Methods for facilitating quantum applications to interact eff
iciently with entangled qubits are necessary in
order for them to trigger distribution of designated entangled qu
bits to potentially any other quantum node residing
in the Quantum Internet. To accomplish this, specific operations
must be performed on entangled qubits
(e.g., entanglement swapping, entanglement distillation). Quantu
m nodes may be quantum end nodes,
quantum repeaters/routers, and/or quantum computers.</t>
</section>
<section anchor="sec:requirement02" title="Entanglement Distribution">
<t> Quantum repeaters/routers should support robust and efficient
entanglement distribution in order to extend and establish
high-fidelity entanglement connection between two quantum nodes.
For achieving this, it is required to first generate an entangled pair on
each hop of the path between these two nodes, and then perform en
tanglement swapping operations at each of the intermediate nodes. </t>
</section>
<section anchor="sec:requirement03" title="The Need for Classical Chann
els">
<t> Quantum end nodes must send additional information on classic
al channels to aid in transferring and understanding qubits across
quantum repeaters/receivers. Examples of such additional informat
ion include qubit measurements in secure communication setup <xref target="sec:u
secase1"/>,
and Bell measurements in distributed quantum computing <xref targ
et="sec:usecase3"/>. In addition, qubits are transferred individually and do not
have any associated packet header
which can help in transferring the qubit. Any extra information t
o aid in routing, identification, etc., of the qubit(s)
must be sent via classical channels.</t>
</section>
<section anchor="sec:requirement04" title="Quantum Internet Management"
>
<t> Methods for managing and controlling the Quantum Internet inc
luding quantum nodes and their quantum resources are necessary.
The resources of a quantum node may include quantum memory, quant
um channels, qubits, established quantum connections, etc. Such
management methods can be used to monitor network status of the Q
uantum Internet, diagnose and identify potential issues
(e.g. quantum connections), and configure quantum nodes with new
actions and/or policies (e.g. to perform a new entanglement
swapping operation). New management information model for the Qua
ntum Internet may need to be developed. </t>
</section>
</section>
<section anchor="sec:conclusion" title="Conclusion">
<t>
This document provides an overview of some expected application categor
ies for the Quantum Internet, and then details selected application scenarios.
The applications are first grouped by their usage which is easy to unde
rstand classification scheme.
This set of applications may, of course, expand over time as the Quantu
m Internet matures. Finally, some
general requirements for the Quantum Internet are also provided.
</t>
<t>
This document can also serve as an introductory text to readers interes
ted in learning about the practical uses
of the Quantum Internet. Finally, it is hoped that this document will
help guide further research and development
of the Quantum Internet functionality required to implement the applica
tion scenarios described herein.
</t>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="sec_conclusion" numbered="true" toc="default">
<section anchor="IANA" title="IANA Considerations"> <name>Conclusion</name>
<t>This document provides an overview of some expected application
<t>This document requests no IANA actions. categories for the Quantum Internet and then details selected
application scenarios. The applications are first grouped by their
usage, which is an easy-to-understand classification scheme. This set of
applications may, of course, expand over time as the Quantum Internet
matures. Finally, some general requirements for the Quantum Internet are
also provided.
</t>
<t>This document can also serve as an introductory text to readers
interested in learning about the practical uses of the Quantum Internet.
Finally, it is hoped that this document will help guide further research
and development of the Quantum Internet functionality required to
implement the application scenarios described herein.
</t> </t>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="IANA" numbered="true" toc="default">
<section anchor="sec:security" title="Security Considerations"> <name>IANA Considerations</name>
<t>This document has no IANA actions.</t>
<t> This document does not define an architecture nor a specific proto
col for the Quantum Internet. It focuses instead on
detailing application scenarios, requirements, and describing typical
Quantum Internet applications. However, some salient observations
can be made regarding security of the Quantum Internet as follows.
</t>
<t>
It has been identified in <xref target="NISTIR8240" /> that once large-
scale quantum computing becomes
reality that it will be able to break many of the public-key (i.
e., asymmetric) cryptosystems
currently in use. This is because of the increase in computing
ability with quantum computers for certain classes
of problems (e.g., prime factorization, optimizations). This wo
uld negatively affect many of the security
mechanisms currently in use on the Classical Internet which are
based on public-key (Diffie-Hellman) encryption.
This has given strong impetus for starting development of new cr
yptographic systems that are secure against
quantum computing attacks <xref target="NISTIR8240" />.
</t>
<t>
Interestingly, development of the Quantum Internet will also mitigate t
he threats posed by quantum computing attacks against
Diffie-Hellman based public-key cryptosystems. Specifically, the
secure communication setup feature of the Quantum Internet as
described in <xref target="sec:usecase1" /> will be strongly res
istant to both classical and quantum computing attacks
against Diffie-Hellman based public-key cryptosystems.
</t>
<t>A key additional threat consideration for the Quantum Internet is poi
nted to by <xref target="RFC7258" />,
which warns of the dangers of pervasive monitoring as a widesprea
d attack on privacy. Pervasive monitoring
is defined as a widespread, and usually covert, surveillance thro
ugh intrusive gathering of application content
or protocol metadata such as headers. This can be accomplished t
hrough active or passive wiretaps, traffic
analysis, or subverting the cryptographic keys used to secure com
munications.
</t>
<t>The secure communication setup feature of the Quantum Internet as des
cribed in <xref target="sec:usecase1" />
will be strongly resistant to pervasive monitoring based on directly
attacking (Diffie-Hellman) encryption keys.
Also, <xref target="sec:usecase2" /> describes a method to perfor
m remote quantum computing while preserving the
privacy of the source data. Finally, the intrinsic property of qu
bits to decohere if they are observed, albeit
covertly, will theoretically allow detection of unwanted monitori
ng in some future solutions.
</t>
<t> Modern networks are implemented with zero trust principles where cla
ssical cryptography is used for confidentiality, integrity protection,
and authentication on many of the logical layers of the network stac
k, often all the way from device to software in the cloud <xref target="NISTSP80
0-207"/>.
The cryptographic solutions in use today are based on well-under
stood primitives, provably secure protocols and state-of-the-art implementations
that are secure against a variety of side-channel attacks.
</t>
<t> In contrast to conventional cryptography and Post-Quantum Cryptography
(PQC), the security of QKD is inherently tied to the physical layer, which makes
the threat
surfaces of QKD and conventional cryptography quite different. QKD i
mplementations have already been subjected to publicized attacks <xref target="Z
hao2008"/> and
the National Security Agency (NSA) notes that the
risk profile of conventional cryptography is better understood <
xref target="NSA"/>. The fact that conventional cryptography and PQC are impleme
nted at a higher layer than the physical one means
PQC can be used to securely send protected information through u
ntrusted relays. This is in stark contrast with QKD, which relies on hop-by-hop
security between
intermediate trusted nodes. The PQC approach is better aligned w
ith the modern technology environment, in which more applications are moving tow
ard end-to-end
security and zero-trust principles. It is also important to note
that while PQC can be deployed as a software update, QKD requires new hardware.
In addition,
IETF has a working group on Post-Quantum Use In Protocols (PQUIP
) that is studying PQC transition issues.
</t>
<t> Regarding QKD implementation details, the NSA states that communication
needs and security requirements physically conflict in QKD and that the enginee
ring required to
balance them has extremely low tolerance for error. While convention
al cryptography can be implemented in hardware in some cases for performance or
other reasons,
QKD is inherently tied to hardware. The NSA points out that this
makes QKD less flexible with regard to upgrades or security patches. As QKD is
fundamentally a
point-to-point protocol, the NSA also notes that QKD networks of
ten require the use of trusted relays, which increases the security risk from in
sider threats.
</t>
<t> The UK’s National Cyber Security Centre cautions against reliance on QK
D, especially in critical national infrastructure sectors, and suggests that PQC
as standardized
by the NIST is a better solution <xref target="NCSC"/>. Meanwhile, t
he National Cybersecurity Agency of France has decided that QKD could be conside
red as a defense-in-depth measure
complementing conventional cryptography, as long as the cost inc
urred does not adversely affect the mitigation of current threats to IT systems
<xref target="ANNSI"/>.
</t>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="sec_security" numbered="true" toc="default">
<section anchor="Acknowledgments" title="Acknowledgments"> <name>Security Considerations</name>
<t>This document does not define an architecture nor a specific protocol
<t>The authors want to thank Michele Amoretti, Mathias Van Den Bossche, Xa for the Quantum Internet. It focuses instead on detailing application
vier de Foy, Patrick Gelard, Álvaro Gómez Iñesta, Mallory Knodel, Wojciech Kozlo scenarios and requirements and describing typical Quantum Internet
wski, applications. However, some salient observations can be made regarding
John Mattsson, Rodney Van Meter, Colin Perkins, Joey Salazar, and Josep security of the Quantum Internet as follows.
h Touch, Brian Trammell, and the rest of the QIRG community as a whole for their </t>
very useful reviews <t>It has been identified in <xref target="NISTIR8240"
and comments to the document.</t> format="default"/> that, once large-scale quantum computing becomes
reality, it will be able to break many of the public key (i.e.,
asymmetric) cryptosystems currently in use. This is because of the
increase in computing ability with quantum computers for certain classes
of problems (e.g., prime factorization and optimizations). This would
negatively affect many of the security mechanisms currently in use on
the Classical Internet that are based on public key (Diffie-Hellman (DH))
encryption. This has given strong impetus for starting development of
new cryptographic systems that are secure against quantum computing
attacks <xref target="NISTIR8240" format="default"/>.
</t>
<t>Interestingly, development of the Quantum Internet will also mitigate
the threats posed by quantum computing attacks against DH-based public
key cryptosystems. Specifically, the secure communication setup feature
of the Quantum Internet, as described in <xref target="sec_usecase1"
format="default"/>, will be strongly resistant to both classical and
quantum computing attacks against Diffie-Hellman based public key
cryptosystems.
</t>
<t>A key additional threat consideration for the Quantum Internet is
addressed in <xref target="RFC7258" format="default"/>, which warns of
the dangers of pervasive monitoring as a widespread attack on privacy.
Pervasive monitoring is defined as a widespread, and usually covert,
surveillance through intrusive gathering of application content or
protocol metadata, such as headers. This can be accomplished through
active or passive wiretaps, through traffic analysis, or by subverting
the cryptographic keys used to secure communications.
</t>
<t>The secure communication setup feature of the Quantum Internet, as
described in <xref target="sec_usecase1" format="default"/>, will be
strongly resistant to pervasive monitoring based on directly attacking
(Diffie-Hellman) encryption keys. Also, <xref target="sec_usecase2"
format="default"/> describes a method to perform remote quantum
computing while preserving the privacy of the source data. Finally, the
intrinsic property of qubits to decohere if they are observed, albeit
covertly, will theoretically allow detection of unwanted monitoring in
some future solutions.
</t>
<t>Modern networks are implemented with zero trust principles where
classical cryptography is used for confidentiality, integrity
protection, and authentication on many of the logical layers of the
network stack, often all the way from device to software in the cloud
<xref target="NISTSP800-207" format="default"/>. The cryptographic
solutions in use today are based on well-understood primitives, provably
secure protocols, and state-of-the-art implementations that are secure
against a variety of side-channel attacks.
</t>
<t>In contrast to conventional cryptography and Post-Quantum
Cryptography (PQC), the security of QKD is inherently tied to the
physical layer, which makes the threat surfaces of QKD and conventional
cryptography quite different. QKD implementations have already been
subjected to publicized attacks <xref target="Zhao2008"
format="default"/>, and the National Security Agency (NSA) notes that the
risk profile of conventional cryptography is better understood <xref
target="NSA" format="default"/>. The fact that conventional cryptography
and PQC are implemented at a higher layer than the physical one means
PQC can be used to securely send protected information through untrusted
relays. This is in stark contrast with QKD, which relies on hop-by-hop
security between intermediate trusted nodes. The PQC approach is better
aligned with the modern technology environment, in which more
applications are moving toward end-to-end security and zero-trust
principles. It is also important to note that, while PQC can be deployed
as a software update, QKD requires new hardware. In addition, the IETF has
a
working group on Post-Quantum Use In Protocols (PQUIP) that is studying
PQC transition issues.
</t>
<t>Regarding QKD implementation details, the NSA states that
communication needs and security requirements physically conflict in QKD
and that the engineering required to balance them has extremely low
tolerance for error. While conventional cryptography can be implemented
in hardware in some cases for performance or other reasons, QKD is
inherently tied to hardware. The NSA points out that this makes QKD less
flexible with regard to upgrades or security patches. As QKD is
fundamentally a point-to-point protocol, the NSA also notes that QKD
networks often require the use of trusted relays, which increases the
security risk from insider threats.
</t>
<t>The UK's National Cyber Security Centre cautions against reliance on
QKD, especially in critical national infrastructure sectors, and
suggests that PQC, as standardized by NIST, is a better solution <xref
target="NCSC" format="default"/>. Meanwhile, the National Cybersecurity
Agency of France has decided that QKD could be considered as a
defense-in-depth measure complementing conventional cryptography, as
long as the cost incurred does not adversely affect the mitigation of
current threats to IT systems <xref target="ANNSI" format="default"/>.
</t>
</section> </section>
</middle> </middle>
<back> <back>
<references title="Informative References"> <displayreference target="I-D.van-meter-qirg-quantum-connection-setup" to="QUANT
UM-CONNECTION"/>
&rfc7258;
&rfc9340;
&I-D.dahlberg-ll-quantum;
&I-D.van-meter-qirg-quantum-connection-setup;
<reference anchor="Castelvecchi" target="https://www.nature.com/articles/d <references>
41586-018-01835-3"> <name>Informative References</name>
<front> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.725
<title>The Quantum Internet has arrived (and it hasn't)</title> 8.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.934
0.xml"/>
<author initials="D." surname="Castelvecchi" /> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.va n-meter-qirg-quantum-connection-setup.xml"/>
<date year="2018" /> <reference anchor="Castelvecchi" target="https://www.nature.com/articles/d
</front> 41586-018-01835-3">
<seriesInfo name="Nature" value="554, 289-292" /> <front>
</reference> <title>The quantum internet has arrived (and it hasn't)</title>
<author initials="D." surname="Castelvecchi" fullname="Davide Castelve
cchi"/>
<date month="February" year="2018"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1038/d41586-018-01835-3"/>
<refcontent>Nature 554, 289-292</refcontent>
</reference>
<reference anchor="Wehner" target="http://science.sciencemag.org/content/3 62/6412/eaam9288.full"> <reference anchor="Wehner" target="http://science.sciencemag.org/content/3 62/6412/eaam9288.full">
<front> <front>
<title>Quantum internet: A vision for the road ahead </title> <title>Quantum internet: A vision for the road ahead</title>
<author initials="S." surname="Wehner"> <author initials="S." surname="Wehner" fullname="Stephanie Wehner"/>
<organization></organization> <author initials="D." surname="Elkouss" fullname="David Elkouss"/>
</author> <author initials="R." surname="Hanson" fullname="Ronald Hanson"/>
<author initials="D." surname="Elkouss"> <date month="October" year="2018"/>
<organization></organization> </front>
</author> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1126/science.aam9288"/>
<author initials="R." surname="Hanson"> <refcontent>Science 362</refcontent>
<organization></organization> </reference>
</author>
<date year="2018" />
</front>
<seriesInfo name="Science" value="362" />
</reference>
<reference anchor="NISTIR8240" target="https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/i r/2019/NIST.IR.8240.pdf"> <reference anchor="NISTIR8240" target="https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/i r/2019/NIST.IR.8240.pdf">
<front> <front>
<title>Status Report on the First Round of the NIST Post-Quantum Crypto <title>Status Report on the First Round of the NIST Post-Quantum Crypt
graphy Standardization Process</title> ography Standardization Process</title>
<author initials="G." surname="Alagic"> <author initials="G." surname="Alagic" fullname="Gorjan Alagic"/>
<organization></organization> <author initials="J." surname="Alperin-Sheriff" fullname="Jacob Alperi
</author> n-Sheriff"/>
<author initials="et" surname="al."> <author initials="D." surname="Apon" fullname="Daniel Apon"/>
<organization></organization> <author initials="D." surname="Cooper" fullname="David Cooper"/>
</author> <author initials="Q." surname="Dang" fullname="Quynh Dang"/>
<date year="2019" /> <author initials="Y-K." surname="Liu" fullname="Yi-Kai Liu"/>
</front> <author initials="C." surname="Miller" fullname="Carl Miller"/>
<seriesInfo name="NISTIR" value="8240" /> <author initials="D." surname="Moody" fullname="Dustin Moody"/>
</reference> <author initials="R." surname="Peralta" fullname="Rene Peralta"/>
<author initials="R." surname="Perlner" fullname="Ray Perlner"/>
<author initials="A." surname="Robinson" fullname="Angela Robinson"/>
<author initials="D." surname="Smith-Tone" fullname="Daniel Smith-Tone"
/>
<date month="January" year="2019"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.6028/NIST.IR.8240"/>
<seriesInfo name="NISTIR" value="8240"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="Komar" target="https://arxiv.org/pdf/1310.6045.pdf"> <reference anchor="Komar" target="https://arxiv.org/pdf/1310.6045.pdf">
<front> <front>
<title>A Quantum Network of Clocks</title> <title>A quantum network of clocks</title>
<author initials="P." surname="Komar"> <author initials="P." surname="Kómár" fullname="Peter Kómár"/>
<organization></organization> <author initials="E. M." surname="Kessler" fullname="Eric M. Kessler"/>
</author> <author initials="M." surname="Bishof" fullname="Michael Bishof"/>
<author initials="et" surname="al."> <author initials="L." surname="Jiang" fullname="Liang Jiang"/>
<organization></organization> <author initials="A. S." surname="Sørensen" fullname="Anders S. Sørense
</author> n"/>
<date year="2013" /> <author initials="J." surname="Ye" fullname="Jun Ye"/>
</front> <author initials="M. D." surname="Lukin" fullname="Mikhail D. Lukin"/>
</reference> <date month="October" year="2013"/>
</front>
<reference anchor="Ben-Or" target="https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/10605 <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1038/nphys3000"/>
90.1060662"> </reference>
<front>
<title>Fast Quantum Byzantine Agreement</title>
<author initials="M." surname="Ben-Or">
<organization></organization>
</author>
<author initials="A." surname="Hassidim">
<organization></organization>
</author>
<date year="2005" />
</front>
<seriesInfo name="SOTC," value="ACM" />
</reference>
<reference anchor="Taherkhani" target="https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/10 <reference anchor="Ben-Or" target="https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/1060590.
60590.1060662"> 1060662">
<front> <front>
<title>Resource-Aware System Architecture Model for Implementation of Q <title>Fast quantum byzantine agreement</title>
uantum Aided Byzantine Agreement on Quantum Repeater Networks</title> <author initials="M." surname="Ben-Or" fullname="Michael Ben-Or">
<author initials="M.A." surname="Taherkhani"> <organization/>
<organization></organization> </author>
</author> <author initials="A." surname="Hassidim" fullname="Avinatan Hassidim">
<author initials="K." surname="Navi"> <organization/>
<organization></organization> </author>
</author> <date month="May" year="2005"/>
<author initials="R." surname="Van Meter"> </front>
<organization></organization> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1145/1060590.1060662"/>
</author> <refcontent>STOC '05, Association for Computing Machinery</refcontent>
<date year="2017" /> </reference>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="Quantum Science and Technology," value="IOP" />
</reference>
<reference anchor="Renner" target="https://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/05122 <reference anchor="Taherkhani" target="https://arxiv.org/abs/1701.04588">
58.pdf"> <front>
<front> <title>Resource-aware System Architecture Model for Implementation of
<title>Security of Quantum Key Distribution</title> Quantum aided Byzantine Agreement on Quantum Repeater Networks</title>
<author initials="R." surname="Renner"> <author initials="M. A." surname="Taherkhani" fullname="M. Amin Taherk
<organization></organization> hani">
</author> <organization/>
<date year="2006" /> </author>
</front> <author initials="K." surname="Navi" fullname="Keivan Navi">
</reference> <organization/>
</author>
<author initials="R." surname="Van Meter" fullname="Rodney Van Meter">
<organization/>
</author>
<date month="January" year="2017"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1088/2058-9565/aa9bb1"/>
</reference>
<!-- <reference anchor="Renner" target="https://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/0512258.
<reference anchor="Unruh" target="https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/ pdf">
10.1007/978-3-662-44381-1_1.pdf"> <front>
<front> <title>Security of Quantum Key Distribution</title>
<title>Quantum Position Verification in the Random Oracle Model</title> <author initials="R." surname="Renner">
<author initials="D." surname="Unruh"> <organization/>
<organization></organization> </author>
</author> <date month="September" year="2005"/>
<date year="2014" /> </front>
</front> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.48550/arXiv.quant-ph/0512258"/>
</reference> </reference>
-->
<reference anchor="Fitzsimons" target="https://www.nature.com/articles/s 41534-017-0025-3.pdf"> <reference anchor="Fitzsimons" target="https://www.nature.com/articles/s 41534-017-0025-3.pdf">
<front> <front>
<title>Private Quantum Computation: An Introduction to Blind Quantum Co <title>Private quantum computation: an introduction to blind quantum
mputing and Related Protocols</title> computing and related protocols</title>
<author initials="J. F." surname="Fitzsimons"> <author initials="J. F." surname="Fitzsimons">
<organization></organization> <organization/>
</author> </author>
<date year="2017"/> <date month="June" year="2017"/>
</front> </front>
</reference> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1038/s41534-017-0025-3"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="BB84" target="http://researcher.watson.ibm.com/resea
rcher/files/us-bennetc/BB84highest.pdf">
<front>
<title>Quantum Cryptography: Public Key Distribution and Coin Tossing</
title>
<author initials="C. H." surname="Bennett">
<organization></organization>
</author>
<author initials="G." surname="Brassard">
<organization></organization>
</author>
<date year="1984"/>
</front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="Preskill" target="https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.00862">
<front>
<title>Quantum Computing in the NISQ Era and Beyond</title>
<author initials="J." surname="Preskill">
<organization></organization>
</author>
<date year="2018"/>
</front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="Zhang2018" target="https://doi.org/10.1364/OE.26.0242
60">
<front>
<title>Large Scale Quantum Key Distribution: Challenges and Solutions</
title>
<author initials="Q." surname="Zhang">
<organization></organization>
</author>
<author initials="F." surname="Hu">
<organization></organization>
</author>
<author initials="Y." surname="Chen">
<organization></organization>
</author>
<author initials="C." surname="Peng">
<organization></organization>
</author>
<author initials="J." surname="Pan">
<organization></organization>
</author>
<date year="2018"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="Optical Express," value="OSA" />
</reference>
<reference anchor="Treiber" target="https://doi.org/10.1364/OE.26.024260 <reference anchor="BB84" target="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2014.05.025
"> ">
<front> <front>
<title>A Fully Automated Entanglement-based Quantum Cyptography System <title>Quantum cryptography: Public key distribution and coin tossing<
for Telecom Fiber Networks</title> /title>
<author initials="A." surname="Treiber"> <author initials="C. H." surname="Bennett" fullname="Charles H. Bennet
<organization></organization> t">
</author> <organization/>
<author initials="et" surname="al."> </author>
<organization></organization> <author initials="G." surname="Brassard" fullname="Gilles Brassard">
</author> <organization/>
<date year="2009"/> </author>
</front> <date month="December" year="2014"/>
<seriesInfo name="New Journal of Physics," value="11, 045013" /> </front>
</reference> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1016/j.tcs.2014.05.025"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="ETSI-QKD-Interfaces" target="https://www.etsi.org/de <reference anchor="Preskill" target="https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.00862">
liver/etsi_gr/QKD/001_099/003/02.01.01_60/gr_QKD003v020101p.pdf"> <front>
<front> <title>Quantum Computing in the NISQ era and beyond</title>
<title>Quantum Key Distribution (QKD); Components and Internal Interfac <author initials="J." surname="Preskill">
es </title> <organization/>
<author initials="" surname="ETSI GR QKD 003 V2.1.1"> </author>
<organization></organization> <date month="July" year="2018"/>
</author> </front>
<date year="2018" /> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.22331/q-2018-08-06-79"/>
</front> </reference>
</reference>
<reference anchor="ETSI-QKD-UseCases" target="https://www.etsi.org/deliv <reference anchor="Zhang2018" target="https://doi.org/10.1364/OE.26.024260
er/etsi_gs/qkd/001_099/002/01.01.01_60/gs_qkd002v010101p.pdf"> ">
<front> <front>
<title>Quantum Key Distribution (QKD); Use Cases </title> <title>Large scale quantum key distribution: challenges and solutions
<author initials="" surname="ETSI GR QKD 002 V1.1.1"> [Invited]</title>
<organization></organization> <author initials="Q." surname="Zhang" fullname="Qiang Zhang"/>
</author> <author initials="F." surname="Xu" fullname="Feihu Xu"/>
<date year="2010" /> <author initials="Y-A." surname="Chen" fullname="Yu-Ao Chen"/>
</front> <author initials="C-Z." surname="Peng" fullname="Cheng-Zhi Peng"/>
</reference> <author initials="J-W." surname="Pan" fullname="Jian-Wei Pan"/>
<date month="August" year="2018"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1364/OE.26.024260"/>
<refcontent>Optics Express</refcontent>
</reference>
<reference anchor="Zhang2019" target="https://arxiv.org/abs/1912.09642"> <reference anchor="Treiber" target="https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.
<front> 1088/1367-2630/11/4/045013">
<title>Integrated Relay Server for Measurement-Device-Independent Quant <front>
um Key Distribution</title> <title>A fully automated entanglement-based quantum cryptography syste
<author initials="P." surname="Zhang"> m for telecom fiber networks</title>
<organization></organization> <author initials="A." surname="Treiber" fullname="Alexander Treiber"/>
</author> <author initials="A." surname="Poppe" fullname="Andreas Poppe"/>
<author initials="et" surname="al."> <author initials="M." surname="Hentschel" fullname="Michael Hentschel"/
<organization></organization> >
</author> <author initials="D." surname="Ferrini" fullname="Daniele Ferrini"/>
<date year="2019"/> <author initials="T." surname="Lorünser" fullname="Thomas Lorünser"/>
</front> <author initials="E." surname="Querasser" fullname="Edwin Querasser"/>
</reference> <author initials="T." surname="Matyus" fullname="Thomas Matyus"/>
<author initials="H." surname="Hübel" fullname="Hannes Hübel"/>
<author initials="A." surname="Zeilinger" fullname="Anton Zeilinger"/>
<date month="April" year="2009"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1088/1367-2630/11/4/045013"/>
<refcontent>New Journal of Physics 11 045013</refcontent>
</reference>
<reference anchor="Qin" target="https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/Workshops-a <reference anchor="ETSI-QKD-Interfaces" target="https://www.etsi.org/deliv
nd-Seminars/2019060507/Documents/Hao_Qin_Presentation.pdf"> er/etsi_gr/QKD/001_099/003/02.01.01_60/gr_QKD003v020101p.pdf">
<front> <front>
<title>Towards Large-Scale Quantum Key Distribution Network and Its App <title>Quantum Key Distribution (QKD); Components and Internal Interfa
lications</title> ces </title>
<author initials="H." surname="Qin"> <author>
<organization></organization> <organization>ETSI</organization>
</author> </author>
<date year="2019"/> <date month="March" year="2018"/>
</front> </front>
</reference> <seriesInfo name="ETSI GR" value="QKD 003"/>
<refcontent>V2.1.1</refcontent>
</reference>
<reference anchor="Cacciapuoti2020" target="https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/ <reference anchor="ETSI-QKD-UseCases" target="https://www.etsi.org/deliver
document/8910635"> /etsi_gs/qkd/001_099/002/01.01.01_60/gs_qkd002v010101p.pdf">
<front> <front>
<title>Quantum Internet: Networking Challenges in Distributed Quantum C <title>Quantum Key Distribution; Use Cases</title>
omputing</title> <author>
<author initials="A.S." surname="Cacciapuoti"> <organization>ETSI</organization>
<organization></organization> </author>
</author> <date month="June" year="2010"/>
<author initials="et" surname="al."> </front>
<organization></organization> <seriesInfo name="ETSI GS" value="QKD 002"/>
</author> <refcontent>V1.1.1</refcontent>
<date year="2020"/> </reference>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="IEEE Network," value="January 2020" />
</reference>
<reference anchor="Cacciapuoti2019" target="https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.0 <reference anchor="Zheng2019" target="https://arxiv.org/abs/1912.09642">
6197"> <front>
<front> <title>Heterogeneously integrated, superconducting silicon-photonic
<title>When Entanglement meets Classical Communications: Quantum Telepo platform for measurement-device-independent quantum key
rtation for the Quantum Internet</title> distribution</title>
<author initials="A.S." surname="Cacciapuoti"> <author initials="X." surname="Zheng" fullname="Xiaodong Zheng"/>
<organization></organization> <author initials="P." surname="Zhang" fullname="Peiyu Zhang"/>
</author> <author initials="R." surname="Ge" fullname="Renyou Ge"/>
<author initials="et" surname="al."> <author initials="L." surname="Lu" fullname="Liangliang Lu"/>
<organization></organization> <author initials="G." surname="He" fullname="Guanglong He"/>
</author> <author initials="Q." surname="Chen" fullname="Qi Chen"/>
<date year="2019"/> <author initials="F." surname="Qu" fullname="Fangchao Qu"/>
</front> <author initials="L." surname="Zhang" fullname="Labao Zhang"/>
</reference> <author initials="X." surname="Cai" fullname="Xinlun Cai"/>
<author initials="Y." surname="Lu" fullname="Yanqing Lu"/>
<author initials="S." surname="Zhu" fullname="Shining Zhu"/>
<author initials="P." surname="Wu" fullname="Peiheng Wu"/>
<author initials="X-S." surname="Ma" fullname="Xiao-Song Ma"/>
<date month="December" year="2019"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1117/1.AP.3.5.055002"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="Caleffi" target="https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/32331 <reference anchor="Qin" target="https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/Workshops-and
88.3233224"> -Seminars/2019060507/Documents/Hao_Qin_Presentation.pdf">
<front> <front>
<title>Quantum internet: From Communication to Distributed Computing!</ <title>Towards large-scale quantum key distribution network and its ap
title> plications</title>
<author initials="M." surname="Caleffi"> <author initials="H." surname="Qin">
<organization></organization> <organization/>
</author> </author>
<author initials="et" surname="al."> <date month="June" year="2019"/>
<organization></organization> </front>
</author> </reference>
<date year="2018"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="NANOCOM," value="ACM" />
</reference>
<reference anchor="Chitambar" target="https://link.springer.com/article <reference anchor="Cacciapuoti2020" target="https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/do
/10.1007/s00220-014-1953-9"> cument/8910635">
<front> <front>
<title>Everything You Always Wanted to Know About LOCC (But Were Afraid <title>Quantum Internet: Networking Challenges in Distributed Quantum
to Ask)</title> Computing</title>
<author initials="E." surname="Chitambar"> <author initials="A. S." surname="Cacciapuoti" fullname="Angela Sara C
<organization></organization> acciapuoti"/>
</author> <author initials="M." surname="Caleffi" fullname="Marcello Caleffi"/>
<author initials="et" surname="al."> <author initials="F." surname="Tafuri" fullname="Francesco Tafuri"/>
<organization></organization> <author initials="F. S." surname="Cataliotti" fullname="Francesco Saver
</author> io Cataliotti"/>
<date year="2014"/> <author initials="S." surname="Gherardini" fullname="Stefano Gherardini
</front> "/>
<seriesInfo name="Communications in Mathematical Physics," value="Spri <author initials="G." surname="Bianchi" fullname="Giuseppe Bianchi"/>
nger" /> <date month="February" year="2020"/>
</reference> </front>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1109/MNET.001.1900092"/>
<refcontent>IEEE Network</refcontent>
</reference>
<reference anchor="Grumbling" target="https://doi.org/10.17226/25196"> <reference anchor="Cacciapuoti2019" target="https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.061
<front> 97">
<title>Quantum Computing: Progress and Prospects</title> <front>
<author initials="E." surname="Grumbling"> <title>When Entanglement meets Classical Communications: Quantum Telep
<organization></organization> ortation for the Quantum Internet (Invited Paper)</title>
</author> <author initials="A. S." surname="Cacciapuoti" fullname="Angela Sara C
<author initials="M." surname="Horowitz"> acciapuoti"/>
<organization></organization> <author initials="M." surname="Caleffi" fullname="Marcello Caleffi"/>
</author> <author initials="R." surname="Van Meter" fullname="Rodney Van Meter"/>
<date year="2019"/> <author initials="L." surname="Hanzo" fullname="Lajos Hanzo"/>
</front> <date month="July" year="2019"/>
<seriesInfo name="National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Med </front>
icine," value="The National Academies Press" /> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.48550/arXiv.1907.06197"/>
</reference> </reference>
<reference anchor="Proctor" target="https://journals.aps.org/prl/abstrac <reference anchor="Caleffi" target="https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3233188
t/10.1103/PhysRevLett.120.080501"> .3233224">
<front> <front>
<title>Multiparameter Estimation in Networked Quantum Sensors</title> <title>Quantum internet: from communication to distributed computing!</
<author initials="T.J." surname="Proctor"> title>
<organization></organization> <author initials="M." surname="Caleffi"/>
</author> <author initials="A. S." surname="Cacciapuoti" fullname="Angela Sara Ca
<author initials="et" surname="al."> cciapuoti"/>
<organization></organization> <author initials="G." surname="Bianchi" fullname="Giuseppe Bianchi"/>
</author> <date month="September" year="2018"/>
<date year="2018"/> </front>
</front> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1145/3233188.3233224"/>
<seriesInfo name="Physical Review Letters," value="American Physical S <refcontent>NANOCOM '18, Association for Computing Machinery</refcontent>
ociety" /> </reference>
</reference>
<reference anchor="Childs" target="https://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/011104 <reference anchor="Chitambar" target="https://link.springer.com/article/10
6.pdf"> .1007/s00220-014-1953-9">
<front> <front>
<title>Secure Assisted Quantum Computation</title> <title>Everything You Always Wanted to Know About LOCC (But Were Afrai
<author initials="A. M." surname="Childs"> d to Ask)</title>
<organization></organization> <author initials="E." surname="Chitambar" fullname="Eric Chitambar"/>
</author> <author initials="D." surname="Leung" fullname="Debbie Leung"/>
<date year="2005"/> <author initials="L." surname="Mančinska" fullname="Laura Mančinska"/>
</front> <author initials="M." surname="Ozols" fullname="Maris Ozols"/>
</reference> <author initials="A." surname="Winter" fullname="Andreas Winter"/>
<date month="March" year="2014"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1007/s00220-014-1953-9"/>
<refcontent>Communications in Mathematical Physics, Springer</refcontent>
</reference>
<reference anchor="Broadbent" target="https://arxiv.org/pdf/0807.4154.pd <reference anchor="Grumbling" target="https://doi.org/10.17226/25196">
f"> <front>
<front> <title>Quantum Computing: Progress and Prospects</title>
<title>Universal Blind Quantum Computation</title> <author initials="E." surname="Grumbling" fullname="Emily Grumbling" r
<author initials="A." surname="Broadbent"> ole="editor"/>
<organization></organization> <author initials="M." surname="Horowitz" fullname="Mark Horowitz" role
</author> ="editor"/>
<author initials="et" surname="al."> <date year="2019"/>
<organization></organization> </front>
</author> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17226/25196"/>
<date year="2009"/> <refcontent>National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Th
</front> e National Academies Press</refcontent>
<seriesInfo name="50th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Scienc </reference>
e," value="IEEE" />
</reference>
<reference anchor="Zhang2009" target="https://www.sciencedirect.com/scie <reference anchor="Proctor" target="https://journals.aps.org/prl/abstract/
nce/article/abs/pii/S002002551930458X"> 10.1103/PhysRevLett.120.080501">
<front> <front>
<title>A Hybrid Universal Blind Quantum Computation</title> <title>Multiparameter Estimation in Networked Quantum Sensors</title>
<author initials="X." surname="Zhang"> <author initials="T. J." surname="Proctor" fullname="Timothy J. Procto
<organization></organization> r"/>
</author> <author initials="P. A." surname="Knott" fullname="Paul A. Knott"/>
<author initials="et" surname="al."> <author initials="J. A." surname="Dunningham" fullname="Jacob A. Dunnin
<organization></organization> gham"/>
</author> <date month="February" year="2018"/>
<date year="2009"/> </front>
</front> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1103/PhysRevLett.120.080501"/>
<seriesInfo name="Information Sciences," value="Elsevier" /> <refcontent>Physical Review Letters, American Physical Society</refconten
</reference> t>
</reference>
<reference anchor="Huang" target="https://arxiv.org/pdf/1707.00400.pdf"> <reference anchor="Childs" target="https://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/0111046.
<front> pdf">
<title>Experimental Blind Quantum Computing for a Classical Client</tit <front>
le> <title>Secure assisted quantum computation</title>
<author initials="H." surname="Huang"> <author initials="A. M." surname="Childs" fullname="Andrew M. Childs">
<organization></organization> <organization/>
</author> </author>
<author initials="et" surname="al."> <date month="July" year="2005"/>
<organization></organization> </front>
</author> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.26421/QIC5.6"/>
<date year="2017"/> </reference>
</front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="Jozsa2005" target="https://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/05 <reference anchor="Broadbent" target="https://arxiv.org/pdf/0807.4154.pdf"
08124.pdf"> >
<front> <front>
<title>An Introduction to Measurement based Quantum Computation</title> <title>Universal Blind Quantum Computation</title>
<author initials="R." surname="Josza"> <author initials="A." surname="Broadbent" fullname="Anne Broadbent"/>
<organization></organization> <author initials="J." surname="Fitzsimons" fullname="Joseph Fitzsimons"
</author> />
<author initials="et" surname="al."> <author initials="E." surname="Kashefi" fullname="Elham Kashefi"/>
<organization></organization> <date month="December" year="2009"/>
</author> </front>
<date year="2005"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1109/FOCS.2009.36"/>
</front> <refcontent>50th Annual IEEE Symposium on
</reference> Foundations of Computer Science, IEEE</refcontent>
</reference>
<reference anchor="Cao" target="https://doi.org/10.1147/JRD.2018.2888987 <reference anchor="Zhang2009" target="https://www.sciencedirect.com/scienc
"> e/article/abs/pii/S002002551930458X">
<front> <front>
<title>Potential of Quantum Computing for Drug Discovery</title> <title>A hybrid universal blind quantum computation</title>
<author initials="Y." surname="Cao"> <author initials="X." surname="Zhang" fullname="Xiaoqian Zhang"/>
<organization></organization> <author initials="W." surname="Luo" fullname="Weiqi Luo"/>
</author> <author initials="G." surname="Zeng" fullname="Guoqiang Zeng"/>
<author initials="et" surname="al."> <author initials="J." surname="Weng" fullname="Jian Weng"/>
<organization></organization> <author initials="Y." surname="Yang" fullname="Yaxi Yang"/>
</author> <author initials="M." surname="Chen" fullname="Minrong Chen"/>
<date year="2018"/> <author initials="X." surname="Tan" fullname="Xiaoqing Tan"/>
</front> <date month="September" year="2019"/>
<seriesInfo name="Journal of Research and Development," value="IBM" /> </front>
</reference> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1016/j.ins.2019.05.057"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="Crepeau" target="https://doi.org/10.1145/509907.51000 <reference anchor="Huang" target="https://arxiv.org/pdf/1707.00400.pdf">
0"> <front>
<front> <title>Experimental Blind Quantum Computing for a Classical Client</ti
<title>Secure Multi-party Quantum Computation</title> tle>
<author initials="C." surname="Crepeau"> <author initials="H-L." surname="Huang"/>
<organization></organization> <author initials="Q." surname="Zhao"/>
</author> <author initials="X." surname="Ma"/>
<author initials="et" surname="al."> <author initials="C." surname="Liu"/>
<organization></organization> <author initials="Z-E." surname="Su"/>
</author> <author initials="X-L." surname="Wang"/>
<date year="2002"/> <author initials="L." surname="Li"/>
</front> <author initials="N-L." surname="Liu"/>
<seriesInfo name="34th Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC)," value <author initials="B. C." surname="Sanders"/>
="ACM" /> <author initials="C-Y." surname="Lu"/>
</reference> <author initials="J-W." surname="Pan"/>
<date month="July" year="2017"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.48550/arXiv.1707.00400"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="Lipinska" target="https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.10 <reference anchor="Jozsa2005" target="https://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/05081
1.032332"> 24.pdf">
<front> <front>
<title>Verifiable Hybrid Secret Sharing with Few Qubits</title> <title>An introduction to measurement based quantum computation</title
<author initials="V." surname="Lipinska"> >
<organization></organization> <author initials="R." surname="Josza"/>
</author> <date month="September" year="2005"/>
<author initials="et" surname="al."> </front>
<organization></organization> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.48550/arXiv.quant-ph/0508124"/>
</author> </reference>
<date year="2020"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="Physical Review A," value="American Physical Society
" />
</reference>
<reference anchor="Wang" target="https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.71.044 <reference anchor="Cao" target="https://doi.org/10.1147/JRD.2018.2888987">
305"> <front>
<front> <title>Potential of quantum computing for drug discovery</title>
<title>Quantum Secure Direct Communication with High-Dimension Quantum <author initials="Y." surname="Cao" fullname="Yuan Cao"/>
Superdense Coding</title> <author initials="J." surname="Romero" fullname="Jacquiline Romero"/>
<author initials="C." surname="Wang"> <author initials="A." surname="Aspuru-Guzik" fullname="Alan Aspuru-Guzi
<organization></organization> k"/>
</author> <date month="December" year="2018"/>
<author initials="et" surname="al."> </front>
<organization></organization> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1147/JRD.2018.2888987"/>
</author> <refcontent>IBM Journal of Research and Development</refcontent>
<date year="2005"/> </reference>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="Physical Review A," value="American Physical Society
" />
</reference>
<reference anchor="Cuomo" target="http://dx.doi.org/10.1049/iet-qtc.2020 <reference anchor="Crepeau" target="https://doi.org/10.1145/509907.510000"
.0002"> >
<front> <front>
<title>Towards a Distributed Quantum Computing Ecosystem</title> <title>Secure multi-party quantum computation</title>
<author initials="D." surname="Cuomo"> <author initials="C." surname="Crépeau" fullname="Claude Crépeau"/>
<organization></organization> <author initials="D." surname="Gottesman" fullname="Daniel Gottesman"/>
</author> <author initials="A." surname="Smith" fullname="Adam Smith"/>
<author initials="et" surname="al."> <date month="May" year="2002"/>
<organization></organization> </front>
</author> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1145/509907.510000"/>
<date year="2020"/> <refcontent>STOC '02, Association for Computing Machinery</refcontent>
</front> </reference>
<seriesInfo name="Quantum Communication," value="IET" />
</reference>
<reference anchor="VanMeter2006-01" target="https://doi.org/10.1109/ISCA <reference anchor="Lipinska" target="https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.101.
.2006.19"> 032332">
<front> <front>
<title>Distributed Arithmetic on a Quantum Multicomputer</title> <title>Verifiable hybrid secret sharing with few qubits</title>
<author initials="R." surname="Van Meter"> <author initials="V." surname="Lipinska" fullname="Victoria Lipinska"/
<organization></organization> >
</author> <author initials="G." surname="Murta" fullname="Gláucia Murta"/>
<author initials="et" surname="al."> <author initials="J." surname="Ribeiro" fullname="Jérémy Ribeiro"/>
<organization></organization> <author initials="S." surname="Wehner" fullname="Stephanie Wehner"/>
</author> <date month="March" year="2020"/>
<date year="2006"/> </front>
</front> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1103/PhysRevA.101.032332"/>
<seriesInfo name="33rd International Symposium on Computer Architectur <refcontent>Physical Review A, American Physical Society</refcontent>
e (ISCA)" value="IEEE" /> </reference>
</reference>
<reference anchor="VanMeter2006-02" target="https://arxiv.org/pdf/quant- <reference anchor="Cuomo" target="http://dx.doi.org/10.1049/iet-qtc.2020.0
ph/0607065.pdf"> 002">
<front> <front>
<title>Architecture of a Quantum Multicompuer Optimized for Shor's Fact <title>Towards a distributed quantum computing ecosystem</title>
oring Algorithm</title> <author initials="D." surname="Cuomo" fullname="Daniele Cuomo"/>
<author initials="R." surname="Van Meter"> <author initials="M." surname="Caleffi" fullname="Marcello Caleffi"/>
<organization></organization> <author initials="A. S." surname="Cacciapuoti" fullname="Angela Sara Ca
</author> cciapuoti"/>
<author initials="et" surname="al."> <date month="July" year="2020"/>
<organization></organization> </front>
</author> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1049/iet-qtc.2020.0002"/>
<date year="2006"/> <refcontent>IET Quantum Communication</refcontent>
</front> </reference>
</reference>
<reference anchor="Elkouss" target="https://arxiv.org/pdf/1007.1616.pdf" <reference anchor="VanMeter2006-01" target="https://doi.org/10.1109/ISCA.2
> 006.19">
<front> <front>
<title>Information Reconciliation for Quantum Key Distribution</title> <title>Distributed Arithmetic on a Quantum Multicomputer</title>
<author initials="D." surname="Elkouss"> <author initials="R." surname="Van Meter" fullname="Rodney Van Meter"/
<organization></organization> >
</author> <author initials="K." surname="Nemoto" fullname="Kae Nemoto"/>
<author initials="et" surname="al."> <author initials="W. J." surname="Munro" fullname="William John Munro"/
<organization></organization> >
</author> <author initials="K. M." surname="Itoh" fullname="Kohei M. Itoh"/>
<date year="2011"/> <date month="June" year="2006"/>
</front> </front>
</reference> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1109/ISCA.2006.19"/>
<refcontent>33rd International Symposium on Computer Architecture
(ISCA '06)</refcontent>
</reference>
<reference anchor="Tang" target="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-019-5029 <reference anchor="VanMeter2006-02" target="https://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph
0-1"> /0607065.pdf">
<front> <front>
<title>High-speed and Large-scale Privacy Amplification Scheme for Quan <title>Architecture of a Quantum Multicomputer Optimized for Shor's Fa
tum Key Distribution</title> ctoring Algorithm</title>
<author initials="B." surname="Tang"> <author initials="R. D." surname="Van Meter" fullname="Rodney Doyle Va
<organization></organization> n Meter III"/>
</author> <date month="February" year="2008"/>
<author initials="et" surname="al."> </front>
<organization></organization> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.48550/arXiv.quant-ph/0607065"/>
</author> </reference>
<date year="2019"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="Scientific Reports," value="Nature Research" />
</reference>
<reference anchor="Denchev" target="https://doi.org/10.1145/1412700.1412 <reference anchor="Elkouss" target="https://arxiv.org/pdf/1007.1616.pdf">
718"> <front>
<front> <title>Information Reconciliation for Quantum Key Distribution</title>
<title>Distributed Quantum Computing: A New Frontier in Distributed Sys <author initials="D." surname="Elkouss" fullname="David Elkouss"/>
tems or Science Fiction?</title> <author initials="J." surname="Martinez-Mateo" fullname="Jesus Martinez
<author initials="V.S." surname="Denchev"> -Mateo"/>
<organization></organization> <author initials="V." surname="Martin" fullname="Vicente Martin"/>
</author> <date month="April" year="2011"/>
<author initials="et" surname="al."> </front>
<organization></organization> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.48550/arXiv.1007.1616"/>
</author> </reference>
<date year="2018"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="SIGACT News" value="ACM" />
</reference>
<reference anchor="Pal" target="https://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/0306195.p <reference anchor="Tang" target="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-019-50290-
df"> 1">
<front> <front>
<title>Multi-partite Quantum Entanglement versus Randomization: Fair an <title>High-speed and Large-scale Privacy Amplification Scheme for Qua
d Unbiased Leader Election in Networks</title> ntum Key Distribution</title>
<author initials="S.P." surname="Pal"> <author initials="B-Y." surname="Tang" fullname="Bang-Ying Tang"/>
<organization></organization> <author initials="B." surname="Liu" fullname="Bo Liu"/>
</author> <author initials="Y-P." surname="Zhai" fullname="Yong-Ping Zhai"/>
<author initials="et" surname="al."> <author initials="C-Q." surname="Wu" fullname="Chun-Qing Wu"/>
<organization></organization> <author initials="W-R." surname="Yu" fullname="Wan-Rong Yu"/>
</author> <date month="October" year="2019"/>
<date year="2003"/> </front>
</front> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1038/s41598-019-50290-1"/>
</reference> <refcontent>Scientific Reports</refcontent>
</reference>
<reference anchor="Guo" target="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41567-0 <reference anchor="Denchev" target="https://doi.org/10.1145/1412700.141271
19-0743-x"> 8">
<front> <front>
<title>Distributed Quantum Sensing in a Continuous-Variable Entangled N <title>Distributed quantum computing: a new frontier in distributed sy
etwork</title> stems or science fiction?</title>
<author initials="X." surname="Guo"> <author initials="V. S." surname="Denchev" fullname="Vasil S. Denchev"
<organization></organization> />
</author> <author initials="G." surname="Pandurangan" fullname="Gopal Pandurangan
<author initials="et" surname="al."> "/>
<organization></organization> <date month="September" year="2008"/>
</author> </front>
<date year="2020"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1145/1412700.1412718"/>
</front> <refcontent>ACM SIGACT News</refcontent>
<seriesInfo name="Nature Physics," value="Nature" />
</reference> </reference>
<reference anchor="Zhao2018" target="https://iopscience.iop.org/article/ <reference anchor="Pal" target="https://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/0306195.pdf
10.1088/1742-6596/1087/4/042028"> ">
<front> <front>
<title>Development of Quantum Key Distribution and Attacks against it</ <title>Multi-partite Quantum Entanglement versus Randomization: Fair
title> and Unbiased Leader Election in Networks</title>
<author initials="Y." surname="Zhao"> <author initials="S. P" surname="Pal" fullname="Sudebkumar Prasant Pal"
<organization></organization> />
</author> <author initials="S. K." surname="Singh" fullname="Sudhir Kumar Singh"/
<date year="2018"/> >
</front> <author initials="S." surname="Kumar" fullname="Somesh Kumar"/>
<seriesInfo name="Journal of Physics," value="J. Phys" /> <date month="June" year="2003"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.48550/arXiv.quant-ph/0306195"/>
</reference> </reference>
<reference anchor="Kiktenko" target="https://arxiv.org/pdf/1903.10237.p <reference anchor="Guo" target="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41567-019
df"> -0743-x">
<front> <front>
<title>Lightweight Authentication for Quantum Key Distribution</title> <title>Distributed quantum sensing in a continuous-variable entangled
<author initials="E.O." surname="Kiktenko"> network</title>
<organization></organization> <author initials="X." surname="Guo" fullname="Xueshi Guo"/>
</author> <author initials="C. R." surname="Breum" fullname="Casper R. Breum"/>
<author initials="et" surname="al."> <author initials="J." surname="Borregaard" fullname="Johannes Borregaar
<organization></organization> d"/>
</author> <author initials="S." surname="Izumi" fullname="Shuro Izumi"/>
<date year="2020"/> <author initials="M. V." surname="Larsen" fullname="Mikkel V. Larsen"/>
</front> <author initials="T." surname="Gehring" fullname="Tobias Gehring"/>
</reference> <author initials="M." surname="Christandl" fullname="Matthias Christand
l"/>
<author initials="J. S." surname="Neergaard-Nielsen" fullname="Jonas S.
Neergaard-Nielsen"/>
<author initials="U. L." surname="Andersen" fullname="Ulrik L. Andersen
"/>
<date month="December" year="20219"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1038/s41567-019-0743-x"/>
<refcontent>Nature Physics</refcontent>
</reference>
<reference anchor="Zhandry" target="http://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-176 <reference anchor="Zhao2018" target="https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10
59-4_14"> .1088/1742-6596/1087/4/042028">
<front> <front>
<title>Quantum Lightning Never Strikes the Same State Twice</title> <title>Development of Quantum Key Distribution and Attacks against It<
<author initials="M." surname="Zhandry"> /title>
<organization></organization> <author initials="Y." surname="Zhao" fullname="Yusheng Zhao">
</author> <organization/>
<date year="2019"/> </author>
</front> <date year="2018"/>
<seriesInfo name="38th Annual International Conference on the Theory a </front>
nd Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Darmstadt, Germany, May 19–23, 2019 <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1088/1742-6596/1087/4/042028"/>
, " value="Proceedings, Part III" /> <refcontent>Journal of Physics: Conference Series</refcontent>
</reference> </reference>
<!--<reference anchor="YudongCao" target="https://doi.org/10.1021/acs.ch <reference anchor="Kiktenko" target="https://arxiv.org/pdf/1903.10237.pdf"
emrev.8b00803"> >
<front> <front>
<title>Quantum Chemistry in the Age of Quantum Computing</title> <title>Lightweight authentication for quantum key distribution</title>
<author initials="Y." surname="Cao"> <author initials="E. O." surname="Kiktenko" fullname="E. O. Kiktenko"/
<organization></organization> >
</author> <author initials="A. O." surname="Malyshev" fullname="A. O. Malyshev"/>
<author initials="et" surname="al."> <author initials="M. A." surname="Gavreev" fullname="M. A. Gavreev"/>
<organization></organization> <author initials="A. A." surname="Bozhedarov" fullname="A. A. Bozhedaro
</author> v"/>
<date year="2019"/> <author initials="N. O." surname="Pozhar" fullname="N. O. Pozhar"/>
</front> <author initials="M. N" surname="Anufriev" fullname="M. N. Anufriev"/>
<seriesInfo name="Chemical Reviews," value="ACS Publications" /> <author initials="A. K." surname="Fedorov" fullname="A. K. Fedorov"/>
</reference> --> <date month="September" year="2020"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1109/TIT.2020.2989459"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="Hill" target="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-019-1248 <reference anchor="Zhandry" target="http://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-17659
6-x"> -4_14">
<front> <front>
<title>A Tool for Functional Brain Imaging with Lifespan Compliance</ti <title>Quantum Lightning Never Strikes the Same State Twice</title>
tle> <author initials="M." surname="Zhandry" fullname="Mark Zhandry"/>
<author initials="R.M." surname="Hill" /> <date month="April" year="2019"/>
<author initials="et" surname="al." /> </front>
<date year="2019" /> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1007/978-3-030-17659-4_14"/>
</front> <refcontent>Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2019</refcontent>
<seriesInfo name="Nature Communications" value="10, 4785(2019)" /> </reference>
</reference>
<reference anchor="Xu" target="https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.108 <reference anchor="Xu" target="https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/
8/1367-2630/12/11/113026"> 1367-2630/12/11/113026">
<front> <front>
<title>Experimental Demonstration of Phase-Remapping Attack in a Practi <title>Experimental demonstration of phase-remapping attack in a pract
cal Quantum Key Distribution System</title> ical quantum key distribution system</title>
<author initials="F." surname="Xu" /> <author initials="F." surname="Xu" fullname="Feihu Xu"/>
<author initials="et" surname="al." /> <author initials="B." surname="Qi" fullname="Bing Qi"/>
<date year="2010" /> <author initials="H-K." surname="Lo" fullname="Hoi-Kwong Lo"/>
</front> <date month="November" year="2010"/>
<seriesInfo name="New Journal of Physics," value="12 113026" /> </front>
</reference> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1088/1367-2630/12/11/113026"/>
<refcontent>New Journal of Physics 12 113026</refcontent>
</reference>
<reference anchor="Lo" target="https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.108.1 <reference anchor="Lo" target="https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.108.1305
30503"> 03">
<front> <front>
<title>Experimental Demonstration of Phase-Remapping Attack in a Practi <title>Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution</title>
cal Quantum Key Distribution System</title> <author initials="H-K." surname="Lo" fullname="Hoi-Kwong Lo"/>
<author initials="H.-K." surname="Lo" /> <author initials="M." surname="Curty" fullname="Marcos Curty"/>
<author initials="et" surname="al." /> <author initials="B." surname="Qi" fullname="Bing Qi"/>
<date year="2012" /> <date month="March" year="2012"/>
</front> </front>
<seriesInfo name="Physical Review Letters," value="American Physical Soci <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1103/PhysRevLett.108.130503"/>
ety" /> <refcontent>Physical Review Letters, American Physical Society</refconten
</reference> t>
</reference>
<reference anchor="Grosshans" target="https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLet <reference anchor="Grosshans" target="https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.
t.88.057902"> 88.057902">
<front> <front>
<title>Continuous Variable Quantum Cryptography Using Coherent States</ <title>Continuous Variable Quantum Cryptography Using Coherent States<
title> /title>
<author initials="F." surname="Grosshans" /> <author initials="F." surname="Grosshans" fullname="Frédéric Grosshans
<author initials="P." surname="Grangier" /> "/>
<date year="2002" /> <author initials="P." surname="Grangier" fullname="Philippe Grangier"/
</front> >
<seriesInfo name="Physical Review Letters," value="American Physical Soci <date month="January" year="2002"/>
ety" /> </front>
</reference> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1103/PhysRevLett.88.057902"/>
<refcontent>Physical Review Letters, American Physical Society</refconten
t>
</reference>
<reference anchor="Gottesman1999" target="https://doi.org/10.1038/46503" <reference anchor="Gottesman1999" target="https://doi.org/10.1038/46503">
> <front>
<front> <title>Demonstrating the viability of universal quantum computation us
<title>Demonstrating the Viability of Universal Quantum Computation usi ing teleportation and single-qubit operations</title>
ng Teleportation and Single-Qubit Operations</title> <author initials="D." surname="Gottesman" fullname="Daniel Gottesman">
<author initials="D." surname="Gottesman"> <organization/>
<organization></organization> </author>
</author> <author initials="I." surname="Chuang" fullname="Isaac L. Chuang">
<author initials="I." surname="Chuang"> <organization/>
<organization></organization> </author>
</author> <date month="November" year="1999"/>
<date year="1999"/> </front>
</front> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1038/46503"/>
<seriesInfo name="Nature" value="402, 390–393" /> <refcontent>Nature 402, 390-393</refcontent>
</reference> </reference>
<reference anchor="Eisert" target="https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.101. <reference anchor="Eisert" target="https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.62.052
032332"> 317">
<front> <front>
<title>Optimal Local Implementation of Nonlocal Quantum Gates</title> <title>Optimal local implementation of nonlocal quantum gates</title>
<author initials="J." surname="Eisert"> <author initials="J." surname="Eisert"/>
<organization></organization> <author initials="K." surname="Jacobs"/>
</author> <author initials="P." surname="Papadopoulos"/>
<author initials="et" surname="al."> <author initials="M. B." surname="Plenio"/>
<organization></organization> <date month="October" year="2000"/>
</author> </front>
<date year="2000"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1103/PhysRevA.62.052317"/>
</front> <refcontent>Physical Review A, American Physical Society</refcontent>
<seriesInfo name="Physical Review A," value="American Physical Society </reference>
" />
</reference>
<reference anchor="NISTSP800-207" target="https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST. <reference anchor="NISTSP800-207" target="https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.
SP.800-207"> 800-207">
<front> <front>
<title>NIST, Zero Trust Architecture</title> <title>Zero Trust Architecture</title>
<author initials="S. J." surname="Rose"> <author initials="S." surname="Rose" fullname="Scott Rose"/>
<organization></organization> <author initials="O." surname="Borchert" fullname="Oliver Borchert"/>
</author> <author initials="S." surname="Mitchell" fullname="Stu Mitchell"/>
<author initials="O." surname="Borchert"> <author initials="S." surname="Connelly" fullname="Sean Connelly"/>
<organization></organization> <date month="August" year="2020"/>
</author> </front>
<author initials="S." surname="Mitchell"> <seriesInfo name="NIST SP" value="800-207"/>
<organization></organization> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.6028/NIST.SP.800-207"/>
</author> </reference>
<author initials="S." surname="Connelly">
<organization></organization>
</author>
<date year="2020"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="Special Publication (NIST SP) - 800-207," value="Nat
ional Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)" />
</reference>
<reference anchor="Zhao2008" target="https://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/Ph <reference anchor="Zhao2008" target="https://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/Phys
ysRevA.78.042333"> RevA.78.042333">
<front> <front>
<title>Experimental Demonstration of Time-Shift Attack against Practica <title>Quantum hacking: Experimental demonstration of time-shift attac
l Quantum Key Distribution Systems</title> k against practical quantum-key-distribution systems</title>
<author initials="Y." surname="Zhao"> <author initials="Y." surname="Zhao">
<organization></organization> </author>
</author> <author initials="C-H." surname="Fred Fung">
<author initials="C.-H." surname="Fung"> </author>
<organization></organization> <author initials="B." surname="Qi">
</author> </author>
<author initials="B." surname="Qi"> <author initials="C." surname="Chen">
<organization></organization> </author>
</author> <author initials="H-K." surname="Lo">
<author initials="C." surname="Chen"> </author>
<organization></organization> <date month="October" year="2008"/>
</author> </front>
<author initials="H.K." surname="Lo"> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1103/PhysRevA.78.042333"/>
<organization></organization> <refcontent>Physical Review A, American Physical Society</refcontent>
</author> </reference>
<date year="2008"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="Physical Review A," value="American Physical Society
" />
</reference>
<reference anchor="NSA" target="https://www.nsa.gov/Cybersecurity/Post-Quan <reference anchor="NSA" target="https://www.nsa.gov/Cybersecurity/Post-Qua
tum-Cybersecurity-Resources/"> ntum-Cybersecurity-Resources/">
<front> <front>
<title>Post-Quantum Cybersecurity Resources</title> <title>Post-Quantum Cybersecurity Resources</title>
<author initials="" surname="National Security Agency" /> <author>
<date year=""/> <organization>National Security Agency (NSA)</organization>
</front> </author>
<!--<seriesInfo name="National Security Agency" value=" (NSA)" /> - </front>
->
</reference> </reference>
<reference anchor="NCSC" target="https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/whitepaper/quan <reference anchor="NCSC" target="https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/whitepaper/quantu
tum-security-technologies"> m-security-technologies">
<front> <front>
<title>Quantum Security Technologies</title> <title>Quantum security technologies</title>
<author> <organization></organization> </author> <author>
<date year="2020"/> <organization>National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC)</organization>
</front> </author>
<seriesInfo name="White Paper," value="National Cyber Security Centre <date month="March" year="2020"/>
(NCSC)" /> </front>
</reference> <refcontent>Whitepaper</refcontent>
</reference>
<reference anchor="ANNSI" target="https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/en/publication <reference anchor="ANNSI" target="https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/en/publication/s
/should-quantum-key-distribution-be-used-for-secure-communications/"> hould-quantum-key-distribution-be-used-for-secure-communications/">
<front> <front>
<title>Should Quantum Key Distribution be Used for Secure Communication <title>Should Quantum Key Distribution be Used for Secure Communicatio
s?</title> ns?</title>
<author> <organization></organization> </author> <author>
<date year="2020"/> <organization>French Cybersecurity Agency (ANSSI)</organization>
</front> </author>
<seriesInfo name="Technical Position Paper," value="French National Cy <date month="May" year="2020"/>
bersecurity Agency (ANSSI)" /> </front>
</reference> </reference>
<reference anchor="Jozsa2000" target="https://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/P <reference anchor="Jozsa2000" target="https://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/Phy
hysRevLett.85.2010"> sRevLett.85.2010">
<front> <front>
<title>Quantum Clock Synchronization Based on Shared Prior Entanglement <title>Quantum Clock Synchronization Based on Shared Prior Entanglemen
</title> t</title>
<author initials="R." surname="Josza"> <author initials="R." surname="Josza">
<organization></organization> </author>
</author> <author initials="D. S." surname="Abrams">
<author initials="D.S." surname="Abrams"> </author>
<organization></organization> <author initials="J. P." surname="Dowling">
</author> </author>
<author initials="J.P." surname="Dowling"> <author initials="C. P." surname="Williams">
<organization></organization> </author>
</author> <date month="August" year="2000"/>
<author initials="C.P." surname="Williams"> </front>
<organization></organization> <refcontent>Physical Review Letters, American Physical Society</refconten
</author> t>
<date year="2000"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1103/PhysRevLett.85.2010"/>
</front> </reference>
<seriesInfo name="Physical Review Letter," value="American Physical So
ciety" />
</reference>
<reference anchor="Gottesman2012" target="https://link.aps.org/doi/10.11
03/PhysRevLett.109.070503">
<front>
<title>Longer-Baseline Telescopes Using Quantum Repeaters</title>
<author initials="D." surname="Gottesman">
<organization></organization>
</author>
<author initials="T." surname="Jennewein">
<organization></organization>
</author>
<author initials="S." surname="Croke">
<organization></organization>
</author>
<date year="2012"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="Physical Review Letter," value="American Physical So
ciety" />
</reference>
<reference anchor="BBM92" target="https://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/PhysR
evLett.68.557">
<front>
<title>Quantum Cryptography without Bell's Theorem</title>
<author initials="C.H." surname="Bennett">
<organization></organization>
</author>
<author initials="G." surname="Brassard">
<organization></organization>
</author>
<author initials="N.D." surname="Mermin">
<organization></organization>
</author>
<date year="1992"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="Physical Review Letter," value="American Physical So
ciety" />
</reference>
<reference anchor="E91" target="https://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/PhysRev <reference anchor="Gottesman2012" target="https://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103
Lett.67.661"> /PhysRevLett.109.070503">
<front> <front>
<title>Quantum Cryptography with Bell's Theorem</title> <title>Longer-Baseline Telescopes Using Quantum Repeaters</title>
<author initials="A.K." surname="Ekert"> <author initials="D." surname="Gottesman">
<organization></organization> </author>
</author> <author initials="T." surname="Jennewein">
<date year="1991"/> </author>
</front> <author initials="S." surname="Croke">
<seriesInfo name="Physical Review Letter," value="American Physical So </author>
ciety" /> <date month="August" year="2012"/>
</reference> </front>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1103/PhysRevLett.109.070503"/>
<refcontent>Physical Review Letters, American Physical Society</refconten
t>
</reference>
<reference anchor="ITUT" target="https://www.itu.int/md/T22-SG13-221125- <reference anchor="BBM92" target="https://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/PhysRev
TD-WP3-0158/en"> Lett.68.557">
<front> <front>
<title>Draft New Technical Report ITU-T TR.QN-UC:"Use Cases of Quantum <title>Quantum cryptography without Bell's theorem</title>
Networks beyond QKDN"</title> <author initials="C. H." surname="Bennett" fullname="Charles H. Bennet
<author initials="" surname="ITU-T SG13-TD158/WP3" /> t">
<date year="2022"/> </author>
</front> <author initials="G." surname="Brassard" fullname="Gilles Brassard">
<!--<seriesInfo name="National Security Agency" value=" (NSA)" /> - </author>
-> <author initials="N. D." surname="Mermin" fullname="N. David Mermin">
</reference> </author>
<date month="February" year="1992"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1103/PhysRevLett.68.557"/>
<refcontent>Physical Review Letters, American Physical Society</refconten
t>
</reference>
</references> <reference anchor="E91" target="https://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/PhysRevLe
tt.67.661">
<front>
<title>Quantum cryptography based on Bell's theorem</title>
<author initials="A. K." surname="Ekert">
<organization/>
</author>
<date month="August" year="1991"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1103/PhysRevLett.67.661"/>
<refcontent>Physical Review Letters, American Physical Society</refconten
t>
</reference>
</back> <reference anchor="ITUT" target="https://www.itu.int/md/T22-SG13-221125-TD
-WP3-0158/en">
<front>
<title>Draft new Technical Report ITU-T TR.QN-UC: 'Use cases of quantu
m networks beyond QKDN'</title>
<author>
<organization>ITU-T</organization>
</author>
<date year="2022" month="November"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="ITU-T" value="SG 13"/>
</reference>
</references>
<section anchor="Acknowledgments" numbered="false" toc="default">
<name>Acknowledgments</name>
<t>The authors want to thank <contact fullname="Michele Amoretti"/>,
<contact fullname="Mathias Van Den Bossche"/>, <contact fullname="Xavier
de Foy"/>, <contact fullname="Patrick Gelard"/>, <contact
fullname="Álvaro Gómez Iñesta"/>, <contact fullname="Mallory Knodel"/>,
<contact fullname="Wojciech Kozlowski"/>, <contact fullname="John Preuß
Mattsson"/>, <contact fullname="Rodney Van Meter"/>, <contact
fullname="Colin Perkins"/>, <contact fullname="Joey Salazar"/>, <contact
fullname="Joseph Touch"/>, <contact fullname="Brian Trammell"/>, and
the rest of the QIRG community as a whole for their very useful reviews
and comments on the document.</t>
</section>
</back>
</rfc> </rfc>
 End of changes. 120 change blocks. 
2328 lines changed or deleted 1890 lines changed or added

This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.48.